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Environmental organizations in the US engage in a variety of political practices in
order to meet their goals. Some organizations consciously pursue more contentious and
oppositional actions to match their goals, while others adopt methods that align with
conventional institutional practices to achieve their goals. This variation in the terrain of
the environmental movement is indicated by the behavior of the environmental
organizations that it largely comprises. The following is an investigation of the factors
that influence the political advocacy of a sample of environmental organizations and thus
the political praxis of the environmental moyement proper. By deriving concepts from a
2006 survey of a, sample of organizations in the US, three conceptual factors derived
from social movement theory are operationalized: ideological identities, strategies of
vpractice and resource structures. Using numerous independent variables, these concepts
are then tested in a logistic regression for the effect they have on the odds that the
organizations would oppose any ofthree historical events: the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and/or the Kyoto
protocols. A typology of environmental organizations is then constructed, tested,
substantiated, problematized, and interpreted. Subsequently, a comparative case analysis
of 11 distinct organizations was conducted that revealed the ways in which, the leadership
constructed meaning around their organizational practices and helped develop the
typology further, explaining some of its shortcomings and adding nuance to the model
that better explains contemporary environmental advocacy behavior in the US. Directions
for future research are assessed, and both the challenging and encouraging implications
that this research has for the environmental movement as a whole are extrapolated.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Memories may escape the action ofthe will, may sleep a long time, but when
stirred by the right influence, though that influence be light as a shadow, they
flash into full stature and #fe with everything in place.
John Muir (19J6)
The storied past out of which the modem environmental movement evolved is a
tale of dynamic interplay between various charismatic leaders, political and social
institutions, and a vast array of motivating ideas and techniques, and is punctuated by
several particularly salient specific events. The vast and sometimes contradictory
ideological, structural, and aesthetic differences within the modem environmental
movement are understandably noticeable when taking this rich tradition into account, and
help explain some of the fissures in its overall terrain. I seek to account for some of these
fractures in the environmental movement, and to investigate some of the consequences
that this may have for its modem manifestation as a whole, as well as the possibilities for
its future. As the mounting and increasingly undeniable consequences of anthropogenic
climate change gain ever more public credibility, our critical task for us as citizens is to
engineer our society in such a manner as to avert catastrophic results. A necessary first
step is thus investigating our capability as a species to effectively collectively address the
issue in a sufficiently timely manner. Environmental crises such as global warming are
complexly interwoven, and also intersect with many other social, religious, economic,
2and political issues, necessitating a nuanced and sophisticated public dialogue in order to
address these issues. Thus we begin our journey here, at the historical roots of the
environmental movement, and through the subsequent quantitative and qualitative
analyses arrive at a place of greater clarity about its current state and hopefully with
renewed vigor for constructing a public dialog capable of fostering environmentally
sound social policy and practices.
The environmental movement was born primarily out of a conflict in the late
1800s between people who relentlessly supported industrial expansion at any cost, and
others who lamented the loss of natural areas and instead sought to protect the
environment from destruction. However, due to the complicated social/industrial/political
implications that ensued, a multiplicity of views emerged on how best to address this
question. This led to important internal disputes among the early founders of the
movement over the degree to which society should change in order to address
environmental concerns. Early environmentalists such as John Muir, the founder of the
Sierra Club, passionately persuaded citizens and politicians alike that our natural areas
are sacred, and thus worthy of our protection. His pleas to honor the intrinsic, spiritual
value of nature, and to facilitate a project of social reconnection to natural areas were so
convincing that he was able to gain the ear of not only thousands of citizens, but also
such prominent figures as Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, and the first
Head of the U.S. Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot.
However, Pinchot was an outspoken advocate for the sustainable use of natural
resources for human beings, which ran directly contrary to the intrinsic value that Muir
3emphasized (Gottlieb, 2005). Although interested in the protection of natural areas,
Pinchot maintained that it was necessary to balance those concerns with those of humans,
which led him to support grazing in national forests. This issue ended the friendship
between the two, and set the stage for the development of two very different forms of
environmentalism. Although the overlap in their concerns is considerable, they
nonetheless divided over the degree to which they proposed change to society. Muir
advocated strongly restricting encroachment on nature by human industry and
development, while Pinchot viewed environmental sustainability as achievable in tandem
with economic development through effective scientific management. The tension
between these two worldviews peaked over the proposed construction of a dam in the
Hetch Hetchy area near Yosemite, California. Although this was ultimately a loss for
Muir when the dam was eventually constructed, it was also somewhat of a victory in that
in its wake, the Ministry ofthe Interior established the National Park Service in 1916
(Hjelmar, 1996).
Another crucial conflict of these worldviews came in the late 1960s I from within
the Sierra Club itself, when their first Executive Director, David Brower (1952), was
forced out of the organization, and then founded the Friends ofthe Earth (FoE). The issue
was nuclear power, and although it had not yet gained much political attention in the
public sphere yet, Brower was staunchly opposed. The Board of Directors had conceded
to locating the plant at Diablo Canyon, California, outside the already protected areas, but
Brower refused. In what some say was a power grab, Brower campaigned to have like-
I This historical account is severely abbreviated for introductory purposes. For a more extensive treatment
of this history, see among others, Gottlieb 2005, Hjelmar 1996, Dowie 1995.
4minded members elected to the Board, who then reversed the Board's decision on the
nuclear plant. This led to increasing tensions and open conflict, and ultimately it was put
to the membership, who narrowly decided to remove him from power in 1969 (Hjelmar,
1996). Thus when Brower and his supporters left to form the FoE, they reinscribed the
previous divide in the environmental movement between conceptions of how much
change is required to achieve environmental sustainability. For the preservationist Sierra
Club, it was enough to compromise that the plant not be located in a protected area. For
the conservationist FoE, the inevitable environmental implications of nuclear power were
absolutely unacceptable. Thus the character of the two Environmental Organizations
(EOs) was as different as their stances on how much change they prescribed for the
world, which helps explain this conflicting conservationist/preservationist undercurrent
that defined the infancy and later historical progression of the environmental movement.
This tension continued and even grew at times, for the environmental movement
could never quite reach equilibrium, but instead oscillated through points of
uncompromising activism and institutional engagement. The subsequent wave of 1970s
environmentalism was rooted in a worldview ofjustice; it presented a new range of
potential action repertoires and further diversified the character of the overall movement.
This can be found at both the micro and macro level, and is most clearly indicated by the
diverse behavior and character of the EOs of which it is comprised. The various
worldviews, beliefs, settings, constituencies, traditions, cultures, ways of understanding
and people involved, all define the contours of the movement itself. The EOs then work
within that template in order to affect change, and in so doing, help determine what the
5overall template looks like. Additionally, the EOs themselves have powerful impacts on
political outcomes. When in 1997 the entire U.S. Congress and 29 white house officials
were asked to identify the national nonprofit organizations that they believed to have the
most influence on federal policy, and environmental policy was the category (out of six,
including budget, family/welfare, foreign aid, health and housing/community
development) that received the greatest number of mentioned organizations (Rees, 1999).
Thus EOs are a salient unit of analysis for understanding the environmental movement as
a whole, and indeed are necessary to examine if we seek to understand the environmental
movement (Hjelmar, 1996).
In examination of the range ofEOs in the US it becomes immediately clear that
some of these EOs are actively engaged in contentious action with the goal of making
substantial changes to society, and are consciously engaged in a wider environmental
movement. Others have an environmental focus, but instead advocate only for enough
social change to address a single or small set if issues. This may because the EO is highly
specialized, or purely recreational in focus, or because it operates in relative isolation due
to some set of unique circumstances (such as being an appendage of a federal
bureaucracy, a historically/regionally specific organization, etc.). Taking into
consideration some of the rhetorical rifts that have emerged in the movement's history, it
becomes clear that the worldviews and belief systems are closely related to the degree of
change to society that they propose. For instance, the value of anti-nuclearism permeated
Brower's entire political philosophy, and through his charismatic influence, spawned an
entirely original EO that was far less compromising than the Sierra Club - the FoE. Thus
6the way the EO perceives itself is connected to how it behaves, and both are connected to
the overall degree of change for which they strive.
Another way to examine the spectrum of identities that EOs adopt can be seen as
distinguished by Hjelmar's categories of "movement identity" and "pressure group
identity" (1996). The former is an identity that is connected to a social movement that
challenges the fundamental political order, and is motivated by a staunch defense of the
issues they pursue. The latter is an identity that seeks to expand political connectedness
and cultivate conventional channels, but is not necessarily consciously connected to a
larger movement. The range of associations in between the two types of identity is vast,
and based on a number of factors including but not limited to the timing of the issue, the
political context, the general demeanor of society at large and the structure of the
organization, might at times lean toward a movement identity, at times toward a pressure
group identity and at times display characteristics of both.
These identities are also closely associated with specific repertoires of action that
Hjelmar separates into "practices ofproblematization" and "practices o.fpolitical
effectiveness, " (p. 3) respectively. The former set of practices are bottom-up, movement-
style tactics such as grassroots organizing, public demonstration/theater, and agitation,
while the latter are more focused on litigation, lobbying and other top-down political
approaches. Again it is in the ambiguities between the ends of the spectrum that the most
interesting relationships are revealed, suggesting a complex net of influences interacting
to determine the character of the EO. Also, EOs may be steered toward one set of
techniques or another based on their identity, but these restrictions may shift over time
7depending on the political opportunities presented. Some of those opportunities are
shaped by the identities of the EOs (as the strategic choices have implications on future
relations between EOs and, government, corporation and foundation agencies), however
many others (such as partisan control over Washington, state of the economy, time of
war, punctuating events such as 9/11) are outside the control of the EO, yet frame their
opportunities nonetheless. Disruptive strategies for instance, are not usually well-received
by observers in times when the public dialogue regularly invokes the pejorative tenn
"eco-terrorism." However the widespread receptiveness to climate issues evidenced by
the popularity of Al Gore's film "An Inconvenient Truth" and the current Democratic
majority in Washington, suggests a time of opportunity for environmental policy-making.
However, whether these indicators suggest that the time is right for conciliatory
"practices of political effectiveness" or agitating "practices of problematization" is up to
the interpretation of these factors by the EO. Some EOs would see that political context
as suggesting an opportunity to forge legal protections with a friendly administration.
Others might see it as an opportunity to participate in disruption without fear of quite as
serious repercussions as those faced during the post 9/11 wake. Thus tracking and
attempting to explain these strategic shifts in EO behavior is critical to addressing the
undergirding of the environmental movement as a whole.
Furthennore, internally the structural composure of the EO is associated with both
the ideological predisposition of, as well as the repertoires of action available to the EO,
which in tum is connected to the degree of change that they propose in the world. In a
phrase, money matters. EOs that receive a preponderance of their financial largesse from
8sizeable donations from a small number of foundations or other groups will tend to have
interests that reflect those of their donors. This may be due to a conservatizing effect
from the external funding source, or it may be due to the sources of funding that that EO
seeks (they may only request or accept funding from sources that are already aligned with
the interests of the EO) however the effect is the same: the source of funding makes a
difference in the way the EO positions itself. Contrarily, if the EO receives most of its
wealth from miniscule contributions from a vast membership (large number of donors),
the leadership will be inclined to passionately motivate their membership that they are
staying ideologically connected to the mission, but will have much more flexibility and
leeway in terms of tactical deployment of those resources. Additionally, some techniques
(such as lobbying) are more expensive than others, necessitating substantial war chests,
while others (such as demonstrations and email communication/information
dissemination) are not financially expensive at all, making them more available to those
EOs without substantial monetary backing. Furthermore, the larger organizations tend to
have more hierarchical leadership structures and professionalized staffs, which run the
risk of becoming autocratic and guided more by the career advancement ofleadership.
Thus the range of EO financial sources and amounts is connected to a corresponding
range of worldviews, repertoires of action and degrees of requested change to society.
However, although the EO's age is related to its size, the progression is not
deterministically conservatizing. Indeed, the Sierra Club for example began as an
organization poised toward advocacy in the political effectiveness vein, but then switched
to that of problematization after Hetch Hetchy in the early 1900s, then it abandoned both
9strategies until Brower reinvigorated problematization in the 1950s, and then switched
back to political effectiveness in 1969 with the removal of Brower and subsequent
inception of the FoE (Hjelmar, 1996). Additionally, Greenpeace has grown considerably
over the years, both in financial largesse as well as in organizational professionalization
and institutionalization, yet they have consistently engaged in problematizing political
advocacy in a largely contentious fashion. This suggests that the historical opportunities
and constraints that EOs face are also important factors underlying the landscape of the
environmental movement as a whole.
My task is to make sense of this population of organizations and what
differentiates them in terms of their approaches to advancing environmental agendas, so
that a more detailed portrait of the entire environmental movement landscape can be
constructed. What explains why some EOs behave more like grassroots social
movements, while others behave more like recreational groups or clubs, while still others
seem like large corporations? How do we explain the differences and interconnections
between the normative prescriptions coming from the EOs that consciously engage in
activities that they perceive to be contributing to an overarching social movement, and
those EOs that would not fit conventional notions of movement organization, yet due to
the nature of their work, are nonetheless a part of this larger historical trend of the
environmental movement? How do we account for the intersectional terrain in the middle
territory ofthese various spectra? Ultimately, how does this inform the body of
knowledge surrounding the environment, social movements, non-profit organizations and
the economy? Is it possible to build on these understandings and formulate a collective
10
environmental dialogue capable of addressing the complex and interconnected set of
environmental crises facing humanity?
This dissertation is thus a study of what differentiates this population ofEOs, and
what that tells us about the foundational substructure of the environmental movement
itself. I will distinguish these EOs by their different approaches to interacting with the
world, and then attempt to explain these differences by examining their worldviews,
specific practices, and internal structures. These concepts expand and develop throughout
the subsequent chapters in order to explicate the various exigencies of this complex set of
relationships between EOs, exploring both the predictable and the problematic. It is in
this crucible that the concepts presented above are tested under heat and pressure, and
what crystallizes in the later chapters is a synthesis of what is revealed by the two
methodological approaches I employed. Finally, I return to a discussion of the state of the
environmental movement as a whole.
In Chapter II, I develop my theoretical model and explore the social
movement and non-profit organizational literature that addresses these notions of
worldviews, specific practices, internal structures, and normative prescriptions. The
chapter begins with an analysis of social movement theory, and traces the early structural
explanations (that departed from the still earlier social psychological explanations) about
the material constraints that affect social movement behavior and/or that determine their
ultimate success or failure. It is here that the importance of resources is first explored, as
well as internal organizational structure and the timing of political opportunities. I then
move on to address the ideological social movement behavior explanations that evolve
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out of the so-called New Social Movement tradition, and that emphasize the importance
of identity, worldview and issue framing for social movement behavior. I then explore
syncretistic explanations for structural and ideological explanations in an attempt to
establish a theoretical lens that bridges both theoretical bases without subordinating either
to each other. I then move to the literature surrounding EOs more specifically, and
examine the way in which these scholars address the worldviews, specific practices,
internal structures, and normative prescriptions of various EOs. 2 Out of that I begin to
develop and operationalize my corresponding concepts of EO identities, strategies,
resources, and oppositionality of political advocacy.
In Chapter III, I devise a means to measure the interaction between EO identities,
strategies, resources, and oppositionality (what I refer to as the ISRO model). These
variables are comprised of complex and culturally contingent processes that cannot
accurately be simplistically described, so I employ a multi-method approach
incorporating a quantitative analysis of survey data and of existing statistics, as well as a
qualitative comparative case analysis of eleven EOs in the US. For the quantitative
section I detail my ISRO model, provide my variable construction rationale, and explain
my hypothesized relationships. I begin the chapter operationalizing the dependent
variable, which is a concept built from the above described idea of normative
prescription, and is essentially a measure of how against the grain an EO is willing and/or
able to go in order to pursue its environmental agenda. The oppositionality of the EO's
political advocacy can also be thought of as its radicalism, contentiousness, level of
2 By nonnative prescriptions I refer to the degree of social/industrial/legal change that the EO advocates for
society.
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opposition to mainstream political currents, or prescribed degree of change for society.
The interaction of these concepts represents the organization's oppositionality of political
advocacy, is indicated by the EO opposing the predominant Beltway stance on any of
three historical issues (NAFTA, the WTO and the Kyoto Protocols). Issues of free trade
and global warming tend to provide adequate variation among EOs along the lines of
oppositionality because the Beltway consensus on these issues, particularly at certain
historical junctures has been relatively edificial. Then, using statistical analyses of survey
data (correspondence and factor analyses of survey response items) 3 and existing data
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), I explain the construction of my dependent
variables for the various components of their identities, strategies, and resources for
which I have data. In the second section of the chapter I develop my comparative case
method, and outline my reasoning for selecting the eleven EOs that I interviewed for
comparative analysis. I then detail the procedures governing my interview and case
research process.
In Chapter IV, I develop the ISRO model more thoroughly by applying a logistic
regression to a dichotomous indicator for oppositionality of political advocacy, and
assessing the effects that various components of the EOs identities, strategies and
resources have on the likelihood that an EO will have publicly opposed any of the three
landmark political events. The identity of an EO is composed of its mission, and all of the
assumptions, values, and beliefs that are connected to the underlying worldview. Through
3 Building on the work of Brulle (2000) we developed categories for assessing the various components EO
identities and strategies, but the responses did not fit neatly into our categories, so rather than assigning
arbitrary labels, we instead performed the correspondence and factor analyses.
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a correspondence analysis of responses to survey data, three axes by which to measure
the identities of EOs emerge: the degree to which their mission overlaps with that of
other EOs (what I refer to as inclusivity), the degree to which the EO utilizes or avoids
discourse that invokes a bias of technological rationality (non-technical environmental
discourse), and the degree to which the EO utilizes discourse that invokes a bias towards
human needs over those of the natural world (exploitation discourse). Through a factor
analysis of another set of survey responses, three axes by which to measure the some of
the most commonly employed strategies employed by EOs emerge: litigation/lobbying,
education/outreach, and alliance participation. Through the analysis of secondary
statistics provided by the IRS and responses to one survey question concerning number of
volunteers utilized, five organizational resource variables emerged as noteworthy: the
amount of money they bring in (revenue), the amount they bring in relative to what they
spend (resource inefficiency), the amount they receive from public or government grants
(public/government support), the amount they pay their staff (compensation) and the
amount of unpaid help they enlist (volunteers). Each of these can be seen as existing on a
measurable continuum, and in this chapter I demonstrate how each variable intersects
with each other, and with the dependent variable, oppositionality. I then revisit my
hypothesized expectations with respect to my findings, and am able to establish a
typology for EOs that reasonably predicts oppositionality of political advocacy in most of
the instances in my sample. Limitations to the typology are included, and suggestions for
further research posed.
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In Chapter V, I destabilize some of the narrow operationalizations of the
typology, not to discount them, but to illustrate the intricacies that the contradictions
reveal. The rough indicators with which I began are functional and the analysis in the
previous chapter is fairly robust, however it is somehow incomplete, as the contradictions
suggest. I then examine more closely these contradictions to the typology in an effort to
reveal these subtler explanations. I then employ the comparative case method to examine
in greater detail the meanings that the spokespeople for various EOs attach to their
orientations, practices and material structures, in an effort to explain the breakdowns in
the typology and reconstruct a more nuanced model. In an effort to garner testimony from
a wide swath of EOs that is representative of the environmental movement as a whole, I
profile six organizations that participated in my survey an interview their leadership.
These EOs occupy disparate ends of the spectra: a trust fund for farmers (AFT), a large
educational ecology center (lAE), a local nature center (NFC), a group working on
environmental issues that affect women (*EI) 4 and a whistleblower defending
organization within the Forest Service (FSEEE). To gain greater comparative power I
then profile and interview five additional EOs that represent alternate types not captured
by the original sample: a medium-sized wildlife preservation organization (CBD), a
charismatic individual at the hub of many EOs, and who successfully defended a tree by
living in it for two years (JBH), a for-profit environmental consultant (*EC), a large,
established, very well-known EO that does not tend to engage in oppositional political
advocacy (*NEPS), and a large, established, very well-known EO that does tend to
4 Asterisk indicates pseudonym.
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engage in oppositional political advocacy (OP). I then connect the data to the conceptual
intersections between the four concepts tested by the ISRO model: identities, strategies,
resources, and oppositionality of political advocacy. I use the conclusions drawn there to
re-evaluate and refine the typology and establish the conditional contingencies that better
account for its contradictory explanatory power, thus more accurately explaining the
relationships between the variables. I also at this point begin the return to a discussion
about what all of this tells us about the state of the environmental movement as a whole,
and what prospects we as a society therefore have for collectively organizing an
environmentally sound economy.
Through this process I refine my characterizations as they develop, and come to
the conclusion that the environmental movement is even more diverse than I thought. But
despite these differences, a potential is emerging for a collective dialogue that will
hopefully coalesce sufficiently in time to address the global ecological crises that face our
species. After performing this analysis, despite potential pitfalls, it would seem that this is
indeed a distinct possibility. The final chapter will conclude with some suggestions of
how to possibly arrive at that successful dialogue.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL LENS
2.1 - Introduction
The environmental movement in the US evolved out of an interaction, both
rhetorical and physical, between multitudes of interested parties seeking redress on a vast
variety of environmental issues. Concerned individuals formed groups in order to devise
concerted efforts to promote their various causes. These efforts included preservation of
particular habitats; conservation of fishing and hunting access; eco-spiritual pursuits;
educational nature centers; government lobbies; and many more that defined their unique
identities at the intersections of various environmental concerns. This diverse set of
interests is not represented by a cogent ideology or congruent set of principles. Indeed,
very often the concerns of these groups conflict, or the ways they go about achieving
their goals conflict, or both. The groups are organized very differently as well, with some
having centralized, insular leadership, with others displaying more interactively
communicative and democratic decision-making capabilities. The types and amounts of
resources that they gamer differ as well, and all of these factors comprise extraordinarily
different organization profiles. Thus EOs in the US employ a range advocacy approaches,
some of which imply fundamental alterations to society, others that imply more
pragmatic, incremental reforms, with a range of degrees in between. Those EOs that
propose more extensive changes to society are positioned as participants in a wider social
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movement with broader social change as a major goal. On the other end of the spectrum
are clubs and recreation groups that ask for just enough change to protect their leisure
activities. In between are various EOs pursuing myriad goals and advocating varying
degrees of change to society. Taken as a set however, all of these EOs make up - in the
minds of scholars and the public - the multi-faceted American environmental movement.
Understanding the range of organizational propensities, and particularly, why some take
on a more movement-like approach to the advocacy work of their organization, is a
central goal of this dissertation.
Environmental organizations (EOs) in the United States are situated in a wide
range of political and organizational settings, and as such have a multitude of goals that
they have employed a wide variety of techniques to achieve. Many EOs organize around
one or more particular environmental issues, yet are not necessarily engaged in active
political practices per se. Rather than attempting to affect sweeping environmental
reforms in society at large, some of these EOs that are focused on education, aesthetics,
park/watershed/greenway restoration, wildlife management, trail-building or hunting and
fishing may have goals of environmental conservation and/or preservation, but might not
necessarily view themselves as part of a wider environmental movement. As such, these
EOs will tend to avoid political praxis that extends beyond their immediate mission.
Despite their possible lack of identification with the environmental movement proper,
their advocacy is nonetheless environmental, and thus these EOs may be referred to more
specifically as environmental advocacy organizations (EAOs). Some EOs however
explicitly define themselves as a part of a larger environmental movement by rhetorically
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connecting their mission with more all-encompassing struggles for environmental
sustainability and/or justice, and by engaging in political practices that seek to achieve
these more comprehensive goals. EOs such as Greenpeace, Earthfirst!, the Sierra Club
and the Forest Defenders tend to struggle for political gains such as tighter federal
environmental regulations, greater transparency and accountability for industrial
practices, government subsidization of greener technologies, and/or changes to the
overall productive process, whether that be revolutionary or reformist in nature. These
more politically engaged EOs, although a far from a unified body, are more overtly
connected to a larger environmental movement, and thus may be referred to as
environmental movement organizations (EMOs). 5 Together, this complex mix of EOs,
some movement-like in their orientation (EMOs) and some more like clubs or nonprofit
educational organizations, make up the larger historical movement of environmentalism.
This dissertation attempts to parse out some of these differences.
Social movement theorists have invested considerable time and effort attempting
to explain how the variation in the composures of advocacy organizations effect a wide
range of political and social outcomes. The body of literature that I consult initially
utilizes social movement theory to frame the debate between the two most readily
5 Accordingly, there is great variation in the degree to which EO advocacy behavior directly opposes
Beltway political currents. EAOs should be less likely to employ oppositional political advocacy than
EMOs, as they are not necessarily part of the environmental movement. However, there is also a great
range of what various EMO leaders and participants consider appropriate advocacy behavior. Some EMOs
will adopt strategies that could be seen as moderately oppositional, such as litigation and lobbying, letter-
writing campaigns or working towards electing environmentally friendly politicians. Other EMOs will
prefer more unequivocally oppositional political practices such as participating in demonstrations,
disrupting opponents' official meetings and/or direct actions. Still others will prefer outright revolutionarily
oppositional tactics such as property destruction, road removal and tree-spiking. Moreover, the degree to
which an EO acts in a directly oppositional manner may shift depending on changing political opportunity
cycles.
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accepted influences on organizational behavior: their ideology and their structure, and
then borrowing from some more contemporary theorists, advances a syncretistic
approach that does not subordinate structure to ideology, nor vice versa. Following that I
turn to environmental organization theory to provide a more detailed analysis of how
ideological and structural influences function at the organizational level. This body of
literature reveals that two major components of ideology become salient and deserving of
independent examination: the ideological stance of the organization, and the strategic
activities in which it endorses engaging to achieve its goals. Also emerging out of this
literature is a more specific treatment of structure, namely the types of resources that an
EO garners, and the way that it distributes authority. Finally, my analysis ofthis literature
uncovers another salient concept that differentiates Environmental Organizations (EOs)
in the US: the degree of fundamental change that they propose for society. Some EOs
engage in political advocacy that directly opposes the predominant position held by
national political leadership on any given environmental issue, while others do not. My
syncretistic theoretical approach explores the connections between these structural and
ideological components, and the types of political advocacy in which EOs engage.
2.2 - Social Movement Theory
Numerous theorists have contributed to the discussion of environmental
movement dynamics, and EOs, particularly EMOs. Major strands of theory emphasize
the importance of ideological and structural attributes of EOs. The debate tends to
revolve around subordination of one to the other: Are the structural components of a
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movement and movement organization the key to understanding their behavior or are
their ideological components more important to examine? Does an EO's ideological
stance flow from its particular material structure, or is its structure more determined by
that ideology? How do the two sociological dynamics interact to shape movements and
organizations? Although there is no consensus in the literature, it is nonetheless possible
to examine each of these divergent strains, and building on the work of some of those
who attempt to bridge the two camps (Brulle, 2000; Dreiling, 2001; Schulz, 1998;
Sewell, 1992; Tarrow, 1998) develop a syncretistic theoretical approach that will help
uncover the importance of including EO identity, strategy and resource availability in the
examination of EO political advocacy.
Social movement theory before the 1970s was dominated by social psychological
explanations of collective behavior. Primarily emphasizing the emotive 6 capacity of
group action, such theories focused on grievances and feelings about perceived
social/political/environmental problems to account for movement participation. The
argument concerning ideology advanced by some pluralist scholars such as Blumer
posited that social movement participation outside the system 7 was irrational and
spontaneous, as it was not the most effective means of realizing the interests of the group
(Knoke & Wisely, 1990). While accurately describing the affective means by which
people come to find themselves participants in social movements, purely ideological
explanations largely ignore the material constraints and possibilities that help shape the
6 Which for these scholars indicates that the behavior is thus irrational.
7 That is, action without the express purpose of utilizing mainstream channels of change, such as legal
protection.
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range of EO advocacy. Contrarily, structural explanations discuss resources, alliance
systems, cycles of contention, social and political networks, historical explanations,
political opportunities and any other material constraints to or conduits for collective
action, but they tend to downplay or completely ignore the importance of the emotive
capacities that affect the range of EO advocacy. Structural explanations can be overly
deterministic at times, appearing as "impervious to human agency, to exist apart from,
but nevertheless to determine the shape of, the strivings and motivated transactions that
constitute the experienced surface of social life" (Sewell, 1992, p. 2). Therefore, although
neither a purely ideological nor a purely structural theoretical explanation will be
sufficient, they both nonetheless deserve consideration. This allows for a more
syncretistic theoretical lens to be constructed, so that we might attain a greater
understanding of the function of strategy, identity, and resources in influencing EO
political advocacy.
2.2.1 - Structural Explanations
Most structural explanations in the literature revolve around measuring the
amounts and types of resources that an EO garners as indicators for the type of EO under
consideration, and as determinants for how that EO will tend to behave. Resource
Mobilization Theory (RMT) emerged within the context of Social Movement
Organization (SMO) literature proper, and became the foundation for those that would
apply this discussion to EOs. Initially, these theorists sought chiefly to explain how and
why some movements succeed and some fail. McCarthy and Zald (1979) painted the
SMO as in direct competition with other organizations for scarce resources, and that the
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success of the SMO depends on garnering those resources. Resource mobilization theory
(RMT) thus arose as a response to those who would argue that collective action
participation is irrational. The first to seize this notion were the rational choice theorists
(Oberschall, 1973; Olson, 1965; Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991), who argued that the
rational self interest of the actor was what determined behavior, so what the discipline
needed was more sophisticated understandings of what people were gaining from
participation. This perspective was useful in its ability to apply to myriad contexts, but
lost explanatory power as its application became delimited. Even advocates of RCT warn
against using it when the rules of the game are unclear or unpredictable (Geddes, 1995),
such as in high-risk situations (e.g., collective action). 8 It also is insufficient to describe
the entire structural framework of a mobilization as merely "exchanges limited by social
ties" (Macy, 1995), such as within dense interpersonal networks. This ignores the appeal
that the movement's key issues receive from the general public. RCT risks slipping into
tautology when it deduces the preferences of its actors from the very actions they are
meant to explain (Loveman, 1998).9 Indeed, RCT obstructs "understanding of human
actions in contexts where nonmaterial incentives, or 'meanings,' are central to individual
decisions" (p. 480). Although it helps us understand that collective action is not
necessarily irrational, that EOs are indeed agents capable of making choices, and begins
8 The argwnent then being that people often do not know the implications or consequences of their actions,
or are unsure what effect their actions will have, yet they choose to participate in the movement anyway.
9 As do Fireman and Gmnson (1979) (according to Loveman 1998). ReT explanations for the EOs would
arguably make this error as well, because they would obfuscate the understanding of what Weber referred
to as "value-rational behavior" (Ibid.) by deducing the preference (the ideological alignment with
environmental philosophy) from the action (actual participation in the movement).
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the very necessary discussion of how resource mobilization affects movement success, it
fails to comprehensively describe the range of EO advocacy behavior.
Other RMT theorists and organizational scholars (including McCarthy and Zald)
and political conflict model scholars (including Gamson, 1990; Oberschall, 1973;
Tarrow, 1989; Tilly, 1978) respond to the rational choice theorists with structural
explanations of political constraints and opportunities that are more helpful in
determining movement dynamics, as well as the timing ofa movement's emergence
and/or collapse. Looking more closely at the material structure of a movement, they
examine what specific resources (including volunteer participation, money, discursive
and/or political endorsement/support, etc.) a movement needs to meet some or all of its
goals. They also assess to what degree the movement is capable of garnering said
resources to determine the movement's degree of success. Downplaying the importance
of why and how people come to and continue to participate in social movements, and
completely ignoring identity (Cohen, 1985), these scholars explain social movement
emergence as a rational process, in which actors work to acquire resources for a group
(such as recognition, exposure, and entrance into the public dialogue). This perspective,
although limited in its ability to comprehend the meanings behind EO actions and
advocacy, is nonetheless useful in assessing the rational means by which EOs determine
what their advocacy will be, and how they will portray that to the public.
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Charles Tilly advanced a wholly structural explanation for movement
participation that, although it acknowledges that repertoires 10 define the method of
struggle (1978), has a "strategic-instrumental bias" that ignores identity and ideology
completely (Cohen, 1985). Richard Gale (1986) argues that the major deficiency in
traditional R!VIT is that it ignores the constraints that the movement and the state place on
each other. 11 Furthermore, the success of relatively powerless insurgents is due to a
combination of sustained outside support and the disunity of the political elites (Jenkins
& Perrow, 1977), again omitting any mention of ideological components. Perhaps most
importantly for my analysis, the RMT model ignores the way in which the agency of EOs
actively select political advocacy "that reflect[s], as well as reinforce[s], their values and
beliefs and their interpretations of social and political institutions" (Carmin & Balser,
2002, p. 366). These actively selected advocacies are associated with appropriate modes
of behavior, and as such tend to influence the identity of the EO. The strengths of the
RMT model in describing the structural possibilities for EO collective action are notable;
indeed these scholars describe the processes by which groups pool and direct movement
resources for social change (Jenkins, 1989), and the limitations that certain forms of
support place on the advocacy of an EO. However the importance of human agency is
drastically downplayed, which is why we must include identity as a component of EO
political praxis.
JO "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out (by groups) through a relatively
deliberate process of choice... They are learned cultural creations ... (that) emerge from struggle" (Tilly
1993: p. 257).
II Which he includes as a central component in his analysis, however he neglects to include an
ideological element.
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2.2.2 - Ideological Explanations
Although structural explanations (such as RMT, polity theory and organizational
theory) provide an excellent template for examining the capacities and opportunities of
EO advocacy behavior, they do not delve into the processes by which people make sense
of and act on particular events or concepts. Members ofEOs and EOs as complex
organizations are not simply reacting to structural stimuli, but instead are constantly
developing shared subjective interpretations of reality through a process of actively
engaged sense-making (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Klandermans, 1991; North, 1990;
Weick, 1995). EO leaders constantly wrestle with this reality, and assess how their
organization's actions and statements affect people's participation. The structural theories
cannot effectively address how EO participants and leadership attribute meaning to
particular events or values, which is why many social movement theorists have shifted
focus from a purely resource based theoretical approach toward one that includes
discourse and ideology. The ideology of an EO can be seen both in what it proclaims its
mission to be, as well as what it actually ends up doing. Both the identity that the
movement disseminates, as well as the strategies that it emphasizes as legitimate, have
their roots in the ideological basis and platform for the EO, and thus are crucial factors in
determining EO advocacy behavior.
Those in the New Social Movement (NSM) tradition most directly address this
ideological terrain of social movements (Castells, 1983; Melucci, 1985; Touraine, 1977).
The development of Frame Alignment Theory (FAT) by Snow, et al. (1986) shows how
the ideological leanings of individuals are directly linked to the discursive frame of a
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movement. McAdam (1999) develops this further to suggest that the "cognitive praxis"
that occurs between movement and participant is a key defining feature of a social
movement. These ideological positions in turn shape the organizational repertoires of
action that are available to EAOs (Carmin & Balser, 2002), and serve to "inspire and
legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (Benford &
Snow, 2000). Identity and strategy are thus theoretically linked through this ideological
component of EOs, as identity influences the channels and methods of resource
acquisition (Knoke, 1990), the tactics that the EO endorses (Benford & Hunt, 1992) as
well as the organizational structure that the EO employs (Voss, 1993). Therefore, to
better understand the importance of the influence that both identity and strategy have on
actual advocacy behavior, it is necessary to first explore in greater detail these more
ideologically-based theories, and ultimately the evolution ofNSM theory.
New Social Movement (NSM) theory departs from RMT and other previous
attempts to explain collective action by asserting that the world of 1970 and beyond was
markedly different than the previous era, 12 and that the movements that emerged, such as
the environmental movement, the feminist movement, and more recently the anti-
neoliberalism movement (or Global Economic Justice Movement, GEJM), had different
organizational structures and goals that demanded different theoretical explanations. Of
critical importance to these scholars 13 were the collective interests, identities, and
12 Because the movements that developed on the coattails of the civil rights movement were more
decentralized and identity-oriented than the previous labor and human rights movements.
13 Such as Melucci (1985) who argues that RMT does not explain symbolic struggle, avoids macro-level
discussion and reduces everything to a political dimension. Gramsci adds a cultural component to Lenin's
concept of class hegemony (Tarrow 1998). Goffinan begins the discussion of issue framing that becomes
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expressive goals of the participants, and how these affective constructions translated into
collective action and sustained participation in social movements. 14 Additionally, these
newer, more ideologically driven movements exist in sharp contrast to previous class
movements (unions, etc.), and as such stand as evidence (according to the NSM scholars)
that class ideology is not the one unifYing and totalizing element for collective action
(Larafia, 1994). Instead, they argue that social scientists must examine the identities and
unique lived experiences of the movement participants in order to explain their
involvement. Their goal is to devise how certain ideological standpoints end up
comprising the master frames for the movement.
One of these new social movement theories, framing theory, or frame alignment
theory (Snow & Benford, 1988), focuses on how and to what degree movements are able
to frame their issues in the public dialogue. The goal of the organization is to have those
master frames resonate with the rest of society (or at least among potential allies) and
thus gamer greater levels of support and participation. Such theories are arguably more
useful in describing the interaction between the movement's participants themselves,
rather than between participants and opponents (Haydu, 1999). 15 However, framing
theories also reveal the ideological background for the development of coalitions; the
central to Snow, et al. (1986). Klandermans (1984) develops the notion of "consensus mobilization" to re-
emphasize the collective affective elements of social movement participation that RMT underemphasizes.
Gamson (1990) adds the idea of "ideological packages" to explain how movements embed concrete
grievances about the world into emotion-laded ideological "packages" that can then be conveyed to a
populace.
14 It must be noted however, that in returning to an ideological explanation of social movement
participation, these scholars underemphasized the significance of history and the constraints and
opportunities that structure the possibilities for collective behavior.
15 However, they can also shed light on movements' opponents, particularly when examining counter-
frames and backlash movements, which directly address the framing of the original movement.
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very issues that the coalitions develop around define the movement. Framing theorists
would argue that this ideological component is an essential precursor to a successful
movement, rather than a mere function of the material makeup of the movement. 16 When
openings for the social movement emerge or expand as a result of early risers, 17 whether
or not those gaps are filled by new actors depends "in part on the ability [of the
movements] to frame the struggle in terms that resonate in the wider society" (Loveman,
1998, p. 517). Should these gaps be filled, local struggles can be linked to broader
"international issue networks" that may generate international publicity and funds (Snow,
1986, 1988).
Advancing further the importance of examining the ideological roots of EO
advocacy behavior, framing scholars argue that discursive frames in the environmental
movement create a "binding definition of the situation" (Brulle, 2000), and that this
definition is bound by "dynamic, interindividual, recursive processes that organize and
interpret discourse [... ] within concrete interactional contexts" (Snow, 2004, p. 402). The
way in which EOs frame environmental problems and how they portray their identity
significantly shape movement dynamics (Kaczmarski & Cooperrider, 1997). This
suggests that the identities and strategies attributable to EOs will at least partially
determine their political advocacy behavior.
16 Although Guigni (1998) argues that defining success inaccurately assumes all social movements are
homogenous, that there is no way to uniformly evaluate them and that such analysis overstates the intention
of the participants.
17 Social movements that notice earlier successes.
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2.2.3 - Syncretistic Explanations
In an attempt to bridge the gap between the structural and ideological
explanations, some theorists have made concessions towards one or the other school of
thought, and sought an interpretation that fuses the logic of both into syncretistic
structural/ideological explanations. In answer to the argument that RMT does not account
for timing of movement emergence, the imperative of looking to political opportunity
structures became more important to those (Diani, 1996) who wanted to know why
contentious politics seem to develop only in particular periods of history, and furthermore
why it is that in some instances they produce robust social movements, and in others
flicker out into sectarianism or repression. Beginning with the work of McAdam (1982)
and advanced by such scholars as Ayres (1997), political process models emphasize the
centrality of the political environment in determining movement advocacy behavior.
They attempt to take into consideration the structural constraints on and possibilities for
particular avenues of advocacy, but also include an ideological component. Dreiling and
Wolf (2001) suggest that two structural elements that are intertwined with ideological
predispositions include the importance of the relative stability of existing political
alignments and the presence or absence of potential allies and support groups. Political
alignments and allies can affect the identity and strategy of an EO because the movement
leadership may tailor the message in order to maintain the allies. Reflexively, the
message of the movement may have the ability to reach some allies while excluding
others.
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The major critique of political process models however, is that some tend to
relegate ideology to a micro-mobilization role, or to present it as purely a function of its
political milieu, rather than providing a syncretistic ideology/structure theoretical base.
Opportunities for political action emerge as changes in the elite structure or political
system occur, and if facilitating pre-existing structures 18 exist, the possibility for a social
movement does as well. The concepts of ideology, cultural understandings, identity, and
consciousness shifts can thus be relegated to a micro-mobilization process: they merely
allow potential participants to perceive the political opportunities, but have little or no
effect on movement outcomes.
Other theorists (Brockett, 1991; Diani, 1996; Dreiling, 2001; Eisinger, 1973;
Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1989) have more explicitly developed a syncretistic approach
that does not subordinate structure to ideology nor vice versa. Brockett (1991) for
example, examines the "configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group's political
environment that influences that group's assertion of its political claims" (p. 254).
However, unlike the political process model explanation offered by Ayres, which
relegates ideology to micro-mobilization, here we see an emphasis on the ideological
framing of the perception of opportunities as a significant, rather than subordinate, part of
the structure of opportunities. Additionally, an examination of Tarrow' s (1989) three
components of political opportunities 19 reveals the importance of ideological framing,
because the ideological conveyance itself may be capable of creating or expanding the
18 e.g., the political system, the elite structure, social networks, established institutions
19 Which are the openness of access to political institutions, stability of political alignments and availability
of allies and support groups (Melucci 1985).
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ally base. 20 Similarly, McAdam and Paulsen's (1993) investigation of the relationship
between social networks and activism concludes that one must take into account the
processes of identity amplification and identity/movement linkage in order for prior
network ties to predict participation. Melucci's (1985) "action systems" represent another
example of a structural explanation 21 that describes the struggle over symbolic space as
being a fundamental goal of a social movement thus re-emphasizing the importance of
including an ideological component in any structural analysis. These theorists take a step
further than the attempts made by earlier political process model scholars (to include
ideology in a structural explanation) by re-centering the importance of ideology in the
structural landscape without subordinating either to each other.
Building further on the work of McAdam (1982), Tilly (1978), and Tarrow (1989)
in their highlighting of the importance of political alignments and potential allies and
support groups, and also on the work of Curtis and Zurcher's (1973) notion of the multi-
organizational field, Klandermans (1990) develops a sophisticated analysis of alliance
systems. By examining a cross-section of social movements (Gould, 1991; Heirich, 1968;
Morris, 1984) he explicates the importance of both alliance and conflict systems, 22 and
argues that "support structures" 23 are crucial to social movement organization formation
and maintenance. The social networks that emerge in response to the countermovement
20 If one were to argue that this is a conveyance and not the ideology itselfI would reply that the very
definition of the magnitude of an ideology depends on its degree of dissemination. Thus the degree of
conveyance of an ideology is an indicator for the significance and impact of that ideology.
21 Although he uses a political opportunity structures model.
22 Conflict systems simply refer to that which confronts or opposes the movement's goals.
23 Which involve both material and ideological exchanges.
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have a substantial influence in connecting organizations to the "alliance and conflict
systems" (Dreiling, 2001). Social networks themselves can thus be viewed as political
opportunities, 24 and although are incapable of predictably determining collective action
outcomes (Gould, 1993), 25 are crucial determinants of advocacy behavior. Social
networks provide meaning and systems of interpretation for ecological action, keeping
the participants morally motivated and providing them a system of cultural rewards for
participation. This system incentivizes participation, and prevents people from retreating
into Habermasian "civil privatism" (1975). Social connections are the mechanism by
which individuals become actively engaged with the EO.
Social action theorists recognize the structural context, yet place ideology or
culture at the core oftheir analyses in order to combine ideological and structural
explanations. Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of capital as "all goods, material
and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being
sought after in a particular social formation" (in Mahar, et aI., 1990, p. 13) it becomes
possible to bridge the notions of ideology and structure without subordinating either.
Capital in this sense has no meaning outside a contested political ideology, 26 and no
value outside a particular struggle. If the goals of the social movement are to achieve
Bourdieu-ian capital, both the ideological definition and the structural landscape are
24 although they also could be considered resources or an indicator of a pervasive ideology.
25 although Gould concludes that social networks are nonetheless are critical for recruitment to high-risk
activism (1995).
26 due to its symbolic nature.
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crucial to determining the shape of the movement. Keeping ideology at the core of the
theory can check the determinism that tends to develop from overly focusing on structure.
Sewell also takes significant steps to include ideology at the core of his analysis,
without subordinating structure. He argues that structures are composed of two things:
resources, which are material, and schemas, which are virtual. "Structures [... ] are
constituted by mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower
and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action" (Sewell, 1992, p.
27). These mutually reinforcing schemas are a key concept in understanding how
structure and ideology are inseparable. He continues by arguing that "agents are
empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to
mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas" (p.
27). Here we see equal importance being given to the structural (resource) and
ideological (schemas) components to collective action.
Sydney Tarrow (1998) advances this notion further by explaining that contentious
politics are simultaneously a function of political opportunities and collective action
frames. Advocacy behavior emerges when the structures of opportunity broaden, but do
not fully develop into a social movement until the group "taps embedded social networks
and connective structures and produces collective action frames and supportive
identities" (Tarrow, 1998, p. 23). This fommlates structure and ideology (similar to
Sewell, 1992) into a cohesive theoretical interpretation; they are mutually dependent.
In Dreiling's (2001) extension of the previous work on alliance structures (Curtis
& Zurcher, 1973; Klandemmns, 1990; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989; Tilly, 1978) he
34
argues that those "forged in the battle over NAFTA created quasi-permanent mobilization
structures prepared for contention over neoliberal economic policy" (p. 4). Furthermore,
the ideological framing of the social movement and the structural basis upon which the
resonation of that framing is either supported or opposed has "profound effects on what
the character, extent, and potential for elaboration of a social movement concern" (p. 8).
It is thus crucial to examine the combination of the ideological explanations for the
framing of the mobilization as well as the structural explanations for the under-girding
that allows resonation (thereby expanding further alliance systems and political
opportunities).
The evolution of the paradigms of social movement theory suggests that those
theorists attempting to fuse ideological and structural concerns without subordinating
either to the other seem to provide the best theoretical lens for the examination of EO
political advocacy. Guarding against the tendency to fuse two theories together at the
expense of one, we can borrow from the rich tradition ofNSM theory and piece together
a picture that helps accurately explain the effects that resources, strategies, and identities
have on whether an EO behaves more like a social movement, or instead more like a club
or educational institution.
The leadership of US environmental organizations must carefully choose their
advocacy so as to maximize their efficacy. In order to do this, they must make some
tough decisions about how and where to exert their energy, given their constraints and
political opportunities. Some choose to act in direct contradiction to mainstream political
culture, some choose to operate within that culture, and most choose some combination
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ofthe two. The spectrum of political advocacy praxis surrounding oppositionality reveals
a great deal about the orientation of the organization. Understanding the ways in which
EOs make tough advocacy decisions, as well as the structural possibilities that frame
those decisions, is a critical task in EO scholarship, and investigating this terrain will
ideally provide a map to assess both the cleavages as well as the common ground shared
among EOs. This contribution to EO scholarship will ideally help to forge a common
vocabulary that will allow us to better understand the terrain of the overall environmental
movement.
2.3 - Environmental Organization Explanations
The literature surrounding the structural and ideological components that effect
political advocacy among EOs reveals that a syncretistic approach seems to best explain
the complex set of influences that result in particular forms of political advocacy. In order
to more accurately describe how these mutual influences operate, we tum now to a more
specific discussion of four general concepts, out of which several important variables will
later be operationalized. These concepts are identities, strategies (the two ideological
concepts), resources (the structural concept), and oppositionality of political advocacy
(the outcome concept). The identity of the EO represents the core purpose of the
organization; its grievances, values and overt predispositions. The strategies of the EO
include all of the practices advocated by the EO. Although similar to the EO's identity,
strategies are a distinct concept in that they relate to both symbolic meanings but also the
related actions. Put another way, the strategies they employ signify not just what causes
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the EO stands for, but also how they address approaching them. This is an additional
aspect of the ideological framing of an issue that includes prescriptive, normative
conclusions concerning appropriate action. The third concept, resources, refers to all of
the tangible or intangible assets that the EO garners in order to accomplish their goals,
and the channels from which they receive the resources. These include how much money
they bring in, where it comes from, how it is spent, and how many paid and voluntary
staff members they employ. All of these structural components are measurable assets to
which EOs have varying degrees of access. The concept of oppositionality of political
advocacy involves the degree to which an EO engages in public advocacy that opposes
the predominant trend in Washington DC. Arguing to end the industrial meat industry is
an environmental political advocacy position that is very oppositional, while supporting
so-called 'cap and trade' legislation 27 would be much less oppositional. Each ofthese
four concepts are thus below explored in greater depth.
2.4 - Identities
Far too frequently in social movement literature (Ayres, 1997; Diani, 1996;
Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1982), the identity of an organization is relegated to a
dependent variable. However, as identities also shape social action, they should in certain
circumstances more rightly be viewed as independent variables (Eyerman & Jameson,
2003). Viewing EOs as instrumental actors whose advocacy behavior can be explained
merely by the structural constraints and opportunities they are presented with tends to
27 Economic incentives to industrialists for reducing toxic outputs.
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ignore the meanings that participants attach to their actions. However, the identity of an
EO is not simply a reflection of its structural components, but rather the foundation for
the social change that they work toward. It is out ofthis identity that EOs "collectively
construct social action and interaction" (p. 369). This identity provides a system of
"cognitive filters" that lead to "interpretations and the construction of meaning that in
turn provide a foundation for action." (Carmin & Balser, 2002) Thus understanding how
meaning is constructed around an environmental issue is of crucial importance for
describing EO advocacy behavior.
The identity of an EO is the terrain over which it struggles for existence. Through
the formation of a collective identity, a marginalized group can establish public
legitimacy for their cause, thus enfranchising the group (Farred, 2000). In the early
1980s, many social movements found that by creating and cultivating an identity around
their shared grievance, they could posit to society at large that they had a right to exist.
This definition of and struggle for a legitimate and distinct identity represented an
entirely new way of "conducting oppositional politics for previously marginalized
constituencies" (p. 631) because rather than appealing to merely class oppression, these
identity movements could address specific issues (such as gender), whose forms of
oppression have more than economic causes and implications. Similarly, the
environmental movement also became more identity-focused. Beginning with the
Environmental Justice movement and various so-called NIMBY (not in my backyard)
organizations, this new form of mobilization took the identity of the localized people
suffering the ecological harm to be valid, and used that validity to establish a right for
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them to not suffer the discriminatory ecological harm. More modem EOs have adapted to
address a wide array of concerns, however the establishment of a legitimate identity
remains at the center. The modem EO may not necessarily associate itself with a
geographical or biological identity per se, however they nonetheless construct the
legitimacy of their identity through the use of rhetorical pleas to moral environmental
claims, which then become the identity of the EO. The participants then integrate these
systems of right and wrong into their own value systems, and in so doing, reflect the
identity of the EO as their own. Therefore, exploring how these systems of meaning
coalesce into an EO's identity is crucial to understanding how it can discern which forms
of political advocacy are appropriate.
As identity construction is a complex process involving a number of
considerations, each EO makes crucial choices that define how that process is to occur,
and these decisions determine how the EO's identity will unfold. Predictably, the
variation between these identities is vast, and the rifts are more significant than those
among their industrialist opponents (Wenner, 1990). These fissures are not arbitrary, but
rather historically rooted. The conservationists, led by Gifford Pinchot (Theodore
Roosevelt's Forest Service Director), embraced utilitarianism as a central value, and used
environmental protection to secure access to sustainable natural resources for human
consumption. The preservationists on the other hand, led by John Muir (founder of the
Sierra Club), departed from identifYing with the economic value of natural areas and
instead argued for protection of these areas for their own sake, so that future generations
could enjoy them just as they are today. This ideological split led to the formation of
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many EOs of two distinct types: utilitarian conservationists and intrinsic value
preservationists. Therefore, the identity of the EO should tell us a great deal about what
sort of political advocacy they are willing to or capable of engaging in. EOs that evolve
out of the conservationist identity would then likely participate in political advocacy that
aligns more closely with the concerns of industry, and avoid political advocacy that
erodes these connections. EOs that build from a preservationist tradition however would
be more predisposed toward political advocacy that opposes the interests of industry.
This rift becomes even clearer when comparing EOs with an identity that involves
consumption of nature by humans (such as protecting hunting and fishing access) versus
those that do not view nature as a commodity. Groups such as Ducks Unlimited may
share some common goals with the National Audubon Society, such as habitat
preservation, but their reasons for doing so are so different that their political advocacy
will not appear similar. The former will advocate consumption of animals and the latter
will emphasize nature's intrinsic value. Further down this scale still would be EOs such
as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA) who both oppose the use of animals by humans in any way. Again here we might
see some dovetailing over specific habitat preservation, however each EO's distinct
identity would foster distrust and possibly even resentment between them, thus counter-
positioning their distinct forms of political advocacy.
Thus EO leadership must constantly engage in identity management, so that the
ideology of the EO continues to be cohesive, and continues to steer the EO in the desired
direction. The grievances and discontent of the membership can be "defined, created and
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manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (McCarthy & Zald, 2003, p. 169)
For EOs then, framing of core issues is an ongoing, conscious, active and constructive
process by which common grievances are framed in terms of a single collective identity.
One aspect of an EO's identity that deserves closer examination is the idea of
inclusivity. Many EOs that push for deep, fundamental shifts in society instead of
incremental reform, do so because they are unsatisfied with the way in which status quo
environmental policy is usually devised with only one set of interests at heart: corporate
interests. These EOs articulate that the exclusion of alternate voices from environmental
policy-making is the reason the environmental movement as a whole has not been more
successful over the last 30 years. Instead of the exclusive identity of the production-
oriented, neo-liberal, growth economy bent of mainstream environmental discourse, these
other EOs seek a more inclusive identity that involves a greater diversity of voices about
environmental sustainability. For instance, a scientific research group on climate change
would probably not associate with the emotive values espoused by an animal rights
group, an ecofeminist organization or any EO based on religion or spirituality. However,
these latter groups would be very likely to employ at least some scientific language to
describe the scale of the problem. There is obvious tension between the two ends of the
identity spectrum, however the relationship is not mutually bidirectional. Some identities
are more inclusive than others, and the type of identity the EO embodies should have
substantial impacts on the type of political advocacy in which the EO engages. Indeed,
the concept of inclusivity is such a salient component of the identity of the EO that Faber
and McCarthy (2002) argue that inclusiveness in decision making is the first principle of
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ecological democracy, which they also argue is an essential component for environmental
sustainability. This move to include disparate ideological stances would be a distinct shift
for many EOs because there is a " ... tendency for many non-profit environmental
organizations to treat members as clients and consumers of services [... ] rather than as
participants in the evolution of ideas and projects that forge our common life" (Shutkin,
2000). Clearly some EOs prefer to maintain centralized control over the EO's ideological
rudder, while others seek to include more voices and allow the EO's identity to be more
organically determined, so that the participants of the movement "speak and act for
themselves" (Alston, 1991). The concept of inclusivity is thus a core component of an
EO's ecological identity.
Another aspect of an EO's identity that deserves closer examination is the degree
of technicality of their discourse. Some groups identifY with an ethos of technological
management ofenvironmental damage, focusing on the capacity of new technologies and
scientific management to mitigate environmental harm. Conversely, other groups identifY
with a more reverent, sometimes even spiritual approach that sees environmental harms
as connected to unrestrained technological development. Although the two identities are
not mutually exclusive, they nonetheless tend to exhibit tension, as they see the source of
the problem and its solution so differently. Furthermore, some scholars (Dowie, 1995;
Gottlieb, 1993) point to a near ubiquity of techno-instrumental rationality within
mainstream environmental advocacy circles, and attach to it at least partial responsibility
for the 40 year decline in influence of the environmental movement. Faber and McCarthy
(2001) argue that this shift is responsible for a marked decline in public interest and
42
support for national environmental legislation. The counter to this position is that
scientific rationality is the only way to prove to the established industries and state
entities that the ecological harms claimed are scientifically verifiable. The global
warming debate, for instance, gains credibility in the public mind as the scientific proof
of its anthropogenic influences reach consensus. These two contrary influences should
thus be attributable to very distinct types of EOs.
The third aspect of organizational identity that becomes readily apparent upon
examination of the literature is how the EO situates the human/ecological relationship.
Some EOs defend the rights of humans to consume, or exploit, the natural world, stress
exchange values of natural areas and argue that consumption of ecosystems is acceptable,
as long as it is managed sustainably. Other organizations instead emphasize the intrinsic
value of natural areas, and seek to protect them for the sake of the areas themselves. This
second perspective views ecological exploitation as a negative ecological ethos that is
more closely connected to the source of the problem than to its solution. These two
fundamental principles ideologically divide EOs in terms of their predispositions, even
though some EOs may prove to straddle the camps somewhat.
The identity that an EO internalizes and espouses is a significant component of
the EO's profile, in that it differentiates EOs by the general ideological stances that frame
their political advocacy. Environmental discourses are not "disembodied conceptual
systems" that are merely the product of structural influences, but rather are active
meaning-construction processes that are "embedded in human communities, that define
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and enable a series of practices" (Brulle, 1996). Understanding how these predispositions
translate into various forms of action is the next task of this analysis.
2.5 - Strategies
The identity of an EO is an important component of its ideology, as it
demonstrates how the organization frames the issues of importance. However, another
crucial component to examine is the specific actions that they prescribe as legitimate.
This portion of the EO identity is less about what they see as appropriate discourse, and
instead refers more directly to the actual tactics that they advocate employing. The tactics
and strategies that an EO advocates employing are quite varied across organizations, and
are a useful manner by which to distinguish two general types of EOs: "establishment
environmental groups" and "mass movement groups" (Wenner, 1990). Establishment
EOs, such as the National Wildlife Federation and the Sierra Club, obtain large war
chests from donors and utilize conciliatory relationships with governmental and corporate
entities in order to influence environmental policy. They do this by maintaining a level of
political advocacy that does not confrontationally oppose these allies, but rather cultivates
connections between the EO and the congressional representatives and administrative
officials that devise environmental policy. This keeps the flow of money coming into the
EO, and portrays the EO as reasonable enough for government agents and corporations to
effectively collaborate. However, EOs that are more actively positioned as manifestations
of the environmental movement will be comprised of people without such connections,
and without their wealth. These EOs rely upon their capability to motivate people to
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participate in the movement, rather than upon substantial financial assets and established
institutional connections. EOs such as Greenpeace and Earth Island Institute emphasize
direct action and symbolic acts targeted at specific corporations and political leaders in
order to spread awareness and galvanize public support. Even further down this scale
toward the social movement-style EOs are the radical EOs, such as Earthfirst!, who have
at times publicly advocated property destruction and sabotage of industrial logging. This
type of political advocacy is so effrontery that it nearly precludes the formation of
establishment alliances.
Smaller, more movement-style EOs are liberated to employ a wider variety of
strategies than the establishment EOs, as well. They focus on grassroots, direct action,
and generally seek to keep their local chapters independent of their national counterparts,
so that they can set their own "action agendas" (Wenner, 1990). The tactics employed by
an EO are closely connected to their political advocacy, and divide EOs between those
that defend the establishment, and those that represent the more confrontational social
movement. Larger, more establishment-connected EOs however are more constrained in
their tactical repertoires, because they are often leery of more militant action that might
alienate the EO from the decision-making process. Rather than holding fast to a staunch
and uncompromising stance, these EOs instead develop relationships with politicians and
corporations that are more ecologically oriented, and use negotiation and bargaining to
influence the legislature.
One strategic element whose frequency of employment differentiates EOs is the
degree to which the EO pursues direct legislative changes, such as through litigation or
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lobbying. Some EOs employ this strategy quite frequently, with hopes of changing the
system from within. Other EOs however instead prefer anti-systemic changes such as
mass mobilization and direct action, which tend to be associated with a rejection of
traditional political channels as legitimate. Some scholars (Berry, 1999) argue that
because professional lobbyists participate in the legislative process at a pro-active rather
than reactive level, they are able to more effectively shape the content of legislative
proposals, and as such have a much more substantive impact on environmental legislation
than those who rely on reactive mass mobilization. Others (Andrews, 2001) argue instead
that 28 it is only when direct negotiation with government agencies coincides with
disruptive protest that public policy is maximally influenced. It is clear then that the
degree to which an EO pursues litigation or lobbying differentiates EOs from each other.
The largest and most financially sound organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the
National Audubon Society for instance, routinely and extensively engage in lobbying
directly to influence legislation. (Mitchell et aI., 1992) Organizations without these
resources however must depend on alternate repertoires of action to achieve their goals.
Strategies designed to shape public opinion through education and awareness
campaigns are some of the most labor and capital intensive techniques available to EOs
(Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Predictably then, the amount of media exposure that an
advocacy organization can muster is proportional to the amount of financial resources
they bring in, and the amount of those resources that they devote to gaining coverage
(Barker-Plummer, 2002). Therefore the employment of education as a strategy by EOs is
28 Although was a study of small, local civil rights organizations.
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a useful concept by which to differentiate types of EOs, because those that cannot afford
the campaigns would be inclined to seek alternate methods.
Another strategy that EOs employ with varying degrees of frequency is the
formation of alliances with other EOs and public interest groups. Borrowing from ReT,
some scholars develop the idea of alliances as resources that rational political actors
attempt to maximize. They seek resources-providing alliances in an effort to improve
their leverage with competing movements and the established state system (Knoke,
1990). The number, strength, and centrality of these connections should be considered
resources, as they are structural components that the EO either has or does not have at
their disposal. However, the degree to which the EO advocates participating in the
alliances should more correctly be considered an ideological stance, as it differentiates
EOs by what they advocate participating in rather than how they actually behave. This
dimension of alliance formation demonstrates the ambiguous positioning of strategies on
the structure/ideology scale, however for the purposes of this analysis, I focus on the
latter interpretation of strategies as an ideological component in order to more acutely
spotlight the dimensions of EO political advocacy.
Additionally, the types of membership communication techniques that an EO
employs will also help define the EO. For example, "disembodied recruitment
technologies," such as email, postal mail, and media appeals, are often effective at
spreading awareness, but they are not as likely to reach people on a profound level. This
may be useful for large organization with centralized leadership guiding its advocacy
behavior, however smaller organizations with more organic and participatory leadership
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would not be served by such strategies. Instead, these more grassroots organizations
would employ organizational and outreach techniques that emphasize the strengths of
"social networks and face-to-face interaction [that] are more successful in recruiting
adherents into stronger membership roles" (Diani, 2004). The composition ofEOs thus
varies significantly based on the different strategies that they employ.
Identities and strategies have different affective impacts on individuals also
through the emotional response that they elicit. As such, the emotional response should
then also affect the EO's oppositionality of political advocacy, as well. Jasper (2003)
shows how emotional responses and pre-existing affects help explain why some people
choose to participate in oppositional political advocacy events, such as protests. Some
ideas and proposed actions will stir different emotional responses in various participants
and observers, and each of these affective responses should have a very direct influence
over the likelihood of participating in oppositional political advocacy. Therefore, the
choice of how to ideologically position an EO is a task that their leadership must embark
upon with great care and precision, so as to have their identities and strategies induce the
type of political advocacy that they want. If an EO has pragmatic goals, having an
uncompromising identity will not help them achieve these goals. Indeed, a radical, rigid
agenda (in both identity and strategy) would be more likely to result in more
confrontational political advocacy, rather than more pragmatic political advocacy,
because it would either be based on (pre-existing affects), or stir up emotional responses
ofjustice above all else. Political advocacy influenced by such an identity or set of
strategies would be much more confrontational. The emotional inspiration for
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participation and the emotional reaction to various identities and strategies thus
substantially affects the oppositionality of EO political advocacy.
The strategic choices that an EO makes help define what the movement is, but
must also be consistent with the movement's identity. If an EO embarks upon a strategic
choice outside the collectively prescribed acceptable forms of action, it risks losing
membership. "When an action or tactic is outside the experience of the people, the result
is confusion, fear and retreat" (Ailinsky, 2003, p. 225). EO leadership then must be
mindful with the strategic decisions that they make, as these will at least partially
determine the membership and mobilization of the EO. Additionally, strategies are the
public expression of the EO's function, and they carry with them specific implications.
For example, advocating property destruction, civil disobedience or other illegal behavior
may be an effective way for some EOs to accomplish their goals, however should they
choose to do so, will necessarily alienate themselves from other more established EOs,
governmental entities, and potentially sympathetic members of the public. Conversely, if
an EO collectively decides to embark upon a strategic choice of a more pragmatic nature,
they may be accused by their members as having sold-out the true concerns of the EO,
and thus the EO will hemorrhage from that end. In both scenarios, it is the tie between the
EO's identity and their strategic advocacy that comprises the ideology of the EO.
2.6 - Resources
The structural components of the EO are crucial determinants of their
composition, as they define not only what political advocacy they can afford to employ,
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but also to which interests the EO is beholden. In order to trace these structural
components it is crucial to examine both external and internal structural variables: both
the amounts and types of resources brought in, as well as how the authority structure of
the EO helps determine their appropriation.
Examining the sources of income of an EO is essential to describing their
makeup, because an EO will rarely bite the hand that feeds them. Once a financial source
has been secured, the EO will be unlikely to participate in political advocacy that
threatens the flow of money. Thus EOs are unlikely to advocate positions opposing those
of the agencies funding them (Clarke, 1996). Some suggest further that accepting
financial assistance from state bureaucracies encourages EOs to reduce the volatility of
the EO's advocacy, arguing that funding from government sources could threaten EOs 29
with a "loss of autonomy or independence, particularly [with] dilution of the sector's
advocacy role" (Salamon, 1995, p. 103). However, in a recent study by Chaves et al.
(2004) this finding was disconfimled. According to that study, "the relationship between
government funding and nonprofit political activity is either positive or null; government
funding does not suppress nonprofit political activity" (p. 292). Furthermore,
governments depend on nonprofits for expertise in policy formation. There may be some
resource dependence that discourages political advocacy, however this "dependence does
not necessarily produce political quiescence," but rather "civil society's capacity for
political action does not seem to be reduced by its increased reliance on government
funding" (p. 314). However, despite these findings, the preponderance of previous
29 although Salamon is referring to nonprofit organizations more generally
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findings to the contrary suggests that the conservatizing influence of government funding
on EO political advocacy is at the very least plausible, and thus warrants further
investigation.
This potentially contradictory set of findings notwithstanding, sources of income
should have substantial influence over the strategies that an EO will be able to afford, and
therefore also over EO advocacy behavior. Smaller, more movement-oriented EOs
"survive on a shoestring and avoid large infrastructures, buildings, professional staff in
Washington, and administrative expenses" (Wenner, 1990, p. xxi). Instead, they rely on
close connections between participants that motivate advocacy behavior at an emotive
level. Although not as well-funded, these EOs are particularly suited to acting
independently, as they would have fewer interests to which to feel beholden had they
accepted financial support. This insulates them against pressures that might conservatize
their tactical range, lending to a wider array of tactical choice available to them.
Contrarily, larger EOs generally have more financial resources, and are thus less
likely to engage in as large of a range of tactical choices. These larger organizations tend
to focus on a membership strategy ofcollecting dues, maintaining a centralized
leadership structure, and forming strong infrastructures within the policy elite of
Washington, rather than on maintaining strong face-to-face interactions among the
membership. Thus these "variations in membership strategy affect the degree of
formalization and participation, as well as the range of tactics groups use to pursue their
goals" (Foley & Edwards, 2002, p. 26-7). The financial structure of an EO determines its
leadership/membership relations, and in so doing affects the range of strategic and
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tactical choices available to them. EOs with smaller budgets will obviously not have
access to such mainstream political channels as lobbying and litigation, as those methods
require substantially more resources. However, as these smaller organizations derive their
strength more from participation than largesse, they will be less likely to be constrained
by career-seeking leadership and/or pressure applied by established donors from outside.
Although these less well-funded EOs may not have as much direct influence over public
officials and policy, they are more uninhibited about employing mass mobilization and/or
disruption as strategic choices (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Thus the resources the EO
garners have substantial implications for which strategies the EO is likely to employ.
This difference in funding sources translates into leadership structure as well - the
more an EO brings in, the more they can afford to pay their staff in salaries, and the more
professionalized the EO becomes. As an EO expands, it faces pressure to professionalize
from three directions: (l) the increasing complexity of bureaucratic environmental
legislation necessitates the expeltise of a specialized paid staff, (2) rapidly expanding
memberships require additional management, and (3) accountability becomes necessary
to maintain their nonprofit status (Mitchell et ai., 1992). These pressures induce a
professionalization of EO leadership, which then constrains political advocacy.
In addition to addressing the three pressures above, this trend toward
professionalization has multiple positive effects. A professionalized staff is capable of
focusing on organizing without needing to find sustenance elsewhere. With such a career
motivation, the professionalized environmentalists often make the EO their life's work,
and therefore are compelled to devote a large proportion of their creative energy toward
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the goals of the EO. Professionalized EOs tend to be more credible in the public eye, and
thus are more able to encourage enforcement of existing environmental legislation.
Indeed, professionalized advocacy organizations have been "critical in the
institutionalization of gains" (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999) made by other EOs and advocacy
groups.
However, professionalization is a double-edged sword. A paid staff is also prone
to self-serving career-seeking maneuvers that benefit the individual staff member at the
expense of the EO's mission. EOs with larger paid staffs run the risk of having the goals
ofthe EO displaced "in deference to exigencies of organizational maintenance and career
advancement" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p. 489). This move toward the business
model for EOs has increased their public legitimacy, however it has also decreased the
democratic participation by the membership through the "corporate-like organizational
models that inhibit genuine citizen involvement" (Faber & McCarthy, 2002, p. 406) 30
National-level EOs tend to exclude the voices oftheir adherents, such that members have
no direct influence over organizational decision-making, and instead, EO staffs are
responsible only to "self-perpetuating boards of directors" (Mitchell et aI., 1992). Larger,
more directive EOs have the capacity to demand acknowledgement by the establishment,
however their size and structure renders them somewhat unwieldy and undemocratic, and
sometimes even counterproductive. As career-seeking and organizational survival
become the primary goal of the leadership, these leaders run the risk of decreasing the
30 Although it should be noted that Staggenborg (1991) found that among a sample ofpro-choice
organizations, that the increase in professionalized staff actually resulted in an increase in member
participation. Future research should explore how the dissimilarities in the organizational strategies of the
two movements relate to the contradictory effects ofprofessionalization on member participation.
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EO's responsiveness to members and becoming instead more focused on political
compromise and maintaining budgets than on true environmental protection (Mitchell et
aI., 1992). This could potentially run directly contrary to the mission of the EO, and even
increase passivity on the part of the volunteers, resulting in more moderate, if not
conservative political advocacy behavior. As the EO becomes larger and the
organizational control shifts upward and becomes more centralized, rank-and-file
participation tends to dwindle, as members see their interests being taken care of by the
leadership, even when this is not necessarily the case (Jenkins, 1989). The
moderatizing/conservatizing effect of resource-rich organizations is further bolstered by
their ability to control perception through mass-marketing, magazines and other material
incentives, (Brulle, 2000) thereby cementing the centralized control by the leadership,
and thus resulting in more moderate political advocacy behavior.
Brulle (2000) expands on this idea by arguing that an EMO's discursive identity
is influenced by the organizational forms (from autocratic to grassroots) connected to the
way in which that movement garners resources. Dreiling and Wolf (2001) build on this
further by arguing that variations in the material-organizational dependencies of EOs
reflect their political networks and thus influence their political positions on trade policy.
All of this suggests that resource indicators are crucial factors in determining EO
advocacy behavior.
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2.7 - Oppositionality of Political Advocacy
The degree to which an EO engages in advocacy behavior that is directly
oppositional to mainstream political culture can be seen as existing in a spectrum of
oppositionality. Political advocacy that is more oppositional directly confronts Beltway
politics as the source of the environmental crisis. Political advocacy that is less
oppositional does not directly confront Beltway politics, and instead seeks partnerships
with Washington elite to alleviate the environmental crisis. For example, if an EO
directly implicates the failures of a given Executive (for example the Clinton or Bush
administrations) for the degradation of the environmental crisis, then they are engaging in
somewhat oppositional political advocacy. If the EO advocates the impeachment of the
President of that administration, then this would be an example of even more oppositional
political advocacy. If they were to commend the actions taken by an administration by
contrasting the actions with those undertaken by another administration, this would be
slightly oppositional, however the degree to which it affirms some solution out of
Washington softens this oppositionality. An EO that commends the administration for its
successes in environmental legislation would be considered not oppositional at all. It is
this range of opposition to Beltway politics on environmental issues that distinguishes the
EOs.
Each method of political advocacy holds varying degrees of potential efficacy, is
associated with a particular set of implications, and emerges from distinct organizational
and cultural settings. The more oppositional forms of political advocacy are designed to
substantially disrupt the status quo. EOs that engage in such political positioning see this
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more extreme advocacy behavior as not only justified, but also as the only effective and
honest rhetorical positions that directly address the root causes of environmental damage.
They tend to view advocacy aimed at incremental reforms as at best insufficient to solve
the larger environmental crisis, and at worst horribly quiescent and demobilizing. On the
other hand, more established or mainstream organizations tend to see the potential of
intra-systemic changes, and seek to build on incremental victories. They fear that more
drastically oppositional forms of political advocacy are counterproductive in that they
invite unnecessary backlash and alienate potential allies. Moreover, the legal institutions
in which established 501 C-3 organizations operate have the effect of limiting
oppositional political advocacy, as they are restricted from engaging in or tacitly
approving of any form of illegal or semi-legal activity. This tension between acceptable
forms of EO advocacy behavior forces movement leaders to make careful decisions about
which forms of public positioning they will endorse, which they will actively employ,
and which they will discourage. Therefore, a discussion about the range of
oppositionality of political advocacy among EOs is an essential element in understanding
EO political praxis.
The types and sources of resources that an EO garners are also connected to the
oppositionality of their political advocacy. If an EO secures substantial external
resources, the leadership may shift its allegiance and accountability away from members
and toward the external sources. Larger donors, such as corporations, foundations and
government agencies, who would be more likely to be representative of mainstream
political advocacy, might be able to wield greater influence over the EO's agenda and
-------------------
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thus their behavior. Critics of this influence (Faber & McCarthy, 2001) point to how
mainstream EOs' sources of financial support channel their activities into strictly
conventional (read: not oppositional) methods, which despite their ability to at least
somewhat mitigate ecological problems, "are proving to be increasingly limited in
effectiveness" (p. 406). Part of the reason for this slide in actual protection is because
despite greater recognition by the general public that the environmental crisis is worthy
of concern 31, the machines of capitalism have outstripped the capacity ofthe movement
to keep environmental harm at bay. The neo-liberal ideology among Washington policy
elite has become ubiquitous, even among so-called environmental politicians. However,
Hofrichter (2000) persuasively argues, since the 1970s, the increase in neoliberal state
policy approaches to address environmental health has been a dismal failure at best, as
despite increases in public awareness, environmental quality has actually declined since
then. Thus EOs that wish to maintain ties to Washington tend to be compelled to adopt a
neo-liberal ideology, or at least become friendly to neoliberalism, so that they might get
in on the gravy train. Any stance against this neoliberal bent is due to the ubiquity of
neoliberal ideology, and is thus necessarily oppositional to Beltway politics.
Contrarily, more mainstream organizations argue that the alternative to
maintaining close policy ties to Washington elite is to relinquish what modicum of
influence that the environmental movement does actually have over the political process
and environmental legislation. The recipients oflarger donations have an intra-structural
31 However, it should be noted that despite the increase in public awareness of environmental issues in the
last few decades, a decline in active participation may also have occurred. For example, Putnam (2000)
argues that "the most critical factor for explaining the incapacity of the environmental movement to address
the fundamental causes of environmental problems is the decline in social capital and civic participation."
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position of leverage in the US political system that they are not likely to surrender, and
indeed they do wield substantial influence. These EOs tend to adopt or become friendly
towards neoliberal policy prescriptions in order to maintain these ties and sources of
support. Washington pays more attention to EOs that know how to play their game. In a
1999 survey of Washington policy makers in which respondents were asked to rank
national non-profit organizations in terms of how much influence they have on federal
policy, environmental policy is the area that had the greatest number of organizations
mentioned (Rees, 1999). This shows that although mainstream environmental groups may
have been somewhat ineffective in securing overall environmental health, they
nonetheless have the ear of the national political elite, and through those channels, made
substantial contributions to environmental legislation. Thus, EO leadership must be
conscious of the degree to which their political advocacy is oppositional, as the path they
choose will have very direct consequences for the future of the EO.
Identities, strategies, and resources are critical determinants of EO composition,
and have close connections to the types of political advocacy in which EOs engage. The
literature presented above shows how the structural and ideological components of EO
political advocacy can be explained in greater detail by examining what their stances on
environmental issues are, how they prescribe addressing these issues and what comprises
their material bases. Dreiling, et al. (2008) have shown how identities, strategies and
resources have substantial effects on the interactivity and costliness of the
communication methods that EOs employ, however so far, no research to date has
examined the effect these variables might have on environmental advocacy behavior; or
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more specifically, on environmental organizations' willingness and/or capacity to
participate in oppositional political advocacy.
2.8 - Conclusion
Some EOs utilize close ties to established elites to attain incremental political
victories upon which to build, with the goal of changing the system from within. Such
organizations would not endorse a revolutionary overthrow of the entire economic
system, but instead would work to reform society and industry to create what they believe
to be more realistic and effective change. These relatively non-oppositional groups might
perceive more radical change as running the risk of eroding, weakening, or dismantling
the system of environmental protection already in place. Throwing the baby out with the
bathwater is their greatest perceived risk, as oppositional advocacy could result in less
effective environmental policy in their eyes, and as such, allow further environmental
degradation. Contrarily, more oppositional organizations may instead choose to position
themselves in a more radical manner. These groups might seek fundamental change in the
whole of society and industry, and would thus be less likely to be impressed with
incremental reforms. The critique these groups might have of more moderate reforms
would be that they serve to demobilize the movement through placation. Should the
public become more passively acquiescent as a result of perceiving the problem to
already have been sufficiently addressed, humanity could slip into an even more severe
ecological crisis. These groups see the danger to the environment as being nearly
insurmountable through established means, and instead seek more revolutionary changes
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to society. Merely rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic is their greatest perceived
risk, and anything short of sweeping systematic change makes that more likely. However,
most EOs would not prefer to be categorized as being a member of either extreme camp,
and instead see their mission as some sort of blend between acting oppositionally when
necessary, and yet also working within the system when pragmatism seems more
appropriate. Where EOs reside on the oppositional/non-oppositional spectrum is a critical
focal point for understanding the character of the organizations, and is theoretically
connected to its identities, strategies, and resources.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
3.1 - Quantitative Analysis: Binomial Logistic Regression
In order to explore some of the factors that help determine the variation in
political advocacy among EOs in the US, I employ a multi-method approach. As
established above, the identities held by, strategies employed by and the types and
amounts of resources garnered by EOs have noticeable effects on the organizational
practices of each organization. Therefore, I conduct both a quantitative and qualitative
investigation of these variables' effects on the character of EO political advocacy.
Initially, utilizing a binomial logistic regression, I inquire as to the power that these
variables have to predict the odds that an EO would engage in advocacy that opposed
Beltway political currents on a national initiative, or what I refer to as their
oppositionality. Secondarily, I utilize the comparative case method to examine several
organizations in greater detail, and conduct interviews that expose how these
organizations interpret, understand, and frame their political advocacy.
3.1.1 - Dependent Variable Concepts: Oppositionality
The concept of oppositionality represents the degree of change to the world that
the EO advocates and is treated here as a willingness and/or capacity for an EO to
position their organization in opposition to mainstream political CUlTents. More
specifically, I measure the likelihood that an EO would participate in political advocacy
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that opposed the predominant stance of Washington DC on one of three national
initiatives: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade
Organization (WTO), or the Kyoto Protocols. 32 Organizations that are less engaged in
oppositional political advocacy chose to maintain moderate stances on environmental
issues such as these and did not oppose Washington's stance. Those EOs that are more
engaged in oppositional political advocacy however, openly and publicly advocated
against Washington by either supporting the Kyoto Protocols or by opposing NAFTA or
the WTO.
An EO's stance on national political initiatives with broad environmental
implications serves as an excellent indicator for the oppositionality of an EO's political
advocacy 33 at any given moment in time, because it displays the degree to which their
overt political discourse contradicts mainstream political culture. The three particular
oppositional political advocacy events mentioned above stand out as decidedly salient
moments in recent history not only because they were so widely covered by the
mainstream media, but also because aligned EOs were directly confronting national
political leadership by taking the oppositional stance. This meant that EOs were
32 While EOs that advocated against the predominant Beltway stance on any the above three events do not
represent an exhaustive list of EOs willing to engage in oppositional political advocacy (as some
oppositional organizations may have chosen not to participate for other reasons, been unable to participate
or were not yet in existence) those that did, nonetheless all belong to that population.
3311 is crucial here to distinguish the tenn 'identity' from 'political advocacy.' An EO's identity (as seen in
their mission statement) is the way in which the movement frames itself in general temls, what repertoires
of vocabulary are available to them, and the general character of their discourse. Political advocacy on the
other hand is more specific, in that it refers to the stances that EOs take on particular political events.
Oppositionality is one dimension of political advocacy that I explore in the quantitative section, although
other dimensions are revealed in the qualitative section, such as cohesion, which is the degree to which an
EO either forces its members and employees to toe the party line (cohesive) or rather allows or even tacitly
encourages them to act beyond the scope of the EO's advocacy limitations (non-cohesive).
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rhetorically obligated to take some sort of stance either way. To not take a stance was
akin to standing against the protest. With the discursive pressure of Washington DC
being applied to the decision-making apparatus ofthe EO, each had distinct choices to
make about how oppositional their organization's position would be.34 On the one hand,
they could have chosen to not take a stance directly opposing national political
leadership. Those that preferred to maintain close relationships with organizations and
politicians ensconced in mainstream political culture would not be as willing to publicly
advocate against the position of their allies in Washington. If they chose not to take an
oppositional stance against the government's official policy position, then they were
likely pursuing such partners. It could be that those EOs not expressing oppositional
political advocacy at this point were concerned that they might jeopardize those
relationships. It could also be that the issue itself was not close enough to the
organization's specific mission to warrant their participation. Contrarily, if the EO did
choose to participate in any ofthe three events, then their political advocacy should be
considered at least to a certain degree, oppositional. This could be because the issue is too
close to their own mission for them to pass on participation. It could also be that their
perception of this importance encouraged them to risk losing some or all access to
established political channels by acting directly and symbolically against the political
currents in Washington. In either case, it is clear that participation in any rhetoric that
34 It should also be noted that the participants and organizations in attendance at each of the events
employed a wide variety of techniques as well, some more oppositional than others. However, taking a
stance against national political leadership indicates a certain degree of oppositionality of the EO. The
internal variation at each event should be explored, however is beyond the scope of this research.
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opposes Washington's stance on the NAFTA, WTO, and/or the Kyoto Protocols
represents oppositional political advocacy.
Taking a contrarian stance towards the NAFTA, WTO, or the Kyoto Protocols
should be considered oppositional, in that they contravened the relatively unified national
political position. If an EO's official stance was counter to NAFTA or the WTO, or in
favor of the US signing the Kyoto Protocols, then that EO is considered to have a greater
propensity toward oppositional political praxis in advocating environmental issues, in
that they opposed the stance of the political elite on a national stage.
The mainstream political climate coming out of Washington D.C. in the 1990s
was largely supportive ofthe ideology and implementation ofneoliberal 'free' trade.
Democrats and Republicans alike decried what they argued to be the folly of Keynesian
economics and worked hard to usher in a new era of unrestricted international trade.
Globalization was the mantra, and rarely if ever was it framed pejoratively by national
political culture. Understandably, opponents of this bipartisan, widely-accepted economic
ideology were looked upon with great disdain by mainstream political culture. To oppose
'free' trade was to oppose progress, or to be blind to modem realities. Those who chose
to juxtaposition themselves to this mainstream political current would risk losing allies
with other non-profit organizations, NGOs, and government agencies and offices. EOs
opposing this neoliberal trend could risk negative public exposure. This could result in
the EO having a more difficult time cultivating and maintaining alliances and negotiating
diplomacy with established institutions and other organizations. Also, an oppositional
stance could cause the EO to suffer from ineffective participant recruitment due to
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negative public exposure. Resistance to neoliberalism would be seen as oppositional to
the health and well-being of the American economy, and thus contrary to the public good.
As such, endorsement of protests against NAFTA in the early 90s and against the WTO
in Seattle in 1999 should be seen as oppositional, in that they were both risky positions to
take, given that they opposed the political agenda of neoliberal Beltway politics.
Although by 2005 human-caused global warming was recognized by many as an
eminent threat to human survival, the US political body was still not poised to officially
take such a stance. Government leaders from most of the nations of the world met in
Montreal, Canada to discuss the impacts of human industrial emissions on global climate,
and to again discuss ratification of the Kyoto Protocol agreement. Although over 160
nations signed the document, the US refused to. 35 The official position has shifted from
outright denial to pleas that due to the industrial demands of the US economy, no
guarantees about carbon emission reductions could be made. EOs that were willing to
publicly decry the US's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocols are thus considered to be
oppositional, in that they directly contradicted Washington's stance.
Advocacy alignment with any of the three national-level political actions (WTO,
NAFTA, and Kyoto) can be seen as an indicator for a tendency to engage in oppositional
political advocacy. This does not suggest that every participating EO shares the same
degree of oppositionality; indeed there is likely to be a great deal of variation. Nor is this
meant to be an exhaustive list of potentially oppositional political stances. However, due
35 It should also be noted that at least 178 nations have signed to date and of those who have not, only the
US has declared their decided lack of intention to ratify (UNFCCC 2008)
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to the size and scope of the political movements behind each of the three events, it can be
safely assumed that if an organization's official stance was against the mainstream
political current, then the EO demonstrates the capacity and willingness to engage in
oppositional political advocacy, at least at that particular historical junction.
The theoretical importance for understanding the oppositionality of EO political
advocacy cannot be overstated. Examining where EOs diverge is essential to charting the
terrain of EO political advocacy. This map could be used to forge new alliances and
cooperative multi-pronged strategic approaches, which will be essential if we as a species
are to be able to confront the massive environmental crisis before us. Predicting this
oppositionality using strategy, identity, and resource variables allows us to see where EO
cleavages and potential alliances might exist. Mapping the variations in EO political
advocacy will be useful in creating a common language through which to describe the
sundry landscape of EO political praxis, and to reveal the tapestry of interconnected
narratives that comprise a larger, diversified movement for environmental sustainability.
Although devising this map will not necessarily result in new alliances between actual
organizations, it will hopefully at least provide an opportunity to do so, as it will present a
means by which scholars, observers and participants might envision the wholeness of this
group of very diverse EOs.
3.1.2 - Independent Variable Concepts: Identities, Strategies, and Organizational
Resources
The repertoires of political advocacy available to various EOs are partially
determined by their structural dimensions (such as their form of internal organization, the
---- -- -----------
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political opportunities and constraints they face, and the types and amounts of resources
they garner) and also partially by their ideological orientations (the deliberate or resultant
framing of the EO's grievance/mission, the resonance this frame has with potential
participants, allies and supporters, and the strategies that the EO chooses to fulfill that
mission). Whether it is strategically by design or tactically by response, the degree to
which an environmental organization employs oppositional political advocacy is related
to the material structures both within and surrounding it, as well as to its ideological
predisposition and the degree to which that message resonates with the public. More
specifically, the identities of, strategies employed by and organizational resources
garnered by EOs in the United States vary significantly, and are useful predictors of EO
advocacy behavior. These three categories encompass 11 more specific concepts that are
then operationalized into variables. Below each variable description is followed by an
explanation of how it was derived, and then by a hypothesis as to its effect on the
oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy.
3.1.2.1 - Identities. The identity of an EO represents its ideological core and its
shared cultural affinities, and is indicated by its mission statement, its stated objectives,
and how it publicly defines its general purpose. EOs in the US hold a range of grievances
and goals and engage in a variety of behaviors in order to address and achieve them.
Some goals are modest, such as to end a particular form of pollution in a given localized
area, while others are more far-reaching, such as to provide comprehensive
environmental legislation, while others are even more extreme in their desire to end the
capitalist mode of production. Some EOs see themselves as social movements such as
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The Sierra Club or Earthfirst!, while others see themselves as independent organizations
with more particularized concems, such as localized conservation groups, hunting/fishing
organizations and educational nature centers. The grievances and the goals of the
organization comprise the identity of the organization. Brulle (2000) identifies seven
distinct environmentalist discourses that incorporate a comprehensive array of
environmental organization identities: Wildlife Management, Conservation, Preservation,
Reform Environmentalism, Deep Ecology, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism (p.
241). However, in our analysis, the responses did not fit neatly into these categories.
Rather than assigning a discreet label, we derive the orientation ofthe EO's identity
based on clusters of responses to survey queries about their mission. Therefore, building
on Brulle's typology and, using a correspondence analysis of survey data, we developed a
set of three dimensions of the EO's discursive identity: (l) the ecological inclusivity of
the movement's organizational mission, (2) the tendency of the organization's primary
concems to focus on non-technical environmental discourse, and (3) the tendency of the
organization's primary concems to focus on discourse of environmental exploitation. 36
3.1.2.1.1- Inclusivity. The first identity concept, inclusivity, involves the degree
to which an EO's organizational mission includes other environmental goals under its
rubric. For example, an EO focusing on the preservation or conservation of a single area
might not be particularly inclusive, as it would not address the concerns of EOs beyond
that localized area. Organizations that identify with Deep Ecology on the other hand,
would be more inclusive, as their main grievance would stretch to critiques of larger
36 Dreiling, et al. (2008)
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modes of production and human relationships to the environment. Although most EOs
have a very limited focus on their particular issue (most EOs are EAOs but not
necessarily EMOs), some look beyond their single-issue concerns, connect their
grievances to wider environmental struggles and engage in collective, inter-organization
advocacy behavior on a national and/or international scale.
As mentioned above, the inclusivity 37 variable is derived using a correspondence
analysis of responses to survey questions inquiring about their organizational mission.
Issues of greatest concern to EOs with high correspondence scores for inclusivity include
renewable energy, population control, and climate change. These identities are more
inclusive because they tend to see environmental problems as being widely
interconnected, and generally have a predisposition towards involving the whole of
society in the solution to environmental problems. However, EOs with low scores in this
correspondence analysis tend to place importance on less inclusive issues such as specific
environmental disasters, waste management and local habitat preservation. These
identities are less inclusive in that they focus on localized problems and solutions that do
not necessarily involve changes to the whole of society or wider issues in the biosphere.
EOs with inclusive identities should be more likely to oppose one of the three
political events. It would stand to reason that EOs with more inclusive identities would be
more oppositional, as they would connect their own mission to the missions of
organizations seeking larger structural changes, and be willing to act in opposition to the
federal political mandate in order to address these larger issues. Smaller, more localized
37 Variables are italicized and concepts are not.
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organizations might see their mission as particularized in such a way as to not demand
addressing the wider political context. However, a partial conservatizing effect may
mitigate this impact. If an EO maintains a more inclusive identity and in so doing so aims
at the ideological center of the political landscape in order to gain supporters from more
moderate perspectives, then they would predictably choose to act in a less oppositional
manner in order to maintain those ties and to avoid disenfranchising constituents. A wider
identity may also be associated with a more politically conciliatory stance so that the EO
might maintain relationships with institutionally established allies. Therefore, although
inclusivity may increase the odds of participation in oppositional political advocacy, this
effect should be mitigated by its conservatizing effect.
3.1.2.1.2 - Non-technical environmental discourse. The second identity concept
is non-technical environmental discourse, and measures the degree to which an
organization aligns with discourses that move away from relying on technical scientific
rationality. Identities that are more non-technical involve an understanding that
technological, scientific management of nature is impossible, and that instead we need to
focus on less technologically-dependent methods, such as respecting and revering the
intrinsic value of the natural world, incorporating native wisdom into ecosystemic
planning, and utilizing the balancing forces of nature (such as permaculture and 'let-it-
burn' forest ecology). More non-technical environmental identities on the other hand,
such as Ecofeminism, would focus instead on the organic or even spiritual relationship
that humans have with the environn1ent. Rather than scientific stewards of the
environment, these non-technical identities revolve more around reverence for the natural
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world and appreciating the non-commoditized value of all species for their own sake, as
well as the areas that they depend on for survival. Identities that are less non-technical (or
more technical) on the other hand, involve the reliance on the capacity of humans and
new technology to scientifically manage environmental sustainability. For instance,
organizations that advocate the development of green technologies, increasing the
efficiency of resource use/8 the scientific management of natural resources, technological
monitoring of environmental damage, etc. would be less non-technical.
The non-technical environmental discourse variable is derived using a
correspondence analysis of responses to survey questions inquiring about EO's primary
concerns, and represents a continuum between EOs that strongly identify with a
technical-rationality in relation to their primary environmental concerns, and those whose
identities are rooted in discourses that are decidedly non-technical and non-
instrumentalist. For example, EOs scoring high on the non-technical end of this
continuum tended to identify with statements like: "nonhuman life has rights" or
"ecosystem abuse is rooted in male-centered concepts, values, and institutions." In this
way, groups with higher scores on this series of questions identified with a view of
human-ecological relations that suggested an ethical, intuitive, or spiritual association
with nature. Conversely, EOs with low scores in this dimension (towards the technical-
rationalist end of the continuum) responded positively to statements like: "natural
resources should be technically managed from a utilitarian perspective" or "scientific
management can ensure stable wildlife populations" or "well-managed resources offer
38 Which as Jevon's Paradox elucidates, actually results in an increase in the use of the resource due to
production alignment and amplification.
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the greatest good over time." These organizations identified with a view of human-
ecological relations that emphasizes the capacities oftechnical management to solve
environmental problems while providing for human needs.
Employing non-technical environmental discourse should increase the likelihood
that an EO would participate in oppositional political advocacy. Identities that focus on
non-technical discourse have a fundamental, sometimes even spiritual reverence for
environmental health. This emotionally-charged value set could outweigh concerns of
stability and conciliation, and could thus be used to motivate and/or justify oppositional
political advocacy. Additionally, less non-technical discourses tend to depend on strong
connections to industrial production. 39 It seems plausible then that EOs that identify with
this discourse would be more likely to have connections to established institutions, and
thus be less likely to position themselves as oppositional. Therefore having a non-
technical environmental discourse identity should have a strong positive effect on the
likelihood that the EO would participate in an oppositional event.
3.1.2.1.3 - Exploitation discourse. The third and final identity concept is
exploitation discourse, and measures the degree to which an organization's discourse
aligns with the idea that nature should be managed in order to maintain sustainable
human consumption. This discourse includes all those environmental identities that focus
on the preservation ofthe natural world for human consumption and enjoyment. Hunting
and fishing organizations for instance may have an environmental bent, however the
purpose for that healthy environment is to service human needs and desires. Rather than
39 As industrial research and development is a prerequisite for the invention of cleaner technologies
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acknowledging intrinsic value to natural areas, these identities instead accept as given the
imperative of human consumption, and seek to protect the environment for that ends.
These identities rarely if ever challenge the status quo mode of production, but rather
point to ways in which that exploitation can be more sustainably managed.
The exploitation discourse variable is derived from the second dimension of a
correspondence analysis of responses to survey questions inquiring about EO's primary
concerns, and represents a continuum between EOs that strongly identify with utilitarian
discourses emphasizing the need to manage nature for consumption by humans, and those
whose discourses focus on the protection ofthe natural world for its own sake. For
example, EOs with higher scores here tended to identify with statements in alignment
with environmental exploitation such as "undeveloped nature is valueless" or "humans
have a right to use the natural environment" or "excess wildlife population should be
used for recreational hunting." EOs with higher scores on this series of questions
identified with a view of human-ecological relations that suggested a need and right to
exploit the environment for human use. Conversely, EOs scoring low responded
positively to statements like: "nature has intrinsic value" or "humans have an obligation
to protect and preserve the natural environment" or "protection of wilderness areas and
wildlife for future generations is essential." These EOs are predisposed towards
discourses of protection of natural areas for their own sake.
Having an identity of exploitation discourse should have a strong negative effect
on the likelihood that an EO would participate in oppositional political advocacy. Placing
humans at the center of the model is not particularly controversial because it subordinates
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the concerns of the natural world to those of humans. This identity would be very much
in line with the vast majority of industrial enterprise. Either EOs with this sort of identity
do so in order to get access to that mainstream corporate culture, or their exploitative
identity is a direct result of their previous ties. In either case, EOs that focus on
exploitation discourse should be less likely to position themselves as oppositional.
3.1.2.2 - Strategies. Strategies employed by EOs have ranged from relatively
mainstream avenues such as education, litigation and lobbying, to more disruptive and
direct actions such as protests and demonstrations, to extremely disruptive actions such as
tree-spiking and property destruction. The strategies that the EO employs are how they
interact with the world. EOs devise strategies that maximize what they perceive to be
effective action and minimize any negative consequences, however there is very little
agreement among EOs about where those lines are drawn. Strategies thus represent
another dimension of the ideology of the EO, in that they represent not just what the
movement says its purpose is, but actually what participants are specifically asked to do
to effect social change. This is obviously associated with the other two categories of
independent variables, in that the resources and identities should influence the EO's
repertoires of action. Examining the variation in strategies alone however sheds light on
how political advocacy is undertaken. Utilizing a factor analysis of survey response items
regarding strategies that EOs indicated that they are willing to employ, I derive three
indicators for types of preferred strategies: (l) litigation/lobbying, (2) education/outreach,
and (3) alliance participation. 40
40 Dreiling et al. (2008)
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3.1.2.2.1 - Litigation / lobbying. The concept of litigation and lobbying
represents the degree to which an organization employs as a strategy the application of
legal, institutional direct pressure to affect change. EOs might hire a lobbyist themselves,
or contribute to an already established environmental lobby. They might contribute to the
campaign of a candidate that appears environmentally friendly. They could also hire legal
counsel for consultation or to actually sue companies and/or individuals for
environmental damage. Most often, they hire lawyers as staff members to advise and
apply legal pressure to individuals, corporations, and/or government agencies.
The litigation/lobbying variable is derived from a factor analysis of survey
response items indicating the frequency that the organization utilizes various organizing
activities to achieve its goals. A higher score indicates a greater reliance on litigation or
lobbying as a strategy.
Employing litigation or lobbying as a strategy should have a strong, negative
effect on the likelihood that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy. These
methods require the commitment of significant financial resources, as legal council is
often expensive to retain, as is gaining access to effective lobbies. Due to the great
financial expenses that these strategies incur, usually only more established EOs with
substantial war chests should be able to afford to engage in them. Thus these strategies
are more likely to be employed by EOs with more direct and indirect connections to large
corporations, foundations, government agencies and other mainstream organizations. As
such, these EOs should be less willing to engage in oppositional political advocacy for
fear of weakening those institutional ties. Additionally, as EOs hire lawyers on staff, they
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increase legal scrutiny. EOs that engage in these strategies will be less likely to engage in
advocacy that could be perceived as encouragement or tacit approval of illegal activity,
thus decreasing their oppositionality. Also, EOs that prefer these strategies will need to
cultivate close relationships with politicians and government agencies in order to
maintain financial support and access. As such, they should be less likely to engage in
oppositional political practices. Therefore, a focus on litigation and lobbying should have
a strong negative effect on the likelihood of an EO participating in oppositional political
advocacy.
3.1.2.2.2 - Education/outreach. The concept of education and outreach
represents the degree to which an EO employs information dissemination to the public as
a strategy to effect change. This could range from information and awareness-raising
campaigns about a given endangered or polluted area, to wider campaigns for awareness
about proposed environmental legislation, local/national initiatives, and/or political races.
This might take the form of nature centers or park kiosks that inform people about
specific habitats or creatures, or letter, leaflet and email campaigns, or releases from
research think tanks that assess and disseminate information about the environmental
impacts of various practices, or advertisements in the media, documentary films, public
speeches and environmental conferences, just to name a few. Any effort to raise
awareness and spread information is considered education and outreach.
The education/outreach variable is derived from a factor analysis of survey
response items indicating the frequency that the organization utilizes various organizing
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activities to achieve its goals. A higher score indicates a greater reliance on education and
outreach as a strategy.
The tendency to employ education and outreach as a strategy should have a strong
negative effect on the likelihood that an EO will engage in oppositional political
advocacy. A nature center explaining raptor habitat for instance, could potentially have
the effect of galvanizing an environmental ethic through greater understanding, but would
not necessarily (and probably not at all) prescribe an oppositional course of action. A
national global warming education campaign may have farther reaching implications for
action in terms of carbon reduction implications, but again, might instead focus on intra-
systemic changes such as more stringent fuel efficiency standards. There is nothing
apparent about education as a strategy that would necessitate oppositionality. Indeed,
because these techniques are so expensive, and we anticipate more substantially funded
organizations to be less likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy (see
resource variables below), the employment of educational strategies should have a
substantial negative effect on the likelihood of an EO engaging in oppositional political
advocacy.
3.1.2.2.3 - Alliance participation. The concept of alliance participation involves
the way in which an EO pursues rhetorical and/or resource-oriented ties to other EOs. A
strategy of alliance building and participation would involve developing and maintaining
a multitude of linkages from the EO in question to various other organizations. These
might include rhetorical alliances, such as providing hyperlinks to other EOs' websites on
their own website, or verbally mentioning the association in a press release or public
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statement. More substantial alliances might include staff member interlocks where some
EO employees and volunteers have worked or continue to work for multiple EOs. Also,
an EO can send money or human power to assist an allied EO or participate in a publicity
or direct action event. However, some EOs do not spend much of their time or effort
securing alliances. This could be because they have no need for alliances, as their mission
is limited in scope. Also, larger organizations that do not focus much on alliance building
may be in such a position of prominence that the alliances come to them rather than vice
versa. Or they might already have a substantial network of alliances already in place, and
as such they might not need to focus much of their time or effort on building alliances. In
either case, the degree to which an EO focuses on reaching out to other organizations
should be very closely connected to the degree of oppositionality of their political
advocacy.
The alliance participation variable is derived from a factor analysis of survey
response items indicating the frequency that the organization utilizes various organizing
activities to achieve its goals. A higher score indicates a greater reliance on building
alliances with other EOs as a strategy.
The tendency to employ alliance participation as a strategy should have a negative
effect on the likelihood that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy.
Alliances can be tenuous, and as such, EOs may choose less oppositional political
advocacy in order to avoid distancing themselves from potential or current less
oppositional allies. Additionally, to whatever degree these alliances are formed with
established and institutionalized agents in Washington, they by definition do not oppose
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national political leadership. If the organizational strategy focuses on forming alliances,
then the EO is probably more interested in those 'big-tent' bonds than it is with
maintaining an oppositional stance. It would seem more likely then that alliance
participation would have a moderate negative effect on the odds of participation in any of
the oppositional advocacy events.
However, to whatever extent EOs spend time and energy forging these inter-
organizational bonds with EOs more oppositional than themselves, they necessarily
politicize their own concerns into a wider critique of environmental exploitation. This
more comprehensive strategic approach would then include a greater variety of allied
voices, some of which might be more oppositional than the EO's own political advocacy.
Therefore, EOs take on a more oppositional character as alliances are pursued. Various
labor organizations for instance, whose political advocacy was not particularly
oppositional under Clinton, nonetheless took to the streets during the WTO protests,
largely as a result of alliances built with a host of EOs. When a representative for the
Direct Action Network (DAN) spoke on the Teamsters' stage that fateful morning, it was
clear that at least under certain circumstances, alliance formation increases the likelihood
of oppositional political advocacy. It is unclear though that the DAN stayed as
oppositional as they were before the protest however. There might have been a
reciprocally conservatizing force acting upon EOs such as the DAN that reigned some of
their oppositional political advocacy in, as well. The organized participation of anti-
looting and property destruction efforts by various individuals is evidence ofthis.
However, this is a very historically specific event that may represent special
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circumstances. The overall conservatizing force should be stronger, as conciliation and is
fundamental to alliances, and is usually not associated with opposition. Although
employing alliance participation as a strategy may act somewhat to increase the
likelihood of oppositional political advocacy, it would stand to reason that overall, it
ought to have a moderate negative effect.
3.1.2.3 - Organizational resources. The resources available to EOs should also
have substantial effects on the degree to which they are willing to and/or capable of
positioning themselves oppositionally. The varying levels of financial resources that EGs
are able to gamer have very important effects on the structure of the movement.
Organizations with greater membership and financial resources tend to attempt to appeal
to a big tent range of environmental philosophies. In so doing, the repertoires of action
they employ tend to not be particularly disruptive, as their support base usually lies
within the mainstream political culture. Through a relatively popular appeal, these
organizations can inspire a wide range of financial supporters to donate money, which
gives the organization the advantage of being able to afford lobbyists and attorneys,
whose efforts focus on influencing legitimate and mainstream political channels.
Legislation is usually the key objective of such organizations, and the success of various
organizations such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth demonstrates the
effectiveness of these techniques. However, although their supporters are willing to
donate financial resources, they mayor may not be willing to place their own bodies in
harm's way. These armchair activists, while clearly not representative of all supporters of
these organizations, are essential to the financial support base of the organization, but are
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also often times unwilling to venture any further than monetary support. Smaller
organizations, while not necessarily more oppositional, do not have the same wide base
of support from which to obtain their largesse, and are as such constrained to less costly
repertoires of action. These organizations depend on human resources such as volunteers
and humans with willingness to participate in direct action, and may be more likely to
agitate or disrupt, as they are likely to have more human than financial resources.
Additionally, the emotive and inspirational capacity of oppositional advocacy may also
contribute to recruitment, making these less well-funded organizations more likely to
have oppositional political alignment. Smaller organizations are not necessarily
predisposed towards direct action; however they are more capable than larger
organizations to do so due to the lack of need to satisfy the inclinations of a big tent.
Therefore, the amounts and types oforganizational resources that EOs gamer should
have very profound effects on the degree to which they engage in oppositional political
advocacy.
To derive these organizational resource variables, I compile five index
components utilizing data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS).
These include dues collected (total amount of dues collected annually), gross receipts
(total revenue brought in annually), expenses (total annual expenditures), contributions
(total annual donations) and salaries (total amount paid in salaries annually). From these I
derive four organizational resource variables, and from survey response items concerning
number of volunteers, a fifth: (1) Resource Inefficiency, (2) Public and Government
Supports, (3) Revenue, (4) Compensation, and (5) Volunteers.
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3.1.2.3.1 - Resource inefficiency. The concept of resource inefficiency refers to
the way in which an EO allocates its financial resources. Those EOs that spend as much
or nearly as much as they receive are less resource efficient (more resource inefficient)
than those that collect a great deal more than they spend. This ratio describes the degree
to which an organization effectively utilizes its resources, or in other words, its capacity
for discretionary spending. From an economic standpoint, EOs with little discretionary
spending would have limited repertoires of action. One reason this could be true is
because they would be without a sizeable war chest, and thus unable to afford techniques
such as litigation and lobbying. This might predispose them more toward direct action, or
other methods that are human capital intensive, but would not necessarily depend on
sizeable budgets. This low level of relative spending power might result in less
connection to and/or dependence upon outside alliances, as the relative desperation of the
limited repertoire of action might necessitate more direct techniques that are more
oppositional.
The resource inefficiency variable is calculated by taking the logarithm of the
ratio of annual expenses to gross receipts. EOs with high values here would have a
greater portion of their gross receipts taken up by expenditures, and would thus be more
resource inefficient. They utilize their resources inefficiently in the sense that they do not
have substantial budget surpluses. EOs with lower values here are less inefficient (more
efficient) because they have a greater proportion of their budget freed up discretionarily.
The more resource inefficient the EO is, the more likely they should be to engage
in oppositional political advocacy. Small, resource inefficient groups such as the Native
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Forest Council may tend towards oppositional political advocacy because they have
nothing to lose. Their lack of economic surplus may constrain the types of strategies they
are able to employ, but without much money, they are not beholden to conservatizing
interests. Resource inefficient EOs attending the WTO protest in Seattle, for example,
might be able to motivate people to show up to a protest, but would certainly not be able
to litigate or conduct expensive media/mailing campaigns. Less resource inefficient EOs
however (more resource efficient), with greater discretionary spending would be able to
afford expensive campaigns, but might be beholden to the interests that funded them,
limiting the degree to which they could position themselves as oppositional. Therefore I
expect that EOs that are more resource inefficient (less resource efficient) should be more
likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy.
3.1.2.3.2 - Public and government supports. The concept of public and
government supports is the degree to which an organization is dependent on public and
government contributions (as opposed to dues, sales revenue, or interest from investment
portfolio) for revenue. This variable measures a specific degree of institutionalism: the
proportion of the EOs financial resources that come directly from the government. EOs
that receive a greater portion of their financial support from the outside will need to
maintain the relationships with those sources, and will thus have very different political
advocacy from those who are more internally financially independent.
The public/government supports variable is calculated using the logarithm of the
ratio of annual government and public contributions to gross receipts. EOs with higher
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scores here are more dependent on outside sources, while those with lower scores are
more independently funded.
Those EOs with a greater proportion of their support coming from the government
should less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy. It would stand to reason
that EOs soliciting government support would be less likely to be oppositional than other
EOs because they would want to maintain a relatively moderate stance in order to
cultivate those relationships. Therefore, EOs with a greater proportion of their money
coming from public and government support should be less likely to have engaged in any
of the three nationally significant oppositional political advocacy events.
3.1.2.3.3 - Revenue. The concept of revenue is simple, in that it refers to the
financial scale of the EO. Larger organizations should have ample monetary resources at
their disposal, and more ties to the sources of those resources. This should have important
consequences for political advocacy, because similar to the other organizational resource
variables, budgets determine both their tactical options as well as their rhetorical
repertoires. The revenue variable was calculated using the logarithm of the gross receipts.
The revenue variable should have a substantial negative effect on the odds of
oppositional political advocacy. The larger the EO is financially, the less likely it is to do
so. It would stand to reason that larger, more financially stable EOs are more likely to
have established institutional relationships, and are thus less likely to participate in
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oppositional political advocacy. 41 Thus, EOs with more money should be less likely to
engage in oppositional political advocacy.
3.1.2.3.4 - Compensation. The concept of compensation refers to the proportion
of an EO's financial resources that are devoted to staff salaries. As discussed in the
theory section above, the professionalization of an EO has a significant impact on how
the organization operates. Career-seeking leaders may steer the path of the organization
to ensure that they are able to continue to make a living. Successful end states that
supplant the need for the EO altogether might be avoided by the leadership if they wish to
continue the struggle. The fusion of like-oriented EOs is perhaps the most optimal
outcome for the environmental movement, in that when EOs combine their strengths and
strategies (and thus avoid duplicitous and repetitious wheel reinventing), they probably
maximize their chances of succeeding. However, when rational actors seek their own
rational self interest, as these career-seekers might do, the overall outcome is sub-
optimized. This "Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968) would mean that EOs with
greater compensation for employees would allow the leadership to steer the EO in a
direction less oriented toward its mission and more toward the financial stability of the
leaders themselves. Many labor unions, particularly earlier in the 20th Century, have
encountered this pitfall. The more EO leadership becomes self-servingly careerist, the
less it will adhere to the principles outlined in the mission statement. The compensation
41 Although it should be noted that Dreiling et al. (2008) found that financial scale was not a very good
predictor of costliness of computer mediated communication tactics employed by EOs, due to the
intervening factors such as volunteers, member dependency and resource efficiency.
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variable was calculated using the total yearly salaries paid to all employees, as provided
by NCCS data.
Compensation should have a very strong negative effect on the likelihood of an
EO engaging in oppositional political advocacy. Career-seeking EO leaders should be
less likely to engage in obtrusively antagonistic political advocacy, as they will be more
interested in cultivating institutional political allies than maintaining a staunch devotion
to the EO mission. This professionalization may have the effect of de-prioritizing
"movement goals in deference to exigencies of organizational maintenance and career
advancement" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p. 489). Indeed, professionalization
encourages organizations to utilize institutional techniques and work within coalitions,
(Jenkins & Halc1i, 1999) which has the effect of discouraging disruptive tactics and
protests (Piven & Cloward, 1978). Additionally, as an organization develops a paid staff,
it increases the bureaucratic paper trails associated with them, which might again
conservatize the advocacy ofthe EO. If an organization hires full-time lawyers, their
activities are even more likely to respect the confines of the law. Although oppositional
political advocacy is not necessarily illegal, these institutional ties should nonetheless
wed the EO to established channels, thereby reducing the likelihood of oppositionality.
Therefore, professionalized EOs should be less likely to participate in oppositional
political advocacy than less professionalized EOs.
3.1.2.3.5 - Volunteers. The concept of volunteers refers to the degree to which an
EO utilizes unpaid, volunteer labor to accomplish the daily tasks of the organization. This
variable measures the degree to which an EO is capable of motivating individuals to
_.. _. ------------------------
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become full participants in the EO. Organizations that heavily rely on volunteers may be
fairly large and autocratic, in that they might keep a large reserve army of volunteer
laborers on hand to do menial tasks such as phone banking or mailings. Contrarily, these
might be more democratic organizations with all or most of their staff being volunteer,
thus minimizing hierarchy. In either situation, the number of volunteers should have a
substantial effect on how their political advocacy is undertaken.
This variable was the only organizational resource variable not derived from the
NCCS data. Rather, it was calculated by using survey response items inquiring about the
number of volunteers that the EO uses, in six categories. 42 The more volunteers the EO
utilizes, the higher the score.
Volunteers should have a positive effect on the likelihood of engaging in
oppositional political advocacy. EOs that heavily rely on volunteers will be more likely to
be responsive to the interests of the participants, or else they risk losing one of their most
critical resources: the volunteers themselves. This would hedge against a careerist bent of
the leadership, and encourage the EO leadership to keep their political advocacy true to
the mission rather than making concessions to other established institutional ties.
Additionally, an organization that depends on volunteers needs to motivate those
participants. Oppositional political advocacy has the romantic appeal of passion, and as
such can sometimes be more effectively used to inspire people than pragmatic realism
can. Therefore, EOs that have volunteers as a predominant organizational resource should
be more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy.
42 The six categories are: None; 1-10; 11-30; 31-50; 51-100; >100
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3.1.2.3.6 -Age. Age is the number of years that the EO has been in existence, and
is used as a control variable.
3.1.3 - Procedures
I conduct a binomial logistic regression 43 to estimate the effect that the identities,
strategies and resources (independent) variables have on oppositionality (dependent)
variable. These independent variables partially describe the relationships between key EO
characteristics and the likelihood that EOs participate in oppositional political advocacy
on any of three historical issues: NAFTA, the WTO, or the Kyoto Protocols. 44
The data for these variables were obtained from a 2006 survey of US
environmental movements (the results of which are published in the December 2008
issue of Organization and Environment) which explored the impact of EO identities,
strategies, communication values and organizational resources (independent variables) on
the interactivity and costliness of the types of computer mediated communication
preferred (dependent variables). As one of the principle researchers on that project,
(second author) I had the opportunity to, in cooperation with my colleagues, devise a
survey instrument that inquired about various identity, strategy and resource variables,45
as well as how they positioned themselves toward the three historical events (WTO,
NAFTA and Kyoto). Additionally, I played a critical role in the several month process of
43 Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, OLS estimates are limited at best, but the maximum
likelihood estimation of a logistic regression overcomes this limitation (Menard 2002).
44 as indicated by survey response items self identifying as having voiced official public opposition to the
mainstream Washington position on any of the three.
45 as well as a series of questions regarding communication practices and use of computer mediated
technology.
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data collection, which involved managing a mailing list and set of postcards requesting
participation from thousands of EOs, maintaining an online survey instrument and its
server, and generating the raw tables for analysis.
If an organization's official stance was to oppose the signing ofNAFTA or the
WTO meetings in Seattle 1999, or opposed the official US stance on the Kyoto Protocols
(not ratifying), they were assigned the value of 1. If the organization participated in none
of those oppositional political advocacies, then they were assigned a O. The independent
variables for the logistic regression were also obtained from the above mentioned survey
(see variable descriptions above for how each was calculated). A higher beta value for
any independent variable indicates that the variable increased the likelihood that an EO
would participate in any of the above political advocacies by that factor. These values
provide an indication for how oppositional the EO is willing/capable to be in its political
advocacy behavior.
3.2 - Qualitative Analysis: Comparative Case Method
In the qualitative section of this research, I explore several key cases and utilizing
the comparative case method, uncover some of the ways that EOs conduct political
advocacy by examining their websites, public statements, mission statements, press
releases, and by supplementing that data with in-depth interviews of EO leaders.
Participation versus non-participation in oppositional political advocacy provides one
lens by which to view the oppositionality of an EO's advocacy, however it does not
adequately or completely explain the full range of political advocacy behaviors among
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EOs. How they come to understand and create meaning around their EO, its mission and
their common grievance reveals volumes about their process of advocacy behavior
selection. Therefore, I conducted semi-structured interviews of leadership figures in each
of the below organizations. This included a series of direct questions as well as several
open-ended questions. I had the interviews transcribed and then utilizing the dependent
variables from the quantitative chapter, coded the data into types of advocacies, and
inductively observed the relationships as they emerged from the data. I also had a series
of general research questions surrounding each of the independent variables from the
logistic regression that guided my interview questions and data coding. Although in the
interviews the questions were not configured to test particular hypotheses, this
nonetheless represented a somewhat deductive approach, in that the questions themselves
had theoretical assumptions built into them. The questions that I asked centered on the
three variables discussed in the quantitative section: identity, strategy, and resources. I
also consulted their mission statements, press releases and other literature, and developed
case comparisons along (and in some cases confounding) each of these axes.
In order to identify the key organizations from divergent ends of the various
spectra (e.g., strategy, identity, and resources) I begin with six divergently located cases
from the quantitative analysis, and then supplement that with cases that display unique
and theoretically important organizational characteristics. This approach "facilitate[s]
stronger qualitative research [... ] by identifying broad patterns within which case studies
can be located and better understood" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p. 500). I therefore
utilize the various organizational characteristics devised in the above described
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quantitative investigation to create a framework from which to develop a detailed
comparative case analysis. By locating cases on disparate ends of each of the three axes
(identity, strategy, and resources) I maximize the scope and specificity of the case
comparisons while minimizing risk of a selection bias. The ambiguous and potentially
contradictory meanings of political advocacy held by various EOs for instance, are
revealed by allowing distinct types of groups to describe in detail their own political
advocacy and how it relates to others. These "internal contradictions" present an
opportunity to reconstruct some of the theory on EOs described above (Burawoy, 1991).
Additionally, anomalous cases that do not support my hypothesized relationships are
similarly useful in reconstructing social movements theory in a Burawoyian sense.
The cases that I have chosen emerge from two sources. Initially, six cases were
obtained from the original survey data as relevant descriptors of particular types of EOs. I
chose representatives from several ends of the various spectra, with the intent of
capturing a more complete range of advocacy behavior and political praxis. EOs that span
several intersections of these three dimensions (identity, strategy, resources) afford the
greatest range within which to capture a rich qualitative data set. Secondarily, five more
were obtained that did not take the original survey, and were selected using the
theoretical justifications presented both in Chapter II, as well as below.
Along the identity axes, the American Farn1land Trust (AFT) scores in the bottom
quartile of my sample in non-technical ecological discourse, and in the top for
exploitation discourse, indicating a preference for scientifically managing the Earth for
sustainable human consumption. Contrarily, the Cascade Raptor Center (CRC), the
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Native Forest Council (NFC) and *Ecofeminism International (EI) all score high in non-
technical discourse, and the CRC scores low on exploitation discourse, indicating a focus
more on nature's intrinsic value. Additionally, the inclusivity of identity axis reveals that
the Institute for Applied Ecology (IAE) and the CRC have relatively exclusive identities
while the NFC and EI relatively inclusive. Therefore, the range between the identities of
these organizations warrants their selection in as cases in the qualitative analysis.
These cases are highly dispersed along the strategy axes, as well. The AFT, EI,
and Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) are all highly poised to
engage in direct action, whereas the CRC is not. Litigation is readily employed by the
NRC and the FSEEE, however not by the IAE nor the CRC. The CRC, NFC sand EI are
heavily invested in alliance participation, but the FSEEE is not. These disparate and
somewhat contradictory findings again suggest excellent selections for case comparisons.
Along the resource axes, the AFT is an established organization with a great deal
of resources. As a trust, their chief concerns would be financial, and their strength from
the degree of resources they would gamer. With the second largest economy in my
sample (calculated by taking the logarithm of gross receipts), AFT is at the top end of the
resource spectrum. However, they also are of the least resource efficient (they spend
nearly as much as they collect) and the least dependent on public or government supports,
which demonstrates the unique strategic position of the AFT. On the other end of this
spectrum is the NFC, who have nearly no budget at all. Although they reported having
collected some income in 2006, they have since slipped into debt, depending on the bank
account of one man to keep the doors open. Although these six cases do not span the
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entirety of the resource axes, they nonetheless represent useful points of comparison, and
provide further theoretical justification for the selection of the subsequent five cases.
Unlike a large, resource intensive EO, Julia "Butterfly" Hill, virtually her own EO
with a system of allies, is one person with very little financial reserves. The high media
profile that she attained with her direct action (she sat in a Redwood tree for nearly 738
days to prevent it from being cut down) galvanized considerable public support. This
social support system was logistically integral to her being able to maintain her direct
action. As such, she and her supporters could be considered the smallest possible unit that
could comprise an EO. Although she did not take our survey, she provides a wealth of
data on the perspective ofthe financially challenged EO. As such, she as a case
represents a nice contrast to the AFT's huge budgets. These diametrically opposed EOs
not only reveal how they envision their resource limitations and strengths, but also
problematize the notion of what it means to be an EO. Neither fits the typical model of
the most famous organizations, so the discussion that emerges between them supplies
new understandings as to the character and definitions of EOs.
Additionally, there are EOs that are for-profit, and thus excluded from the original
sample (due to their lack of 501-C-3 NPO status). Therefore, I selected the
*Environmental Consultants (EC), 46 an environmental consulting firm. This case
selection provides a unique angle from which to view the resource variables, as the EO is
paid to do its work. As a consulting firm, the LC interacts with a wide spectrum of EOs,
46 Asterisk denotes pseudonym
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providing additional insight as to the internal discursive terrain connecting and separating
various EOs.
As a moderately sized EO poised to address a great variety of environmental
issues, the Center for Biological Diversity represents another key focal point in this
landscape. Similar to the CBD but much larger and less confrontational is the *National
Environmental Protection Society (NEPS), and although this is a pseudonym, it is an EO
with a readily recognizable name, which suggests that it is a much larger player than the
CBD: professionalized, institutionally connected, and very well recognized. Lastly I
selected Greenpeace, as a uniquely large yet confrontational EO.
Each of these EOs provides a unique perspective that can be contrasted to the
others, and in so doing, reveal the relationships between EO identities, strategies,
resources and oppositionality of political advocacy.
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CHAPTER IV
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
4.1 - Introduction
In this chapter, I investigate the relative weight that various factors contribute to
the likelihood of EOs opposing any of three political events: the debate over NAFTA in
the mid 90s, the events leading up to and following the WTO protest in Seattle, 1999, and
the discussion concerning the Kyoto Protocols during the G.W. Bush administration.
Each of these events represent periods where the predominant positions in Washington
DC (of promoting neo-liberal trade agreements and resisting binding climate legislation)
directly and publicly confronted various social movements, including the environmental
movement. The oppositionality of EO political advocacy can be relatively accurately
predicted by examining various ideological and structural components of EOs. This
analysis helps explain why some EOs are more inclined towards more contentious,
confrontational, movement-style politics while others tend to employ more conventional,
pragmatic and less disruptive means of political advocacy.
4.2 - Variables Summary
I investigate the effect that EO's identities, strategies, and resources have on the
logarithm of the odds that they would oppose any of the three political advocacy events,
by conducting a binomial logistic regression. For the dependent variable I use a raw,
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dichotomous indicator: an oppositional stance to any of three major Beltway policy
propositions with environmental implications (NAFTA, the WTO, and/or the Kyoto
Protocols): oppositionality. I then investigate three categories of continuous independent
variables: identities, strategies, and resources.
After employing correspondence analyses of survey response items concerning
the EO's organizational mission and issues of primary concern, several meaningful
dimensions emerge, and reflect three salient identity variables: the inclusivity of their
mission and purpose as well as their proclivity towards utilizing non-technical
environmental discourse and/or exploitation discourse. From a factor analysis of survey
response items concerning the frequency that the EO engages in various activities, three
important strategy variables emerge as well: litigation/lobbying, education, and alliance
participation. From IRS data four resource variables emerge, the first three of which
include resource inefficiency (such that the more an organization spends relative to its
gross receipts, the less efficient that EO is), government dependency (the proportion of
the EOs financial support received from public and government agencies) and revenue
(the total amount received from all sources). As these distributions are not normally
distributed, they are logged for greater comparative utility. 47 A fourth variable is also
constructed: compensation (the amount paid to employees). From survey response items
concerning the number of volunteers in service, I derive a fifth resource variable:
volunteers. (See Table 1.) I also control for one additional structural variable: age
(number of years the organization has been in existence).
47 One was added to each value so that all scores could be logged, as many organizations reported no
income.
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Table I
Variables
Variable Name abbrev Derivation Type
Oppositionality oppos yes to any of 3 protests DV
Age age year of inception less 2006 Control
Inclusivity incl "organizational mission" correspondence Identity
analysis
Non-Technical nontech "primary concerns" correspondence Identity
Env. Discourse analysis
Exploitation exploit "primary concerns" correspondence Identity
Discourse analysis
Litigation litig factor analysis Strategy
Lobbying
Education/Outreach educ factor analysis Strategy
Alliance allianc factor analysis Strategy
Participation
Resource 1geffic log of expenses/gross receipts Resources
Inefficiency
Public/Government 19psupt log of contributions/gross receipts Resources
Supports
Revenue 199rec log of gross receipts Resources
Compensation compens total yearly salaries paid Resources
Volunteers volunt # of volunteers in 6 categories Resources
4.3 - Methods Summary
With a dichotomous dependent variable, the classical linear regression
assumptions of linearity, normality, and homoskedasticity are violated, and as such, the
estimates for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will be inefficient at best.
However, by transforming the dichotomous dependent variable from Y(1,O) into a
logarithm of the odds of falling into the" 1" category, or a logit regression, we overcome
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this inefficiency (Menard, 2002). Also, intuitively, this Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) of the logistic regression makes more sense than OLS estimations, as I am
investigating the effect that various factors have on the likelihood of greater oppositional
political advocacy.
4.4 - Model
The "ISRO" model (lSR = 0) that I developed is based on the idea that identities
(I), strategies (S) and resources (R) etTect the degree of oppositionality of the EO's
political advocacy, or more specifically, the likelihood of an EO opposing any of three
landmark events (0).
The logit equation:
logit(Y) = a + ~IXI + ~2X2 + ~3X3 + f:
The grand model:
logit(Yoppositionality) = a +~l Xidentities + ~2 Xstrategies + ~3 Xresources + f:
The specific model:
logit(Yoppositionality) = a + ~1.I Xinclusivity + ~1.2 Xnon-technical environmental discourse + ~1.3 Xexploitation
discourse + ~2.1 Xlitigationllobbying + ~2.2 Xeducation + ~2.3 Xalliance participation + ~3.1 Xresource inefficiency +
~3.2 public/government support + ~3.3 Xrevenue + ~3.4 Xcompensation + ~3.5 Xvolunteers + ~3.6 Xage + f:
._------------
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I then transfonn the model through exponentiation so that the coefficients of the logit
model are converted into odds ratios:
odds(Y = 1) = e1n[odds(Y = I)]
The results show odds ratios between 0 and 2, with 1 representing no change in the log of
the odds that an EO would report to have opposed any of the above mentioned political
events. Odds ratios above 1 indicate an increase in these odds, and below 1 a decrease by
that factor.
4.5 - Variables and Descriptive Statistics
4.5.1 - Oppositionality: Response Variable (Dependent)
Interestingly, only one forth of EOs sampled reported participating in oppositional
political advocacy. Some of these organizations were not in existence during some of the
earlier protests: roughly one third of EOs have been around less than 10 years, and more
than one tenth of EOs less than 5 years. However climate change and the Kyoto Protocols
remain a contemporary issue, and as the dependent variable is an index of participating in
any of the events, one might expect a larger proportion of sampled EOs to have reported
to have advocated that the US sign the agreement. (See Table 2.)
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
mean min max std dev
oppos 0.257732 0 1.0 0.438139
age 20.18557 1.0 146.0 22.44749
inel -0.06654 -1.43 3.098988 0.988643
nonteeh 0.021275 -2.79133 3.392692 1.014123
exploit 0.00436 -2.01165 7.610851 0.99779
litig 0.017636 -1.54382 5.281438 1.011894
edue 0.082819 -2.93648 1.877013 0.970515
alliane -0.00362 -2.39906 3.174977 0.996089
Igeffie -0.0362 -2.51634 0.711052 1.037597
Igpsupt -0.03604 -2.32819 0.519423 1.036207
Iggree -0.03497 -2.83312 1.714564 1.030089
eompens 46828.3 0 1063914.0 101709.9
volunt 3.38488 1.0 6.0 1.643056
4.5.2 - Inclusivity
The dispersion ofthe variables that are best intended to capture the concept of
identities reveals predictable and interesting results as well. These identities are rooted in
particular ecological worldviews, which are varied across a wide spectrum. Some adopt
more inclusive identities, as indicated by higher scores on this dimension of the
correspondence analysis, and some more exclusive. With a negative mean score for
inclusivity, it is clear that most EOs view their mission with a relatively exclusive
worldview. While allies may form across various lines, the identity itself is largely kept
distinct from that of other EOs. However, this may be tautological: that an EO only exists
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inasmuch as it can define itself as distinct from other EOs. If an EO were to replicate the
mission of another organization, it might be in competition with that EO, which under
most circumstances should prove to be a suboptimal outcome for the combined missions
of the EOs, and thus hopefully quite uncommon. This might occur if there were personal
and/or political but not ideological 48 factionalization in the EO, or it might be
inadvertent, 49 however taken in this context, should occur only rarely. The majority of
EOs cluster around the lower scores, 50 which suggests that most EOs seek more
pragmatic, immediate and more narrowly defined environmental goals. Those with higher
scores here, such as Women's Voices for the Earth (WVE) and Global Village Institute,
have missions that require grand strategies of cooperation and dialogue that reach across
industry/movement fissures.
4.5.3 - Non-Technical Environmental Discourse
Non-technical environmental discourse has a less skewed distribution, with an
approximated mean and median, suggesting a wide range of potential discourses
available to EOs. Global Warming Initiatives and the Thoreau Institute for example have
low scores here, suggesting that they rely heavily on scientific management to calculate
environmental damage in ways that are respected by policymakers. EOs such as the
Native Forest Council, whose extremely uncompromising mission seeks sweeping
change and balks at the human capacity to manage or even mitigate ecological damage,
48 because an ideological faction would by definition result in a distinct mission
49 due to lack of knowledge of each other's existence, or a coincidentally simultaneous yet organic
origination for both EOs without them having yet merged.
50 The mean score, -0.067, is more than twice as close to the minimum, -1.430 than it is to the maximum,
3.099.
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score very highly here, as they are of the most non-technical in their approach to
environmental degradation amelioration.
4.5.4 - Exploitation Discourse
Exploitation discourse is relatively clustered around the lower scores, suggesting
that most EOs do not closely identify with that approach. However, the International
Hunting Land Association for example has a relatively high score for exploitation
discourse, which would stand to reason: hunting is by definition an act of utilizing nature
for human consumption. Contrarily, EOs such as Vegan Outreach and Mercy for
Animals, who are the two EOs in my sample with the lowest scores for exploitation
discourse, would by their very purpose oppose the consumption of animals by humans.
Moreover, the preponderance of low scores here suggests that the bulk of EOs seem to
have at their root a deep respect for the natural world, which is a framework that would
understandably represent a certain degree of tension with a discourse of exploitation.
4.5.5 - LitigationlLobbying and Alliance Participation
The dispersion of the variables that are best intended to capture the concept of
organizational strategy also reveal interesting patterns. The frequency that an EO
employs various methods in relation to each other method is indicated by the factor
analysis, with higher scores indicating a greater propensity to employ the given strategy.
Litigation/lobbying and alliance participation are all relatively evenly dispersed and
clustered around the mean, which stands to reason in that neither are particularly
disruptive tactics, and as such unlikely to provoke a strong reaction either direction.
Those EOs that report not making use of these techniques are likely not vehemently
102
opposed to the utilization of the tactic in general, and are probably simply unable to do
so, or are preoccupied engaging in other approaches. Those that do employ them
probably have the techniques at their disposal, and might even routinely utilize them, yet
more frequently employ other techniques. In other words, most EOs utilize these
strategies to a certain degree, yet do so as part of a grander strategy that involves a
multitude of techniques.
4.5.6 - Education
Education on the other hand, is skewed left by the few cases that do not
emphasize this strategy at all. The Lazar Foundation for example, who sits at the bottom
of this scale, focuses primarily on funding environmental grants in the Pacific Northwest.
As such, they do not employ education as a strategy per se, however they might fund
those who do. This cluster around the higher factor scores suggests that most EOs
reported that they intentionally perform some educational function. This would stand to
reason, as nearly every EO has as its general objective the desire to raise awareness of
their issue, in an effort to garner support.
4.5.7 - Resource Inefficiency
The dispersion ofthe variables that are best intended to capture the concept of
resource dependency also reveals some predictable patterns. For instance, the mean for
resource inefficiency is considerably above the median, which indicates a propensity for
EOs to be resource inefficient, or to spend nearly all of what they take in. More resource
efficient EOs, such as the Wildlife Rescue Service of Florida, Inc., probably take in more
donations than they have the facilities to spend. With such a particularized mission, it
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would seem likely that they would not feel obligated to distribute their resources among
other EOs or invest in a diverse array of projects. Alternatively, EOs at this end ofthe
spectrum may be compiling a war chest to fund more expensive initiatives down the road.
Most EOs however are located toward the top of the scale of inefficiency, and thus tend
to be strategically constrained by their lack of financial latitude. EOs such as the Western
Lands Project spend nearly all of what they take in, and as such have little flexibility to
expand beyond their usual repertoires of action.
4.5.8 - Public/Government Support and Revenue
The public/government support variable also has a mean relatively higher than the
median, suggesting that most EOs tend to receive a substantial amount of resources from
government grants. This is also true of revenue, although to a lesser degree, suggesting
that most EOs garner substantial resources, and several who bring in very little skew the
distribution left somewhat.
4.6 - Correlations
Now turning to my multivariate analysis, some important relationships between the
variables become readily apparent (see Table 3). The following section is a protracted
and detailed analysis of that correlation matrix, which is a necessary foundation for the
development of the typology at the end ofthis chapter, and its resolution at the end of the
next chapter. The results of the logistic regression continue below in section 4.7.
Table 3
Correlation Matrix
N = 291 oppos 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 age -0.013
0.831 p< 0.100
2 inel 0.240 -0.068 p< 0.050
0.000 0.249 p< 0.010
3 non- 0.278 -0. lIS 0.245 *note: entries in boldface denote p<0.050
tech 0.000 0.050 0.000 **significance values in italics
4 exploit 0.050 -0.055 0.088 -0.148
0.393 0.350 0.134 0.011
5 litig 0.165 0.061 0.072 0.125 0.002
0.005 0.303 0.223 0.033 0.976
6 educ 0.030 0.021 -0.303 -0.065 0.137 -0.019
0.614 0.716 0.000 0.268 0.020 0.748
7 allianc 0.262 0.035 0.139 0.361 -0.117 -0.028 -0.033
0.000 0.549 0.018 0.000 0.046 0.636 0.575
8 1geffic -0.034 0.142 0.017 -0.087 -0.054 0.036 -0.091 0.027
0.570 0.016 0.775 0.140 0.361 0.547 0.123 0.643
9 19psupt -0.047 0.119 -0.018 -0.101 -0.110 0.049 -0.048 -0.001 0.741
0.427 0.042 0.767 0.087 0.060 0.402 0.417 0.992 0.000
# 199rec -0.095 0.271 0.044 -0.113 -0.066 0.041 -0.076 0.113 0.818 0.732
0.106 0.000 0.456 0.054 0.264 0.492 0.195 0.05-1 0.000 0.000
# com -0.022 0.181 0.040 -0.097 0.018 0.001 -0.040 0.098 0.190 0.184 0.367
pens 0.709 0.002 0.502 0.097 0.760 0.986 0.497 0.096 0.001 0.002 0.000
# volunt -0.124 0.182 -0.084 -0.038 0.041 0.015 0.271 0.015 0.053 0.101 0.069 -0.015
0.035 0.002 0.155 0.524 0.487 0.80-1 0.000 0.804 0.370 0.085 0.241 0.802
o
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4.6.1 - Oppositionality
Initially, it is important to examine the correlations between the independent
variable, oppositionality, with the various significant dependent variables. Five dependent
variables have significant correlations with oppositionality: inclusivity, nontechnical
environmental discourse, litigation/lobbying, alliance participation and size.
4.6.1.1 - Oppositionality and inclusivity. Two of the identity variables,
inclusivity and nontechnical environmental discourse, are both significant at the p <
0.010 level and positively correlated with oppositionality. This suggests that the more
inclusive the orientation of the EO, the more likely it is to engage in oppositional political
advocacy. For example, organizations with the lowest correspondence scores in
inclusivity, such as the Gulf Coast Bird Observatory, The New York Turtle and Tortoise
Society and the Wood River Land Trust also did not oppose any of the three major
political events. This would stand to reason, as the exclusivity of their identities (being
focused on the localized objectives of their respective particular regions) would define
the issues of concern at the oppositional events to be outside the narrower purview of
their own mission.
Likewise, organizations with the highest correspondence scores on the inclusivity
dimension, such as Clean Air Now, the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance,
the Global Village Institute and the Earth Ministry, all did oppose one or more of these
political events. This also would stand to reason as the wider missions of these
organizations would require tackling larger social problems in order to achieve them. For
instance, the issue of climate change involves a great deal of sub-issues (such as species
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loss, population displacement, violent conflict, food/water shortages, etc.). The issue of
neoliberal trade also includes a wide array of sub-issues (such as ecosystemic destruction,
mounting global debt and dependency, poverty, sustainable agriculture, etc.). Including
the identities of various EOs that address the myriad implications to each of these
umbrella problems would then be essential to devising a comprehensive enough strategy
to successfully implement effective change. Additionally, as the debates on global
warming and neo-liberalism continue in Beltway policy circles, the political advocacy of
EOs investing in such comprehensive strategies become oppositional, as the implication
to the stance is that Washington is mistaken in allowing the problems to deepen.
Interestingly, one of the most inclusive organizations, the Government
Accountability Project, did not get involved in any of the three political events. This
anomaly helps situate the above relationships. Although the GAO must be as inclusive as
possible (as its mission covers such a wide range of topics) it also, by its very nature of
being linked to a government agency, is either not predisposed toward or actively
restrained against participating in political advocacy that opposes the general sentiments
coming out of Washington.
4.6.1.2 - Oppositionality and non-technical environmental discourse.
Additionally, net everything else, the more an EO identity suggests an embrace of less
technological environmental discourse, the more likely it will have participated in
oppositional political advocacy. This should be expected, as the critique of the capacity
of technological mechanisms to address ecological destruction is connected to a critique
of modernity in general. Established political circles in Washington however tend to
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avoid the larger critique of modernity, as this would challenge the interests of capital.
Therefore it would seem intuitively sound that there would be a correlation between
discourse that avoids technology and political advocacy that challenges the established
order. For example, the Native Forest Council, whose score on this dimension of the
correspondence analysis is one of the highest in my sample, also has a mission that does
not seem worried about making enemies. Their self declared goal to "fully protect and
preserve every acre of publicly owned land in the United States" primes them for political
advocacy that does not leave room for compromise or cooperation, but rather one that is
explicitly oppositional.
The inverse is also true: net everything else; the more an EO identity suggests an
embrace of more technological environmental discourse, the less likely it will have
participated in oppositional political advocacy. Again this stands to reason, as EOs that
are mired in technocratic solutions tend to seek assistance from government agencies for
funding and expertise, and as such are less likely to bite the hand that feeds them. For
example, two organizations whose scores are found at the bottom of this dimension of the
correspondence analysis, such as Global Warming Initiatives (GWI) and the Greener
Good Foundation, Inc. (GGFI), employ technological solutions to help businesses. GWI
states that they "assist businesses in turning energy efficiency and environmental
performance into a corporate asset while reducing global warming" and the GGFI claims
to balance "the delicate needs of our environment with the demands of commercial
interests." Not only do both EOs focus on technologically based solutions (such as green
engineering, mechanical and chemical pollution and waste cleanup and filtration, etc.),
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but they also both maintain an intimate connection to the business world, rendering their
political advocacy decidedly non-oppositional.
Interestingly, the International Hunting Land Association Inc., whose position on
this dimension of the correspondence analysis was one of the lowest, (indicating a strong
preference for technological discourse) actually did participate in oppositional political
advocacy (they opposed NAFTA). Although further investigation would be necessary to
definitively determine the reasons for this, it would stand to reason that the international
focus of the EO might draw them into the discussion on international trade. Although
hunting organizations may tend to be more conservative generally, ecosystemic habitat
protection across national borders demands a more oppositional stance than other hunting
organizations would be inclined to undertake, which might account for their oppositional
political advocacy.
4.6.1.3 - Oppositionality and litigation/lobbying. Two strategy variables,
litigation/lobbying and alliance participation, were also both significant at the p < 0.010
level as well as positively correlated with oppositionality. The positive correlation for
litigation/lobbying (although not as strong as with the identity variables) indicates that net
everything else, organizations that employ strategies of litigation and/or lobbying tend
also to engage in oppositional political advocacy. Litigation is in itself a form of
oppositional political advocacy to a certain degree, as it represents an institutional forum
for a conflict between parties. For example, the New York City Environmental Justice
Alliance (NYCEJA), whose factor score was one of the highest in the sample (suggesting
a strong preference for utilizing this strategy), also participated in oppositional advocacy
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for both the WTO and Kyoto Protocols events. They apparently rely on litigation to
protect various areas and/or neighborhoods from disproportionate pollution affliction
along race/class lines. Additionally, pressure on entities in Washington would also be
essential to promote legislation that prevented such abuses. These techniques bind the
NYCEJA to oppositional political advocacy, because this stance is inherently
quarrelsome, as it is a direct confrontation with alleged offenders. It would also stand to
reason that they would oppose unrestricted trade as well as obstinacy toward recognizing
the anthropogenic causes of global warming. Both issues transcend borders and
disproportionately affect poorer nations, an area of recent focus for the environmental
justice movement in general, and the NYCEJA more specifically.
Additionally, those EOs that have low factors scores for these strategies tend to
not have participated in any of the landmark oppositional events. For example,
educational EOs such as the Ecology Project International and the Lady Bird Johnson
Wildflower Center do not employ litigation or lobbying at all, and also did not participate
in any of the oppositional advocacy events. Understandably, an outdoor education
organization and a nature center would not be predisposed toward oppositional political
advocacy, as each EO would require a general perception of neutrality in order to
establish pedagogical credibility and legitimacy.
Some anomalous cases also demonstrate intuitive relationships, such as the
National Pollution Prevention Roundtable (NPPR) and the Quaker Earthcare Witness,
who have low factor scores for litigation/lobbying, yet opposed at least one of the
political events anyway. The NPPR focuses on global warming explicitly, and thus was
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understandably opposed to the Beltway stance (indicating that the EO would have
opposed Washington by favoring that the US sign the Kyoto Protocols). Also, Quakers
tend to be relatively outspoken on issues of social justice, so their predisposition toward
oppositionality is logical. However, the Global Warming Initiatives did not oppose any of
the events, despite their tendency to employ litigation and lobbying. This is particularly
interesting because they are an EO that claims to seek solutions to climate change, yet
they did not support the signing of the Kyoto Protocols. This becomes more
understandable upon closer examination of the GWI however, as their mission reveals
that they primarily focus on partnerships with corporations, which would explain why
they do not engage in oppositional political advocacy. Apparently the legislation that they
advocate for is not very controversial, and may even be supportive of corporate interests.
4.6.1.4 - Oppositionality and alliance participation. The second strategy
variable, alliance participation is also both significant at the p < 0.010 level as well as
positively correlated with oppositionality. This association between seeking alliances and
advocating oppositionally may be a necessity: if an EO is going to be oppositional to
Beltway politics, it might need to be more conciliatory with potential EO allies, as it
would suffer from fewer institutional relationships. For example, the National Pollution
Prevention Roundtable (NPPR), who scores very high in this factor analysis (indicating a
preference for employing alliance formation as a strategy), also took an oppositional
stance to Washington's position on the Kyoto Protocols. Their mission states that they
seek to "avoid, eliminate, or reduce pollution at the source" (NPPR, 2007) indicating that
the changes they pursue are quite fundamental in nature, and as such might be considered
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threatening by established institutions. They therefore would understandably need to seek
alliances not only to hedge against potential adversaries, but also to increase their
effectiveness (as the sweeping nature of the refonns they advocate demand cooperative
approaches). Additionally, they claim to be the "largest membership organization in the
United States devoted solely to pollution prevention." With this focus on size, they would
naturally seek to include as many allies as possible. Understandably then, the NPPR also
has one of the highest correspondence scores for inclusivity. This would stand to reason,
as their big tent approach would demand an inclusive identity and a repertoire of
strategies that emphasizes alliance fonnation.
Those organizations that do not focus on alliance fonnation also tend to be less
oppositional. At this end of the spectrum, the Forest Service Employees for
Environmental Ethics (FSEEE), who have a very low factor score for alliance
participation, did not oppose any of the three landmark political events. This organization
is obviously ensconced in fonnal institutional bonds, as represents government
employees. This unique focus would eliminate the need for alliances, as no other
organization has overlapping purview. Additionally, as government employees, members
of the FSEEE and thus also its leadership should be very unlikely to directly oppose the
government's stance.
4.6.1.5 - Oppositionality and size. The size of the organization is also correlated
with oppositionality. Although only significant at the p < 0.050 level, volunteers has a
negative coefficient, which indicates that the larger organizations with more volunteers
do not tend to engage in oppositional political advocacy. This fits theoretical expectations
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because these larger organizations with more volunteers are more connected to
established political channels and have a more professionalized (and thus career-seeking)
leadership, both of which have a negative effect on oppositionality. This institutional
inertia hinders a larger, more established EO from engaging in radical politics because
the size of the EO limits the how wieldy the EO's political advocacy can be. Only four of
the 60 largest (having the most volunteers) EOs in our sample reported having opposed
any of the political events, indicating a strong tendency for larger organizations to avoid
contentious politics. The National Religious Partnership for the Environment and the
International Humanities Center are two exceptions, however both of these organizations
scored very highly on the inclusivity correspondence analysis, indicating that it might be
a possible intervening variable: that the inclusivity of their identity outstripped the
conservatizing influence of their size, resulting in a net oppositional political advocacy.
4.6.2 - Age
Although included primarily as a control variable, the variation in the ages of the
organizations significantly correlates with six of the independent variables: non-technical
environmental discourse, resource inefficiency, public/government support, revenue,
professionalization, and size.
4.6.2.1 - Age and non-technical environmental discourse. Older EOs tend to
employ more technical environmental discourse (negative coefficient with p = 0.050).
The rhetoric of scientific management of the environment defines the inception of the
early environmental movement. Recognizing the human capacity to manage a sustainable
ecosystem was a huge shift from earlier interpretations that ignored anthropogenic
I
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environmental damage. Some of the so-called "new" social movements that emerged in
the 70s and beyond, took a more holistic approach, which involved a host of ecological
identities that challenged the primacy of scientific management. The Massachusetts
Interfaith Power and Light (MIPL), for instance, a very new organization (6 years old)
that emphasizes a spiritual approach, also has a very high correspondence score with non-
technical environmental discourse. This would suggest that non-technical discourses
have found much greater resonance in recent times then they have historically.
Additionally, the Maine Audubon society, the oldest organization in the sample, also has
a very low correspondence score for non-technical environmental discourse. As is typical
with the older, more established EOs, traditional, scientific management is a much more
commonly accepted identity than it is by some ofthe newer, more culturally sensitive
EOs which focus on more holistic identities.
4.6.2.2 - Age and resource inefficiency. Older EOs are more likely to spend
much of what they bring in rather than amassing a war chest, as indicated by the positive
and significant (p < 0.050) coefficient for the correlation between age and resource
inefficiency. This stands to reason because older organizations tend to have a greater
revenue base (see 4.6.2.4 below) and organizations with greater revenue tend to spend
most of their money (see 4.6.9.4 below). With such large budgets, older EOs tend to
develop routinized and institutionalized accounting procedures that encourage money to
be used up. Internal procedures incentivize the utilization of all collected resources in a
timely manner. If line items are left unspent, they could be removed from the budget. If
they want the money next year, they might have to spend it all during the current year.
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Also, with greater levels of funding, there tends to be greater scrutiny on what is done
with the money. Therefore, the older an organization gets, the more it routinizes their
accounting procedures, thus increasing the usage of funds relative to gross receipts, and
therefore also the resource inefficiency.
4.6.2.3 - Age and public/government support. Older EOs are also tend to
receive a substantial portion oftheir financial support from public and governmental
agencies, as indicated by the positive and significant (p < 0.050) coefficient for the
correlation between age and public/government support. The institutional relationships
that are the foundation for government support ofNPOs take time to develop. Upstart
EOs such as The Gaiaway have not yet had a chance to forge many of these relationships,
and as such seek alternate sources of support. Even the Firefighters United for Safety,
Ethics, and Ecology, a fledgling (2 years old at time of survey) EO whose mission,
membership and organizational structure is closely tied to governmental channels, has the
lowest factor score in my sample for that strategy. This would suggest that despite an
organization's predisposition toward seeking public support, unless they have been
around long enough to forge key relationships with particular governmental agencies,
they will be unlikely to be able to secure those resources. Realizing that this would
constitute a very steep uphill battle, younger EOs likely pursue other avenues of funding.
4.6.2.4 - Age and revenue, professionalization, and volunteers. As an EO ages,
provided that it is able to continue to exist, it will tend to grow. All three of my indicators
for size: revenue, projessionalization and volunteers, are both significant (p < 0.005) and
positively correlated with age. As an organization grows, it increases its capacity to
r-----------------~----
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garner financial resources from donors, memberships, grants, and revenue generation,
thus expanding its yearly revenue. For example, Maine Audubon, the oldest organization
in the sample, also has one of the greatest yearly revenues (top 2% of sample), greatest
levels of compensation (top 8% of sample), and number of volunteers (top sextile). Over
the years, Main Audubon has been able to expand and grow, substantially increasing their
revenue, professionalization and volunteer base. With more financial resources at their
disposal, EO executives are able to maintain or even increase sizeable salaries for
employees. With this expanded paid staff the EO is more capable of attracting and
managing large numbers of volunteers. Over time, successful EOs are able to garner
more financial resources, pay more in professional staff salaries, and support greater
numbers of volunteers.
4.6.3 - Inclusivity
Identities ofEOs tend to cluster around similar dispositions. Another way to look
at this is that there are commonalities between various EO identities such that we can
begin to construct profiles of identity types.
4.6.3.1 - Inclusivity and non~technical environmental discourse. One identity
cluster is indicated by the positive correlation between the inclusivity of EO identities
with their propensity toward utilizing non-technical environmental discourse. Apparently
discourses that stress technical solutions are also less inclusive of alternate avenues.
Perhaps it is a case of having nothing but a hammer and seeing the whole world as a nail:
as we place greater degrees of faith in the capacity of humans to scientifically manage
nature, we blind ourselves to the possibility that we are ultimately incapable of doing so.
116
Additionally, organizations that emphasize spiritual reverence might be amenable to the
usefulness of science despite its limitations. However, a scientific research organization
for example, would probably be less likely to include the voices of various cultural
influences, as they would be mostly concerned with maintaining the credibility of their
findings. This would encourage the forn1er type of EO to be more inclusive, and the
latter, less. For example, the Earth Ministry and the Massachusetts Interfaith Power and
Light both have high correspondence scores for both inclusivity and nontechnical
environmental discourse, indicating that they do not necessarily emphasize technical
discourse; although they are open to multi-pronged approaches that would include such
discourse. However, scientific organizations and trusts, such as the Wood River Land
Trust, the Kittitas Conservation Trust, and the Bear Trust International all have very low
scores for both of these identities, indicating a preference for technical discourse that is
relatively exclusive of other identities.
Additionally, this relationship between inclusivity and non-technical
environmental discourse would stand to reason because more inclusive EOs tend to be
more oppositional (see 4.6.1.1 above), as do less technical EOs (see 4.6.1.2 above). Here
we begin to see two identity profiles emerging: some organizations tend to be more
inclusive, less technical, and more oppositional, while others tend to be less inclusive,
more technical, and less oppositional.
4.6.3.2 - Inclusivity and education. There is a strong relationship between
identities and strategies as well, in that the identity of the organization at least partially
determines the strategies that they will employ. For instance, inclusivity is both
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significant (p < 0.000) and negatively correlated with education, indicating that EOs that
tend to focus on education do so relatively exclusively. For example, the Cascade Raptor
Center (CRC), an educational and rescue facility for birds of prey, has one of the lowest
correspondence scores for inclusivity. They require a public perception of legitimacy so
that their message can be heard and understood by a wide range of people, so they need
to be certain that their message cuts across as many political perspectives as possible. If
the identity of the CRC were to become more inclusive of the identities of other EOs, it
could come to be perceived as politically, instead of scientifically, motivated, thus
curtailing the donations of more conservative community members. At worst, it could
discourage such people from bringing injured birds to the center if they were to be found,
which would hinder the overall mission of the EO. In general, educational EOs need a
public perception of neutrality to be taken seriously, hence the tendency toward more
exclusive identities.
4.6.3.3 - Inclusivity and alliance participation. Participation in alliances is an
inherently inclusive strategy, in that it by definition seeks to include other groups in the
mission of the EO. It is thus intuitive that inclusivity and alliance participation should be
strongly correlated (p < 0.050). Additionally, this relationship is intuitive because both
inclusivity and alliance participation are positively correlated with oppositionality (see
4.6.1.1 and 4.6.1.4 above, respectively). For example, Women's Voices for the Earth,
Voices for Earth Justice/MI Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign, and the Global
Village Institute all have high correspondence scores for inclusivity, high factor scores for
alliance participation, and each opposed one or more of the landmark oppositional
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events. EOs such as these that engage in oppositional political advocacy, seek to expand
their influence by dovetailing objectives with other EOs and by reaching out to them to
forge alliances.
Interestingly, the EO in my sample with one of greatest degrees of affinity with an
inclusive identity, (the Government Accountability Project) and with one of the greatest
propensities toward alliance formation as a primary strategy, nevertheless did not engage
in any of the landmark political advocacy events. This seemingly confounding example
however is actually consistent with the above theoretical conceptualization, because this
EO is actually a part of the government itself. Evidently the internal institutional pull to
keep the EO from becoming oppositional has a greater influence than that of its inclusive
identity and preference for alliance-building strategies.
Further evidence of the intuitiveness of the relationship between inclusivity and
alliance participation is that they both are positively correlated with non-technical
environmental discourse (see 4.6.3.1 above and 4.6.4.3 below). Again, we see two
profiles emerging: some EOs tend to be oppositional, small, young, inclusive, non-
technical and focus on building alliances, while others are not so oppositional, but are
larger, older, less inclusive, more technical and do not need to pursue alliances.
4.6.4 - Non-Technical Environmental Discourse
4.6.4.1 - Non-technical environmental discourse and exploitation discourse.
Two theoretically similar identities, non-technical environmental discourse and
exploitation discourse, are both significant (p < 0.50) and negatively correlated. For
example, the two EOs with the highest correspondence scores in my sample for non-
------------------------
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technical environmental discourse also have the two lowest correspondence scores for
exploitation discourse. The Vegan Outreach and Mercy For Animals for example, both
challenge the logic of scientific management of the environment for human consumption,
which appears to be the quintessential fusion of the two discourses. A discourse of
seeking solutions outside a technocratic mindset would probably do so in order to
develop a holistic, connected approach to environmental protection, which is consistent
with the desire to protect the environment for its intrinsic value. Inversely, EOs that stress
the protection of nature for human use-value would probably tend to utilize more
technical discourse. This means that EOs with identities that stress technological
solutions to environmental problems also tend to seek to preserve the environment for
human consumption. For example, the International Hunting Land Association Inc., as
mentioned above, has one of the lowest correspondence scores in my sample (bottom
decile) for non-technical environmental discourse and one of the highest correspondence
scores in my sample (top decile) for exploitation discourse. The ideology of utilitarian
scientific rationality to manage the environment binds technical and exploitative
discourses together.
4.6.4.2 - Non-technical environmental discourse and litigation/lobbying. Net
everything else, EOs that tend to engage in non-technical environmental discourse also
tend to employ strategies of litigation and/or lobbying. The positive and significant (p <
0.050) coefficient for non-technical environmental discourse and litigation/lobbying
suggests that EOs that prefer less technical solutions are in greater tension with other
groups (perhaps those that employ more technical solutions) and thus are left with
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confrontational lobbying and litigation as a means to achieve their objectives. This is
further supported by the positive correlation between non-technical environmental
discourse and oppositionality, (see 4.6.1.2 above) and between litigation/lobbying and
oppositionality, (see 4.6.1.3 above) because as an organization finds itself in greater
tension with other organizations, such as over ideological splits over the ability of
scientific management to solve environmental problems, it will necessarily become more
oppositional, and without sufficient formal connections to established governmental
agencies, be left with litigation and lobbying as a viable avenue. Additionally, those
organizations comfortable with scientific management would develop less tension with
other groups, and as such engage in less oppositional tactics such as education or
partnership planning. Global Warming Initiatives, for example, uses scientific data and
partnerships with businesses to reduce pollution. Not surprisingly, they prefer a more
technical discourse, do not engage in litigation or lobbying much if at all, and did not
oppose any of the landmark political events.
4.6.4.3 - Non-technical environmental discourse and alliance participation.
Net everything else, EGs that tend to engage in non-technical environmental discourse
also tend to employ strategies of alliance participation. The positive and significant (p <
0.010) coefficient for non-technical environmental discourse and alliance participation
suggests that this ideological preference for less technical solutions is divisive somewhat,
as it challenges the effectiveness of scientific management. This divisive ideological
stance has very direct effects on the types of strategies that EGs tend to employ, because
it creates a more confrontational dynamic that forces these EGs to reach out to other
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organizations to stay afloat. If an organization chooses to pursue a divisive ideological
alignment and does not spend enough time or energy developing alliances, they will lose
support and thus influence, and eventually fade away. This is further supported by the
positive correlation between non-technical environmental discourse and oppositionality,
(see 4.6.1.2 above) and between alliance participation and oppositionality, (see 4.6.1.3
above) because it demonstrates how EOs that remain steadfast in their opposition to
highly technical solutions are also more prone to oppositional political advocacy. As a
result of these two sources of tension, these EOs are inclined to devote considerable
energy toward cultivating alliances. Once again, we see The Vegan Outreach and Mercy
For Animals, who have the two highest correspondence scores in my sample for non-
technical environmental discourse, also have two of the highest factor scores (top decile)
for alliance participation, suggesting a strong connection between these two identities.
Not surprisingly, both also opposed at least one of the aforementioned political events.
Animal rights organizations might be predictably ostracized somewhat by more
mainstream EOs, as animal rights issues themselves are often perceived by many to be
unreasonably radical. Some other potential opponents may even feel threatened or judged
by the suggestion that humans ought not consume animal products. This tension probably
encourages these non-technical EOs to spend their energy cultivating alliances to hedge
against any lack of solidarity they might inflict upon themselves from taking unpopular
positions on technologically-based solutions.
4.6.4.4 - Non-technical environmental discourse and public/government
support. Organizations with strong ties to government agencies also tend to prefer more
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technical discourse for managing environmental sustainability. Although only significant
at the p < 0.100 level, the negative correlation between non-technical environmental
discourse and public/government support demonstrates that EOs that devote their energy
to technologically sophisticated methodologies also tend to have more financial ties to
government agencies. This would stand to reason, as developing advanced technologies
is consistent with growth-oriented economics, the preferred economic model out of
Washington. It does not challenge the mode of production, and indeed commits our
society further to an industrialized path. EOs such as the Institute for Applied Ecology
and the Washtenaw Land Trust both use government partnerships to develop cooperative
solutions to environmental problems. Both have very high (top decile) correspondence
scores for non-technical environmental discourse, and as well have one ofthe highest
levels ofpublic and government support (log of ratio of contributions to gross receipts) in
my sample. It would stand to reason that government agencies would be more likely to
fund more technical projects, and simultaneously, that more technical EOs would be
more likely to seek government funding.
4.6.4.5 - Non-technical environmental discourse and revenue/
professionalization. Larger EOs tend to have the resource garnering capacities and
inclinations toward pursuing technologically-dependent environmental solutions, and as
such are more likely to engage in technical environmental discourse. Although only
significant at the p < 0.100 level, both revenue and projessionalization, two of my
indicators for size, are negatively correlated with non-technical environmental discourse.
This establishes that the more money an EO takes in, the more its discourse will
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emphasize technological capacities for environmental management. Also, the more
employees that the EO has, the more its discourse will reflect this preference. Larger
organizations with more financial resources and more employees have both the capacity
as well as the tendency to engage in technical ecological discourse.
4.6.5 - Exploitation Discourse
4.6.5.1 - Exploitation discourse and education. EOs whose discourse stresses
the preservation of the environment for sustainable human consumption are also likely to
employ education as a strategy. The correlation (p < 0.050) between exploitation
discourse and education demonstrates this connection, and stands to reason, as utilitarian
management of natural areas, with its penchant for scientific methodology, requires
education. For example, the Fontenelle Nature Association strives to "enhance human
stewardship" (Fontenelle, 2010) by educating the public about the scientific management
of natural resources. Indeed, even the usage of the term "natural resources" invokes a
level of consumptive bias. This dovetailing of a discourse of sustainable consumption and
a strategy of education is likely common among these types ofEOs.
4.6.5.2 - Exploitation discourse and alliance participation. Similarly, EOs with
a preference for discourses that emphasize the sustainable consumption of natural
resources do not tend to spend much if any effort cultivating alliances. More importantly,
EOs that depart from exploitation discourse do tend to employ alliance participation as a
strategy. The negative correlation (p < 0.050) between exploitation discourse and
alliance participation demonstrates this ideological/strategic association. Such EOs
probably distance themselves from established channels of support by taking issue with
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the logic of human consumption of nature. Animal rights organizations, for example are
often perceived by the general public and government agencies as unreasonable and
unrealistic. With fewer channels of institutional support, it is clear that these EOs must
cultivate relationships with other EOs in order to remain effective in the face of potential
public disapproval. As mentioned above, the two EOs in my sample who indicated the
least approval of exploitation discourse are the Vegan Outreach and Mercy For Animals.
Not surprisingly, they also have two of the highest (top5%) factor scores for alliance
participation. This further stands to reason because groups that prefer non-technical
environmental discourses tend to not employ a discourse of exploitation (see 4.6.4.1),
however do devote a considerable amount of time, energy and resources to building
alliances (see 4.6.4.3).
4.6.6 - Education and Volunteers
EOs that frequently employ education as a strategy also tend to have greater
numbers of volunteers. The positive correlation (p < 0.00 I) between education and
volunteers illustrates this tendency. Education may be an activity that requires greater
numbers of volunteers. This is seen most obviously in EOs such as the Gorman Heritage
Farm Foundation, who utilize volunteers (in this case sustainable farm labor) as an
educational activity.
4.6.7 - Resource Inefficiency
4.6.7.1 - Resource inefficiency and public/government support. EOs that
spend most of what they bring in tend to rely heavily on government funding. The very
strong (~ = 0.741) and significant (p < 0.001) correlation between resource inefficiency
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and public/government support demonstrates this close connection. This connection
between how resource efficient an EO is and how much of their largesse comes from
public and/or government sources is further established by the above findings, in that
older organizations tend to be more resource inefficient (see 4.6.2.2 above) as well as
publicly funded (see 4.6.2.3 above). Additionally, EOs that garner more total resources
are both resource inefficient (meaning they spend nearly as much as they bring in; see
4.6.7.2 below) as well as are heavily government supported (see 4.6.8.1 below),
indicating yet another confirmation of this connection. Furthern10re, EOs that devote a
great deal of their financial resources to salaries for employees are also both resource
inefficient as well as are heavily government supported (see 4.6.8.1 and 4.6.7.2 below).
Older, larger EOs that pay more in total employee salaries tend to spend much of what
they own, and are substantially funded by government and public groups.
4.6.7.2 - Resource inefficiency and revenue, professionalization. As mentioned
above (4.6.7.1), the correlation between resource inefficiency and revenue is both
significant (p < 0.001) and considerably positive (13 = 0.818), indicating that EOS that
garner substantial caches of financial resources also tend to spend most of what they
bring in. Additionally, the correlation between resource inefficiency and
professionalization is both significant (p < 0.005) and positive, indicating that EOS that
spend more on employee salaries also tend to spend most of what they bring in. This is
consistent with above observations that suggest a connection between larger
organizations (indicated by revenue and professionalization) and a maximal utilization of
their resources. This is particularly salient given the relationship between age and size.
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Older organizations are less resource efficient (see 4.6.2.2 above), and larger (they gamer
greater levels of financial resources, spend more on employee salaries and utilize greater
numbers of volunteers; see 4.6.2.4 above) than younger organizations, indicating a path
of development for EOs. As an EO ages, it grows in size and largesse, and tends to spend
a greater percentage of what it earns. As an EO becomes more institutionalized, it
develops more of a financial support base, which necessitates accounting procedures that
ensure the continued existence of the line items, thus increasing the proportion of the
budget that gets spent each year. Additionally, the process of institutionalization also
coincides with measures of greater transparency and accountability for how the funds are
appropriated, again diminishing the chances that any surplus will remain unspent.
4.6.8 - Public/Government Support and Revenue, Compensation, Volunteers
Larger organizations tend to gamer a greater proportion of their resources from
public and government sources than small organizations do. The significant (p < 0.001)
and substantially positive correlation (~ = 0.732) between public/government support and
revenue suggests that EOs with greater revenues also tend to receive these funds from
public and/or government sources. Additionally, the significant (p < 0.005) and positive
correlation between public/government support and compensation suggests that EOs that
spend substantial resources on salaries for employees also tend to receive a sizeable
amount oftheir funds from public and/or government sources. Furthermore, the
significant (p < 0.100) and positive correlation between public/government support and
volunteers suggests that EOs that enlist the support of many volunteers also tend to
receive a sizeable amount of their funds from public and/or government sources. This
127
result is somewhat predictable, because all three indicators for size reveal a parsimonious
relationship; that as organizations become larger, they tend to foster more relationships
with government entities, from whom they tend to receive a greater proportion of their
funds.
4.6.9 - Revenue and Professionalization
Further demonstrating the parsimony between my measures for size, we see a
very significant (p < 0.001) and positive (~ = 367) correlation between revenue and
projessionalization. Larger organizations bring in more funds and pay more in salaries.
This is supported by the strong correlations between age and revenue, projessionalization
and volunteers. Older organizations are larger: they earn more money, pay more in
salaries, and hire more volunteers.
4.7 - Results
4.7.1- Significant Odds Ratios and Hypotheses ConfirmationlDisconfirmation
Turning now to the results of the logistic regression, we see further evidence of a
typology of two distinct types of EOs emerging. We see oppositional EOs, who tend to
be discursively inclusive and non-technical, strategically focused on litigation and
alliance participation, and structurally smaller, younger, and with fewer financial
resources. Non-oppositional EOs on the other hand, tend to identify discursively with a
more exclusive, exploitative and technical worldview, are strategically more likely to be
focused on education, and structurally larger, older and with greater access to financial
resources. This loosely defined typology that emerges from the correlation matrix is
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further supported by the results of the logistic regression, and explicated below (see
4.7.2.2 below).
4.7.1.1- Inclusivity. As was demonstrated by the correlation matrix, there is a
strong association between inclusivity and oppositionality. Therefore it stands to reason
that EOs whose identities are inclusive of other EO's identities would also be more likely
to engage in oppositional political advocacy. The significant (p < 0.005) odds ratio for
inclusivity (see Table 4) is also much greater than 1 (1.72), suggesting that for every
increase in inclusivity score, the likelihood of them opposing these events increases by
72%. Indeed, in general, having an inclusive identity substantially increases the log of the
odds of opposing any of the political events.
These results conform to my hypothetical expectations, because inclusive
identities should facilitate oppositional political advocacy. An EO predisposed toward
more oppositional political advocacy might be constrained in terms of the degree to
which it is capable of acting oppositionally, as it would need to appear somewhat
reasonable in order to maintain support. To the extent that an EO can define itself as
ideologically poised in cohesion with other related concerns, the more strongly it can
adhere to its oppositional inclinations while maintaining this level of lateral legitimacy.
Additionally, a relatively oppositional EO might position itself as oppositional because of
the degree of change that they seek. Sweeping, revolutionary change proposals are
usually viewed as oppositional precisely due to the degree of change that they propose.
EOs with this more revolutionary focus should be more likely to feel the need to connect
their own mission to the missions of organizations seeking more fundamental structural
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Table 4
Logistic Regression Results
Logistic regression '~p < 0.050
N = 291 **p/0.010
LR chi2( 12) = 66.45 ***p < 0.005
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -132.842
Pseudo R2 = 0.2001
Independent
Variables Odds Ratio Standard Error z score P>z
age 1.01102 0.007338 1.51 0.131
illcl 1.721019 0.300385 3.1 ] 0.002 ***
nontcch 1.387797 0.230726 1.97 0.049 *
exploit 1.199871 0.188317 1.16 0.246
litig 1.425097 0.206395 2.45 0.014 *
educ 1.53371 0.288096 2.28 0.023 *
allianc 1.89387 0.327356 3.69 0 ***
1geffic 1.732212 0.584453 1.63 0.103
19psupt 1.434433 0.390171 1.33 0.185
199rec 0.331996 0.125732 - .9] 0.004 ***
compens 1.000001 1.70E-06 0.57 0.572
votunt 0.75 291 O. 78507 -2.72 0.007 **
changes, and be willing to act in opposition to the federal political mandate in order to
address these larger issues. There may also be some mutual causality between the
variables. Indeed, it may be that as an EO becomes more oppositional, it will need to
hedge against isolation and marginalization by rhetorically reaching out to other
similarly-minded EOs. In either case, inclusive EOs are more likely to be oppositional,
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and thus an inclination towards a more inclusive identity has a strong and significant
positive effect on the odds of opposing any of the political events.
Contrarily, although I expected the effect to be positive, I also hypothesized a
mitigating influence, specifically that the conservatizing effect of inclusivity (due to its
encouragement of cooperation and dialogue) might decrease the magnitude of the effect
(see above). However, with such a strong positive odds ratio (1.72; see Table 4), it is
clear that if this mitigating influence exists, it is nonetheless not enough to substantially
reduce the positive effect that inclusivity has on oppositionality.
Additionally, for the original group research project out of which this research
evolved (Dreiling et aI., 2008), we performed an inter-coder reliability test on a control
variable for organization type. One of the ten types of organizations was
"Religious/Spiritual." Of the ten EOs with the highest correspondence scores for
inclusivity, seven of them were coded as religious organizations, and all of those opposed
at least one of the political events. This affirms the above conclusions that an ecological
identity built on a spiritual, reverent respect for the natural world would be inclusive of as
many other voices as possible, and in so doing, also be contentiously oriented. The non-
denominational aspect of each of these organizations also points to this inclusivity.
However, despite this inclusive, seemingly conciliatory identity, as religious motivation
for behavior is inherently morally grounded, a staunch adherence to the cause of the EO
tends to outweigh considerations of pragmatism. Therefore, this inclusivity of identity
would increase the odds ofthe EO participating in oppositional political advocacy: it is a
mechanism to draw as many as possible into the fold of using a moral lens to motivate
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environmental advocacy. This morally contentious yet cooperatively oriented ideology
operates as a basis for oppositional stances.
4.7.1.2 - Non-technical environmental discourse. As an EO pursues a discourse
that moves away from technologically-based solutions, they are also more likely to
participate in oppositional political advocacy. The significant (p < 0.050) and strong odds
ratio (see Table 4) suggests that a tendency towards non-technical environmental
discourse results in an increase in the log of the odds of participation in any of the three
political events by a factor of 1.38. This conforms to the expectations of the correlation
matrix, because there we also see a strong correlation between non-technical
environmental discourse and oppositionality (see 4.6.1.2 above).
This relationship confirms my original expectations because these EOs tend to
reject technologically-based solutions due to the connections to industrial production that
these models necessitate, which are often viewed as the source ofthe problem. If the
rapacious pace of capitalist industrial production is seen as the root source of the
environmental crisis, then technological discourse would also be avoided. EOs with non-
technical identities then often base their views on a deep, even spiritual reverence for
environmental health. This emotionally-charged value set tends to outweigh concerns of
stability and conciliation, and thus motivates oppositional political advocacy, such as
solutions to environmental problems that aim to fundamentally alter or strictly regulate
the institutions of society. Additionally, those who score low on this correspondence
analysis would demonstrate a proclivity towards a technological identity, and would need
to cultivate relationships with industrial and governmental entities, so as to increase the
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development and application of said technologies. This should then have a negative effect
on the odds that the EO would oppose any of the political events, which is what we do
indeed observe.
4.7.1.3 - Litigation/lobbying. EOs that tend to employ strategies oflitigation
and/or lobbying are more likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than
those that are less likely to employ such strategies. This is evidenced by the significant (p
< 0.050) coefficient for litigation/lobbying, which suggests that as an EO tends to employ
such strategies, the log of the odds that they will have opposed any of the three political
events increases by a factor of 1.42 (see Table 4).
This finding disconfirms my original expectations. It would stand to reason that
litigation and lobbying are expensive activities that require developing congenial
relationships with donors and/or government agencies and entities in order to execute. As
such, employing strategies of litigation/lobbying should decrease the odds of opposing
any of the political events. However, this does not appear to be the case. Instead,
employing these techniques increases the odds of oppositional political advocacy.
In retrospect, this finding actually makes more sense than my original hypothesis.
Initially, it is clear that litigation and lobbying are both oppositional tactics, as they
attempt to confront rather than negotiate with political adversaries. It would stand to
reason then that these litigious and lobby-prone EOs would be capable of oppositional
stances in other arenas, such as over free trade or climate change.
Additionally, it was assumed that litigation and lobbying are more expensive than
other techniques, limiting their use to EOs that are larger and less oppositional. However,
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this is proven to not be the case. Larger, more financially sound organizations do not tend
to prefer this strategy. In fact, when regressing litigation/lobbying on revenue, the
coefficient is not significant, and the Pearson's R2 is only 0.04. This suggests that
organizations with more money are not ending up in the courts or legislature. They are
spending their money elsewhere. A more in-depth study that investigated and
comparatively evaluated the financial costs of various techniques utilized by these EOs
would be informative here; however it seems clear that there are more expensive
techniques available to them, such as employee compensation. Perhaps these large war
chests are spent predominantly on salaries for high-profile professional leadership, more
extensive research, or on securing land trusts. Apparently the cost barrier to employing
litigation and lobbying is much lower than it had originally seemed, relative to other
methods of spending, which shows how smaller, more oppositional EOs can be likely to
employ these strategies. Thus there is evidence indicating both directions of the
relationship between litigation/lobbying and oppositional political advocacy.
It is also possible that some larger, less oppositional EOs do not need to employ
litigation or lobbying because they have more effective means at their disposal. If they
utilize their connections to established corporate and government entities effectively, then
they can shape public policy long before the issues are presented in a forum (such as the
courts or legislature) in which they could be contested. Thus their lack of reporting
litigation or lobbying as a priority strategy is associated with a decrease in the odds of
opposing at least one of the key political events.
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It may also be that the courts and legislature are the last technique of the
oppositional EO. If their message is fairly contentious, then they will likely employ
contentious strategies. This is confirmed by the strong correlation between
litigation/lobbying and oppositionality (see 4.6.1.3 above), suggesting that an EO with a
fairly radical message might be ignored by other political currents until they force those
currents to address the message through the courts and Congress. Thus in order to get
their message out, the oppositional EO must resort to utilizing these contentious
strategies. Additionally, as these strategies are so contentious, they may have the effect of
severing potential and/or previous allies. As an EO loses allies by gaining momentum in
the pursuit of their cause, it will be less likely to fear losing other established allies, and
will instead adhere to more rigid, less compromising political advocacy. Indeed, the
successful litigious EO will have been rewarded for this contentious stance. Therefore, as
the EO develops its strategic platform around a more confrontational demeanor, it will be
more likely to participate in other oppositional political advocacy as well.
4.7.1.4 - Education. The EOs in my sample that tend to employ a strategy of
education are more likely than those who do not, to engage in oppositional political
advocacy. The significant (p < 0.050) coefficient for education suggests that the more an
EO employs education as a strategy, the log of the odds that they will have opposed any
of the three political events increases by a factor of 1.53 (see Table 4).
This finding disconfirms my original hypothesis. EOs that focus explicitly on
education, such as nature centers, are less politically motivated, and indeed need to
remain somewhat neutral in order to maintain cultural legitimacy. Therefore, I originally
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expected that these types of EOs should be less oppositional. However, although this is
true for the nature centers in my sample, there are many more EOs of a wide variety that
also employ education, and these EOs tend to be more predisposed toward oppositional
political advocacy. This may be due to the way in which an educational strategy provides
the foundation for oppositional political advocacy. If an EO feels somewhat constrained
to not engage in oppositional political advocacy for fear of losing allies, education can
serve to pave the path by using data to increase the appearance of reasonability. For
instance, an EO focusing on comprehensive reforms to climate change (such as were
proposed in Kyoto) will have its arguments fall on deaf ears ifthe public is unaware of
the severity of the problem. Educational campaigns are thus a means by which a more
radical agenda can be made palatable to the average observer. Thus, employment of this
strategy should actually increase the odds of an EO pursuing oppositional political
advocacy.
Interestingly, most organizations report usage of this strategy in some fashion. As
mentioned above (see 4.5.6), the dispersion ofthe cases in the education variable is
skewed left, with most cases clustering around the higher values. This indicates that
nearly all EOs see at least some part of their duty as to provide education about their
issue. Therefore, as most organizations (74%) are not oppositional (see 4.5.1 above), but
are educational, it would stand to reason that a focus on education as a strategy would
decrease the log ofthe odds of engaging in oppositional political advocacy. However, the
logistic regression reveals that there is actually a positive effect, probably due to the way
that education provides the framework for oppositional political advocacy. This suggests
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that what it means to be an educational organization is much wider in the minds of EO
leadership than it is to the social scientist. Apparently, although it seems that some EOs
are more predisposed towards education than others, few will admit this, and indeed most
EOs portray themselves as educational organizations.
It is important here also to recognize that this was a self-reported variable. It does
not measure exactly what the EO does, but rather what they say they do. This
disconfirming observation may reveal a disconnect between in which activities EOs
actually engage, and in which they merely purport to engage. It also shows that there is a
bias toward education among EOs. As each EO has a cause that they seemingly would
like more people to have sympathy with, they necessarily tend to view their position as
educational. Opponents can be viewed as those just not yet aware of the seriousness of
the problem. Should that seriousness be conveyed, the EO will have successfully
educated the public, and the mission of the EO will have become closer to becoming
realized.
4.7.1.5 - Alliance participation. The EOs in my sample that tend to focus on
cultivating and participating in alliances with other EOs are more likely to engage in
oppositional political advocacy than those who do not. This is demonstrated by the
significant and positive correlation between the two variables (see 4.6.1.4 above) and
further supported by the very large and incredibly significant (p < 0.000) odds ratio for
alliance participation and oppositionality. Therefore, preferring alliance participation as
a strategy increases the log of the odds that an EO will have opposed any of the three
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political events by a factor of 1.89, which is the largest and most significant coefficient in
the model.
This finding also disconfirms my original hypothesis. It would seem that those
interested in cultivating alliances would need to avoid oppositional political advocacy. By
avoiding radical stances, EOs could presumably increase the strength of their alliances. If
they would like to be perceived by other organizations as reasonable and cooperative,
they would necessarily refrain from stances that would pit them against potential allies.
However, we notice that the inverse is actually true; that alliance participators are
more oppositional. This may be because those EOs that wish to advocate oppositionally
will recognize the strain that this stance might put on the cultivation of alliances. As such,
an adroit EO would respond by compensating for this potential loss through the
expenditure of greater resources, time and energy towards creating and maintaining these
alliances. Similar to education, alliance participation may be a way for oppositional EOs
to hedge against potential disruptions that their stance may incur, by compensating for
that which threatens them most: becoming isolated or ostracized by potential supporters.
4.7.1.6 - Revenue. As should be expected, the larger EOs in my sample with
more revenue are less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than smaller
EOs with less revenue. As the log of gross receipts increases one unit, the log of the odds
that the EO will have opposed any of the three political events decreases by a factor of
0.3 (p < 0.005). This is consistent with other findings surrounding size, in that larger
organizations are less oppositional, yet have greater resources, and supports my original
hypothesis. This is probably due to the way that more heavily funded EOs are more
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beholden to their income sources, and are thus less likely to take oppositional stances.
Larger, more established EOs should be less wieldy, despite their financial stability.
Indeed, the ties that are necessary for the maintenance of such resource channels have a
conservatizing effect on the advocacy of the EO. Rather than adhering to staunch
defenses of radical ideologies, larger EOs with more money tend instead to portray
themselves as reasonable and pragmatic, and in so doing, attract more sizeable donations.
This cycle of growth has a professionalizing effect, in that the more they pay in salaries,
the more career-seekers will seek to use leadership roles as livelihoods. This also has a
conservatizing effect, as the unwavering pursuit of the EO's mission may take a back seat
to settling for incremental reforms that appear more reasonable. As incremental reforms
can be touted as success stories and used to motivate more donations, the vectors of
revenue amassment and non-oppositional advocacy are mutually reinforcing.
4.7.1.7 - Volunteers. The EOs in my sample that employ larger numbers of
volunteers are less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than those that
employ fewer volunteers. This is initially revealed in the correlation matrix (see 4.6.1.5
above), as we see a negative coefficient between volunteers and oppositionality. This is
further supported by the logistic regression, as we see that for every increase in sextile of
number of volunteers, there is a corresponding decrease in the log of the odds that the EO
will have opposed any ofthe above three political events by a factor of 0.75 (p < 0.010).
This finding also confounded my expectations. It would seem that an EO with
many volunteers would need to inspire those people to participate. An ideology more
aligned with a radical defense of the mission would seem to be the passionate stance that
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would be necessary to inspire volunteers to participate. Apparently, however, the
reasonable approach of the non-oppositional EO is more capable of doing garnering these
human resources.
This however stands to reason when comparing EOs to the Democratic Party in
the US. While not oppositional at all (by definition a part of the Beltway system, and thus
not oppositional as an organization), the Democratic Party utilizes massive numbers of
volunteers. Phone banking is their primary task, and it is incredibly labor intensive. The
way they inspire participation is not through promises of grandiose change (although the
most recent Presidential campaign might be a slight exception), but rather through
rhetoric of achievable (yet incremental) change that remains enmeshed with the
institutional process. Instead of opposing Beltway politics, the Democratic Party uses
faith in a moderate system of realistic reform rather than promising more radical change.
Larger, less oppositional EOs use the same model. Organizations such as The Sierra Club
do not take oppositional stances, yet they garner thousands of volunteers every year.
There are obviously many volunteers in various relatively oppositional EOs that are
inspired by the adherence to a mission that advocates sweeping alterations in society, as
per the hypothesized relationship, however it appears that even more people are
persuaded to volunteer for larger, less-oppositional EOs.
This inverse relationship between number of volunteers and oppositionality could
be due to prestige. Larger organizations tend to be more well-known, and thus will
obviously be able to attract more volunteers. Taking into consideration the negative
relationship between size and oppositionality, these EOs with more volunteers should be
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less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy. Furthermore, it seems obvious
that larger organizations tend to have fewer volunteers, merely as a matter of scale. This
is because number of volunteers is an indicator for the size of the EO. As larger
organizations are less oppositional (see above) this relationship should be expected.
4.7.1.8 - Public/government support. The proposed relationship between the
degree of support that the EOs in my sample receive from government sources and the
degree of oppositionality of their political advocacy is not supported by this analysis. It
was assumed that public and government support should decrease the likelihood of an EO
participating in oppositional political advocacy, as it would represent conservatizing
institutional ties (Salamon, 1995). Although it seems reasonable that ties to government
agencies should decrease the log of the odds that an EO had opposed any of the political
events, the results did not confirm this expectation. Not only was the odds ratio not
significant, but it also suggested an inverse relationship. If anything, my results show that
such organizations are more likely to participate in such political advocacy, suggesting
that "resource dependence does not necessarily produce political quiescence" (Chaves et
aI., 2004, p. 314). 51
4.7.2 - Making Sense of Odds Ratios
4.7.2.1 - Exemplary cases. Turning now to a discussion of specific cases that
serve to highlight the relationships between the variables, it becomes clear that certain
EOs illustrate the patterns quite well (see Table 5).
51 Who suggest that governmental resource dependency either has a positive or null effect on political
activity.
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Table 5
Exemplary Cases
Name oppos incl nontech Iitig educ allianc Iggrec volunt
Pacific Rainforest
Wildlife Guardians -0.053 2.172 1.952 0.755 0.771 -2.833 2
Voices for Earth
Justice/MIICandEC 2.787 2.240 0.344 0.956 1.776 -2.833 3
Native Forest
Council, Inc. 0.970 3.032 1.614 0.601 1.069 0.169 2
Andover Village
Improvement Society 0 -0.862 -0.465 -0.079 -0.092 -1.438 0.062 4
Kenai River
Sportfishing
Association 0 -0.644 -1.075 -0.582 -0.778 -0.939 0.767 6
mean 0.26 -0.067 0.021 0.018 0.083 -0.004 -0.035 3.4
4.7.2.1.1- Oppositional EOs.
4.7.2.1.1.1 - Pacific Rainforest Wildl([e Guardians. The EOs in my sample that
opposed any of the previously mentioned political events tend to have similar
characteristics in other areas as well, particularly among their identities. For instance, the
Pacific Rainforest Wildlife Guardians, an EO that I characterize as oppositional
(officially objected to the US stance at Kyoto), also demonstrates an identity that is
inclusive of many other identities, and leans away from technical rhetoric. Their mission
statement welcomes the viewer/reader to the pacific rainforest, where "the animals are
people who have their own languages and communicate fluently among other species, the
people are animals who struggle to communicate even with each other" (PRWG website).
By asking us to communicate in ways that look beyond our rigid, discreet concepts of
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human and animal, the EO embraces an inclusive identity. This is supported by their
correspondence score for the inclusivity variable, which is slightly above the mean,
suggesting that this EO's identity is more inclusive than exclusive. Additionally, their
almost spiritual reverence for the natural world, which is revealed by the supernatural
rhetoric of their mission statement, demonstrates a rejection of scientific rationale as the
basis for change, and instead asks the potential participant to engage with the natural
world on a more intimate, emotionally-driven manner. This is supported by their
correspondence score for the non-technical environmental discourse variable, which is
far above the mean (9ih percentile), indicating a very non-technical discourse. This is
consistent with patterns we would expect, given the logistic regression. EOs that have
identities that are inclusive and non-technical tend to also be oppositional.
The strategic choices made by oppositional EOs continue to unveil this pattern.
With a factor score well above the mean for litigation/lobbying (96th percentile), the
PRWG reports to engage in this confrontational activity quite frequently. Additionally,
with a factor score far above the mean for the education variable (nnd percentile), it is
clear that this oppositional EO commonly pursues education, presumably to increase the
legitimacy of an otherwise potentially alienating radical stance. Furthermore, with a
factor score for the alliance participation strategy variable also substantially above the
mean (79th percentile), we can see that the PRWG conforms perfectly to the relationship
between strategies and political advocacy revealed by the logistic regression: that EOs
that pursue strategies of litigation, lobbying, alliance participation and education tend to
also engage in oppositional political advocacy.
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The resources that an EO garners are also at least somewhat determinate of their
political advocacy preferences. For instance, the PRWG has the lowest gross receipts in
my sample - virtually none, with a score for the revenue variable equal to the minimum.
Also, with only between one and ten volunteers (see Table 5), the PRWG is of the least
volunteer-supported as well. These two resource indicators suggest that smaller
organizations that bring in less revenue and enlist fewer volunteers tend to be more likely
to have opposed any of the three political advocacy events. The PRWG is an excellent
example of a small organization with few resources, and which is also relatively
oppositional.
4.7.2.1.1.2 - Voices jor Earth Justice/Mllnterjaith Climate and Energy
Campaign. This pattern is further exemplified by the identity characteristics of the Voices
for Earth Justice/Michigan Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign (VEJIMICEC),
another EO that opposed at least one oppositional political advocacy event (the Kyoto
Protocols). This organization stresses "prayer, education, and action that deepen our
sense of wonder, responsibility, and gratitude for all creation." 52 This is very similar to
the PRWG, in that it attempts to bridge potentially disparate environmental ideologies.
The PRWG used the problematization of the human/animal distinction to widen the scope
of their rhetoric, but the VEJ/MICEC instead uses non-denominational religion to do so.
With a correspondence score for inclusivity far above the mean (99th percentile), the
interfaith aspect of their goal clearly seeks to incorporate a diverse set of environmental
ethics. Similar to the PRWG however, they utilize a spiritual reverence for the natural
52 http://www.Yoices4earth.org/
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world in order to depart from technocratic expression. In this case it is a religious
motivation, with a bent towards non-denominational Christianity. This is further
evidenced by their extremely high correspondence score for the non-technical
environmental discourse variable (99th percentile). The VEJ/MICEC is an exemplary case
for how an inclusive, non-technical identity encourages more oppositional political
advocacy behavior.
The strategies employed by the VEJ/MICEC are also those that we might expect
from an oppositional EO. With a factor score for the litigation/lobbying variable
substantially above the mean (69th percentile), the VEJ/MICEC seeks to counter the
political inertia of climate legislation through confrontational lobbies and/or legal battles.
Additionally, the VEJ/MICEC frequently employs education and outreach, as indicated
by their high factor score for education (79th percentile). Furthermore, their focus on
alliance participation is undeniable, as evidenced by their very high factor score for
alliance participation (89th percentile). Therefore, the VEJ/MICEC is a stellar example of
how confrontational strategies such as litigation and lobbying, and outreach strategies
(presumably to mitigate against the impact of an oppositional political stance detracting
from potential support) such as education and alliance participation, all increase the
chances that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy.
The resources garnered by the VEJ/MICEC also encourage them to participate in
oppositional political advocacy. As they have virtually no revenue and relatively few
volunteers (between 11 and 30), this small organization has little to lose by advocating
oppositionally.
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4.7.2.1.1.3 - Native Forest Council. Another example of an oppositional EO that
fits the expectations derived from the logistic regression is the Native Forest Council
(NFC). This EO opposed all 3 political events (NAFTA, WTO, and Kyoto). Additionally,
the NFC scored among the highest in my sample for inclusivity (83rd percentile). Their
mission to "fully protect and preserve every acre of publicly owned land" (NFC, 2010) is
a grand goal with totalistic rhetoric that would require sweeping and fundamental change
to all of industrial production and society. Despite how alienating this identity might
appear, the NFC does not seem to view it this way. Instead, they apparently feel that in
order to affect such comprehensive change, they need to include as many voices from as
many sympathetic perspectives as possible. They would obviously not agree with every
perspective, however they nonetheless wish to portray themselves as reasonable and
capable of addressing the wide range of issues that would inevitably unfold when
focusing on "every acre of private land". They also conform to my expectations
concerning the technicality of their identity, as their correspondence score for non-
technical environmental discourse is of the very highest in my sample (98th percentile).
This is an intuitive relationship, because the vast preponderance of Beltway
environmental discourse revolves around technical solutions, so moving away from that
identity would be departing from Washington almost by definition. Therefore, the
PWRG, the VEJ/MICEC, and the NFC all represent oppositional EOs that use an
inclusive identity to gain support for sweeping changes, and depart from Washington's
technocratic rhetoric to do so.
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The strategic choices made by the NFC also tend to encourage its oppositional
political advocacy. With a very high factor score for litigation/lobbying (92nd percentile),
the NFC does not shy away from confrontation. Additionally, with a relatively high score
for education (65th percentile), the NFC focuses on getting the word out, so that their
somewhat radical proposals might seem more reasonable to the general public.
Furthermore, with such a high factor score for alliance participation (86th percentile), the
NFC clearly devotes a great deal of time and energy toward cultivating alliances,
presumably to make oppositional positions more palatable to the state and citizenry. They
are clearly not afraid to engage Beltway politics directly, yet in order to do so they cover
their flanks as much as possible by spreading awareness and seeking allies.
The low resources of the NFC are further indicative ofthis type of oppositional
EO. In 2006, the NFC reported to the IRS that they earned $150,000 (51 st percentile),
however in an interview with their director, (see Chapter VI), indicated that they have
since spent all of their money and are operating at a loss. This would put them among the
most destitute of all the EOs in my sample. Without any donors to be beholden to, the
NFC can advocate pretty much whatever they want. They obviously attempt to position
themselves in such a way as to not become completely politically marginalized, but they
would have no qualms about participating in an oppositional political advocacy event if it
was meaningful and important to them. Interestingly, the NFC is clearly quite
oppositional, and has apparently suffered a financial loss in the last few years, so the
inverse relationship between funding and oppositionality is further demonstrated by their
apparent decline in financial support.
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4.7.2.1.2 - Non-oppositional EOs.
4.7.2.1.2.1 - Andover Village Improvement Society. The non-oppositional EOs in
my sample were equally (although inversely) illustrative. For example, the Andover
Village Improvement Society (AVIS) is an organization that did not oppose any of the
political events, and whose identity accurately predicted that result. With a low
correspondence score for inc!usivity (20th percentile), the AVIS tends to exclude a variety
of other EO missions from its purview. As a land trust, AVIS focuses on preserving the
Andover region ofMassachusetts, and as such does not feel the need to include much
outside of this mission. This regional bias should decrease ideological inclusivity, and as
such reduce the possibility of engaging in political advocacy outside their immediate
arena. Therefore, they should be very unlikely to have opposed any of the political
events. Additionally, their mission states that they focus on "acquiring land and
preserving it in its natural state" as well as "encouraging public use and quiet enjoyment
of the reservations." Purchasing land is a process that must conform to the technical rules
of economics. Indeed, acquiring the funds necessary to purchase land usually involves
some industrial production. Also, encouraging public use in an environmentally
sustainable manner requires scientifically assessing the impact of human activities, so as
to minimize harm. This scientific management of the environment is precisely what the
EOs who score highly on the non-technical environmental discourse variable attempt to
avoid, which is probably why we see such a low score for AVIS here (33 fd percentile).
The AVIS also does not often engage in the types of strategies that are associated
with oppositional EOs. For instance, their factor score for litigation/lobbying is slightly
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below the mean, indicating that they are not adverse to such strategies, but do not engage
in them as often as other strategies. Also, their score for education is also relatively low
(40th percentile), suggesting that trusts do not need to educate the public at large much,
however a certain amount of education (about how to sustainably and "quietly" use the
specific area) is nonetheless required of them. This type of education would not be used
to frame a larger political position as reasonable, but would rather be more akin to a
safety demonstration before an airplane flight: to encourage safe behavior, but not to
convince or persuade. Most illustrative however is their reluctance to develop alliances.
With one of the lowest scores in my sample for alliance participation (3 rd percentile), the
AVIS is very focused on their own region, and likely sees it as a jurisdictional issue.
Alliances may even be feared, as they might represent a loss of control, or a distortion of
their mission. It seems that it is this very focus away from alliances that discourages their
oppositionality: they probably do not want to be associated with what they perceive to be
more radical environmentalism that might reduce human access. If they wish to build a
trail, or create a picnic area for example, an alliance with a more radical EO might hinder
their ability to do so. Therefore, a portion of the reason that the AVIS did not engage in
any ofthe political events is due to their strategic isolation, manifested as a reluctance to
participate in alliances.
As a conservationist land trust, the AVIS needs large sums of cash. Although they
do not gamer as much as some other trusts do, they nonetheless receive slightly more
than the average EO in my sample, which should have a conservatizing effect. That is,
being beholden to the interests of their funding source, they would not engage in
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oppositional behavior. Also an indicator for size, their reasonably substantial revenue
suggests an EO not wieldy enough to respond to other issues, such as climate change and
neoliberal trade. Also, with between 31 and 50 volunteers, the AVIS represents a large,
established EO that sticks to the tactics that has served them over the years, preserves a
focus on the one obtainable goal within their purview (the conservation of their specific
region), and does not attempt to dovetail their concerns with other EOs. This is a recipe
for an EO predisposed against participation in oppositional political advocacy.
4.7. 2.1. 2. 2 - Kenai River Sportjishing Association. Intuitively, we should expect
that sport fisherman should not support oppositional environmental advocacy, as they
would fear that a victorious radical environmental movement would reduce access to
their sport. EOs such as the Kenai River Sportfishing Association (KRSA) should have
an identity that is quite exclusive of other EOs, potentially even hostile. Instead, these
hunting/fishing EOs advance an environmental identity of sustainable harvesting. KRSA
claims to "bring sport anglers and conservationists together to protect and preserve the
greatest sportfishing river in the world --- the Kenai" (KRSA, 2010). Although the
rhetoric does suggest inclusion, it only suggests inclusion with those environmental
groups that support the harvesting of animals, and is in direct conflict with those who
might oppose this. It is not surprising then that their correspondence score for inclusivity
is relatively low (36th percentile). Also, with one of the lowest scores for non-technical
environmental discourse (11 th percentile), it is clear that the KRSA aligns itself
ideologically with the scientific management of nature perspective, as this is an essential
part of recreational environmental management. As the KRSA excludes the causes of
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other (potentially more radical) EOs from its own identity, and instead focuses on
scientific management of sustainable harvests of nature, it severs itself from a larger
movement that would challenge a wider array of environmental issues, and as such would
not participate in oppositional political advocacy.
Strategically, the KRSA also tends to avoid the strategies that oppositional EOs
prefer. For example, their factor score for litigation/lobbying is relatively low (34th
percentile), indicating that they might pursue this strategy if it is possible to do so without
upsetting potential allies, but they would generally avoid doing so in order to maintain
the connections they have to conservation scientists. For instance, suing a company for
polluting in one specific area feeding into the Kenai River is much less oppositional than
lobbying congress for more restrictive emissions standards. The former is incremental
and does not challenge the logic of production itself, just its particular application. The
latter however asks for a much larger change, and a fundamental alteration to the way we
execute industrial production. As such, EOs such as KRSA would only sparingly employ
this strategy, and in doing so, maintain a non-oppositional stance. Likewise, EOs such as
KRSA should be very unlikely to employ education as a strategy, as their mission, similar
to AVIS, is limited to the protection of their particular region. Thus their very low factor
score for education (19th percentile) is indicative of their stance. They want to promote
the protection of their area, but they do not need to effect fundamental change in society
at large to achieve that mission, thus the avoidance of oppositional political advocacy.
Furthermore, their very low factor score for alliance participation (1 i h percentile)
suggests that despite their mission statement of forging alliances between
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conservationists and anglers, they apparently have all of the alliances they need right
now. It is also possible that they avoid alliances because they want to maintain a certain
degree of autonomy from other environmentalists. Similar to AVIS, KRSA's drive to
protect their mission may result in isolation from more radical EOs that might oppose the
fundamental kernel that inspires their movement: the right to angle. Whether they have
the alliances they need or fear the EOs that threaten them, it is clear that they do not
prefer alliances with other EOs, and as such do not engage in oppositional political
advocacy.
Even though they do not pursue alliances very much, the KRSA apparently does
not need to, partly because they are garnering plenty of financial resources without many
(88th percentile). They also employ over 100 volunteers, making them of the largest
organizations in the sample. This large size, plentitude of resources and
strategic/ideological predisposition make KRSA an exemplary non-oppositional EO.
4.7.2.2 - Typology. The above discussion begins to reveal patterns among the
cases, and points to a typology ofEOs in the US. Smaller organizations, who garner less
financial resources and volunteers, who tend to have inclusive, non-technical identities,
who tend to employ litigation, lobbying, education and alliance formation as strategies,
are unrestricted to engage in oppositional political advocacy, and are thus more likely to
do so. Contrarily, larger organizations, who tend to garner more financial resources and
volunteers, and who tend to have exclusive and technical environmental identities, and
who tend to not employ any of those strategies, are beholden to their institutional ties and
are thus not at all likely to engage in such oppositional political advocacy (see Table 6).
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Table 6
Typology
Identities
Strategies
Resources
Oppositional
inclusive
non-technical
focus on Iitigation/lobbying
focus on education
focus on alliance formation
do not have substantial resources
do not have substantial volunteers
Non-Oppositional
exclusive
technical
do not focus on litigation/lobbying
do not focus on education
do not focus on alliance formation
have substantial resources
have substantial volunteers
4.7.2.3 - Typology reliability test. To test the reliability of this typology, I
initially calculated the directional relationship that each case was from the mean, on each
of the seven significant variables (from the logistic regression). I then calculated for each
cell, whether or not the result conformed to the expectations about its relationship to the
mean (that were revealed by the logistic regression). I then calculated this for all
oppositional EOs, all non-oppositional EOs, and for the total set. If an EO fit all seven of
the expectations, it was regarded as a 7, and if none, a O. I calculated the proportion of
expected results across each EO for the total distribution. If every EO conformed to the
expectations of the typology 100% of the time, then the score of7 would hold 100% of
the distribution (see Table 7). Contrarily, if! had found that a greater proportion of the
distribution was represented by the lower scores, 3 or below for instance, then I could not
reject the null hypothesis that the typology is inaccurate, because most organizations do
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not conform to the expectations. However, if I found that a greater proportion of the
distribution was represented by the higher scores, 4 or above, then I could somewhat
confidently reject the null hypothesis that typology is inaccurate, and conclude that the
typology could possibly be a very useful tool for two fairly distinct types ofEOs. I found
the latter result (see Table 7), in that a majority (67%) ofEOs, both oppositional and not,
did indeed conform to at least 4 of the typology variables. This is also true for
oppositional EOs (60%), but even more true for non-oppositional EOs (69%). This
suggests that although not completely distinct, there are two general categories ofEOs in
the US, and those that are non-oppositional are more cohesive as a group than those that
are oppositional. This cohesion among non-oppositional groups is particularly interesting
considering that there were three times as many non-oppositional EOs in my sample as
oppositional EOs, indicating that despite the increased number of cases when applying
the typology to non-oppositional EOs, the typology actually increases in accuracy, rather
than decreases. One might expect it to decrease if the typology were inaccurate, because
as the number of cases increases, the spuriousness ofthe relationship should emerge. This
suggests that this is a fairly robust typology ofEOs in the US, and that in most cases,
most of the indicators define two mostly discreet types ofEOs.
4.8 - Discussion
When discussing the likelihood that an EO will engage in political advocacy that
is oppositional to mainstream political currents; identities, strategies and resources, in a
word, matter. This research affirms that these characteristics significantly impact the
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Table 7
Typology Reliability Test
score 7 6 5 4 3 2 0
oppositional 3% 15% 19% 23% 29% 8% 4% 0%
non-oppositional 1% 13% 25% 30% 22% 6% 2% 0%
combined 2% 14% 23% 28% 24% 6% 2% 0%
advocacy behavior of this national sample of Environmental Organizations. The degree to
which an EO engages in oppositional political advocacy behavior is shaped by both their
ideological as well as structural components. Ideologically, the frame orientation of the
EO determines the arenas in which they are able to act. This impacts the strategies that
they deem appropriate, as well as the likelihood that they will participate in oppositional
political advocacy. Certain frames encourage oppositional behavior, while others
discourage it. Additionally, the strategies that they employ also carry expectations, such
that certain strategies increase the chances that the EO will participate in oppositional
political advocacy, while others decrease those odds. Structurally, the size of and
resources that an EO garners also shape the political advocacy behavior of the EO.
The alignment between identities and strategies, such as the strong association
between litigation, alliance participation, inclusivity, and non-technical environmental
discourse, that encourage oppositionality suggests that the indicators chosen are fairly
efficient estimators of the concepts they seek to measure. Each of these four variables are
positively associated, as well as have the same direction of effect on oppositionality. The
very lengthy description of the numerous correlations between the significant variables in
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the correlation matrix above further suggests that the indicators measure these ideological
dimensions effectively, and that the model demonstrates parsimony. Also, the resource
variables operated as effective measures as well. The multitude of positive and significant
coefficients between public/government support, revenue, compensation, and volunteers
is astounding. Examining Table 3 we can see nine positive and significant coefficients,
suggesting that the structural dimension ofEOs are relatively effectively mapped. Big
organizations have many volunteers, more money, pay more in salaries, and receive more
government money. That these indicators also describe a typology ofEOs in the US is
not surprising, however in retrospective examination, the parsimony of the model is
greater than I had expected.
Although the model seems to display relative parsimony, there are nonetheless
several limitations to the indicators that should be discussed. Most glaringly is the
indicator for volunteers. We measured the number of volunteers with six categories in our
scale, however there is no common metric between the categories, so it is ordinal-level
data at best. In retrospect, that scale should have been ratio-level, as we would have more
complete and useful data had we asked the respondents to enter a raw number of
volunteers. Additionally, we did not inquire as to the type of volunteers employed by the
EO. Tree-sitting and phone-banking are two very different types of volunteering, and
should have opposite effects on oppositional political advocacy. Ifwe were able to
control for type of volunteerism, I would imagine that direct-action volunteerism tends to
encourage oppositional political advocacy, while outreach volunteerism (such as phone
banking) should discourage such advocacy.
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The second major limitation is over the indicator for strategies. This is treated
here as an ideological variable, but if measured differently could have been considered a
structural variable as well. I measure the self-reporting use of strategies, but not the actual
strategies employed. I measure what they say they do, but not what they actually do. My
guess is that if we controlled for actual strategy employed, we would see less
oppositional EOs employing, for example, alliance formation more than oppositional
EOs. If we could measure actual time, energy, human hours or resources spent on
maintaining and seeking alliances, we might even notice that alliance formation actually
has an inverse relationship with oppositionality: the more an EO spends on alliances, the
less oppositional they are. However, I do not capture that in this study.
What I do measure is how much the EO portrays themselves with regards to
alliance formation priorities, which really measures what they want, not what they have.
Indeed, more oppositional EOs need to cultivate alliances in order to mitigate the damage
from their more oppositional stances, however this does not mean that other EOs are
willing to reciprocally develop alliances. Less oppositional EOs may not need to
persuade outsiders that the EO is reasonable enough to participate in alliances. However,
they might actually spend more time and energy cultivating these alliances. Depending
on how it is measured, alliance formation could be an indicator for how much actual
alliance participation occurs, rather than how much is sought. A large, non-oppositional
EO sending a check to a fledgling EO may not take much time or energy, however it
might represent more of an extension of support than, for example, the common
hyperlinks shared between smaller, less-oppositional EOs. Ifwe control for actual
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strategy employed, I expect we would see alliance formation having a negative effect on
oppositionality. Additionally, alliances when measured this way could be looked at as a
resource. The number and/or strength of alliances should at least partly determine the size
and strength of the EO, and thus would ideally be treated this way in future studies.
The third area of limitations stems from the resource variables. Although a
reasonable indicator for size and thus an acceptable variable for this study, the revenue
variable did not adequately address the issue of to whom the EO might be beholden.
Disconfirming the assumption that government ties conservatize EO politics was useful,
in that it began to address the issue of sources. However, a more rigorous investigation
into the sources of resources seems the necessary next step: to take into consideration
how variation in revenue sources results in different types of organizational practices.
Additionally, although some of the odds ratios in the logistic regression were in
the opposite direction than I had originally expected, after examining the relationships
between the variables, it becomes clear that the reasons these ratios were inverted
actually conforms to my original hypothetical expectations: that identities, strategies and
resources do indeed affect the chances than an EO will participate in oppositional
political advocacy, and that these relationships demonstrate two distinct patterns ofEO
political advocacy. What both the confirmation and disconfirmation of those hypotheses
demonstrates is where the line between the two types of EOs is drawn. Certainly there are
many that bridge the gaps. However the preponderance of cases that do conform to the
typology suggests that the distinction is relevant. Larger organizations with plenty of
money and volunteers tend to seek scientific solutions, do not tend to cultivate alliances
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or litigate, nor do they participate in oppositional political advocacy. Smaller
organizations with less money and volunteers do litigate and seek alliances, and are more
likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy.
What this typology tells us is that the US environmental movement is bifurcated
along somewhat predictable lines. My albeit lofty goal is that this typology somehow
contributes to the success of the environmental movement as a whole. Fledgling and
burgeoning EOs might examine this typology in order to make strategic decisions.
Should they endeavor to evolve into a large, resource rich EO, they might be vary careful
what political advocacy they engage in. Should they wish to remain more oppositional,
they might seek alternative resources. Particularly when smaller EOs tend to think of
themselves as all alone, finding out that other oppositional EOs also seek alliances more
so than the larger organizations, might foster communication between them and actually
encourage such alliances. Although it is dubious to assume that enough people will
actually view these results so as to incur any substantial changes, it nonetheless serves as
a possible foundation for the building of bridges between EOs in the US.
If a cogent and effective environmental movement is to actually cohere, these
lines will needs to be addressed. My hope is that by more clearly explaining the terrain in
which EOs vie for influence, we can develop a common language that EOs can use to
develop a multi-pronged, cross disciplinary strategy toward environmental sustainability.
Understandably there will be conflicts, and many organizations are not interested in
forming alliances, however understanding that there are determinant influences that shape
the advocacy behavior of EOs could provide the foundation for a conciliatory mutual
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respect. The Vegan Outreach and the Kenai River Sportfishing Association may never
fully agree, however if they could see that they occupy very different rhetorical space,
they might be able to see that they are not in competition. They will have conflicting
goals, this is true, and they pursue very different strategies and resources. However, they
have common goals as well, such as that both seek to address environmental health.
Hopefully it will become ever clearer to the participants and leadership of EOs
everywhere that this is a complex set of issues that cannot probably be solved in a
centralized, authoritarian manner, but instead will require cooperation across staunchly
divided political lines. Ideally, this research brings us closer to the dialogue that will be
necessary to bridge some of these gaps into an effective multi-pronged environmental
approach.
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CHAPTER V
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
5.1 - Introduction
The typology of EOs presented above shows that, in general, the political
advocacy behavior of EOs tends to cluster along a continuum of oppositionality.
However, there are numerous exceptions to the typology, with regard to explaining the
tendency of groups to adopt more or less oppositional advocacy repertoires, and the
anomalous cases that demonstrate this ambiguity provide useful insights into to the
nuances of which this rich tapestry of EO political advocacy is comprised. This uncovers
some of the contingencies among the relationships between the variables that
problematize the dualism of the typology as implied by the dichotomous measure in the
logistic regression, and reveals that the range of oppositionality of political advocacy
among EOs in the US exists in more of a continuum.
Initially, it is necessary here to revisit my definition of political advocacy. As
previously discussed, all EOs are engaged in some form of political advocacy. The
purpose for creating a mission statement is in itself a form of political advocacy because
it contains normative prescriptions for society; they propose change to the status quo.
Electoral and litigious politics are two additional forms of political advocacy, however
many political perspectives lie outside this realm. If any organization advocates collective
action, then this is in itself a political activity of sorts. Although many EOs may not
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consider their actions as being associated with political advocacy, I maintain that they
nonetheless are. To actively or unconsciously decide to avoid contravening Beltway
politics is to display political advocacy that is not oppositional, yet it is still political
advocacy of a sort. Political advocacy should be seen as the total set of prescriptions that
the EO has for society, and the political implications attached to them. Political advocacy
that is oppositional prescribes a greater degree of change for society than political
advocacy that is non-oppositional. The scale of oppositionality of political advocacy can
thus also be seen as a scale for the degree of change to society that the EO prescribes.
Although in the previous sections I defined my concepts explicitly in order to
maintain a common metric across the cases, the representatives of the organizations that I
interviewed did not necessarily agree with my interpretations. For instance, I would have
expected a small raptor recovery center to consider itself engaged in some form of
political advocacy (to provide habitat protection and to advocate on behalf of the raptors),
albeit not oppositional. However, I would also expect that they would consider
themselves outside of the environmental movement per se, as they would tend to focus
on education and attending to the birds, rather than organizing collaboratively with other
EOs. However, I found exactly the opposite: that they do not consider anything they do
political advocacy, 53 yet they do consider themselves part of the environmental
movement proper. For the purposes of this research therefore, I use the more general
definition of political advocacy described in the paragraph above, so that I can measure
and interpret the grand narrative of how the EO argues that society should evolve.
53 Because they avoid taking stances on ballot measures, petitions or candidates.
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This disconnect between our understandings of these concepts underpins one of
the crucial difficulties in the environmental movement that this research seeks to
mitigate: that the lack of a common language between EOs limits their ability to operate
as a cogent social movement, and that a healthily reinvigorated movement will require
some improvements in cross-organizational understandings. By exploring the meanings
that the representatives of these EOs attach to the four concepts under development
(identities, strategies, resources and oppositionality of political advocacy) I begin to
explore the possibilities of such a common language, and attempt to map how that might
unfold. Although overall it is apparent from the quantitative chapter that the four
concepts provide revealing lenses through which to view EO composition and behavior,
the interestingly ambiguous responses given by the EO representatives in the interviews
uncover more of the complexities of the entire movement, and suggest that the greatest
barrier to more cohesion of the environmental movement as a whole is this lack of
common understanding.
Although the typology presented above does not completely describe the entire
terrain of the environmental movement, the places in which it breaks down reveal a more
nuanced and detailed story. For example, the resources data help prove the rule while
revealing that it is more complex than it initially appeared. One of these nuances is that
political advocacy is not simply shaped by resource amounts but also depends on the
types and sources of the funding they receive. Although this is developed in the theory
chapter, the quantitative data does not adequately reveal this, because we did not sample
larger organizations quite enough. Although the typology suggests that larger
163
organizations should be less likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than
smaller organizations (and this is predominantly true), and that this is partly due to the
amount of resources garnered, some organizations grow to notable sizes and yet maintain
their oppositional demeanor. The quantitative analysis out of which the typology emerged
did not measure sources of funding however (an oversight I will seek to correct on future
surveys). As will be shown below, the large EOs that remain oppositional do so by
avoiding the very pitfalls revealed by the typology: they resist professionalization and
tend to instead receive their money from small contributions from individuals. This limits
the career-seeking mission dilution problem presented above that so often occurs in larger
organizations, and as well insulates the EO from being beholden to any single set of
interests. So the reasons the typology functions so efficiently among my sample is
actually reaffirmed by the exceptions. EOs such as the Sea Shepherd, Greenpeace, and to
a lesser extent the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth are similar to the non-oppositional
EOs in that they are well-established, well-funded, have large, well-paid staffs and many
volunteers, however, due to their dependence on small donations from individuals (and
liberal progressive foundations), are not beholden to corporate interests, or any other
interests with strong ties to the Washington policy elite. This leads these anomalous EOs
towards more contentious forms of political advocacy, often challenging the other Big 10
Green organizations (see Dreiling, 1997; Dreiling & Wolf, 2001).
Furthermore, the meanings that the leaders associated with their different forms of
political advocacy are obfuscated by the quantitative analysis as an inevitable
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consequence of survey research; 54 however the interviews that I conducted helped to fill
those gaps. In the analysis that follows, I explore how each of the 11 EOs that I
interviewed explain the meanings they associate with their identities, strategies, resources
and political advocacy, and what that can tell us not only about the character of EOs in
the US today, but also about the state of the environmental movement as a whole.
5.2 - Comparative Cases
5.2.1 - American Farmland Trust - Don Stuart
The American Farmland Trust is an EO that focuses primarily on securing
farmland from the deleterious effects of development. I interviewed Don Stuart, their
current Pacific Northwest Director, who informed me that it was founded in 1980 by
conservationists and farmers with the dual purpose of keeping farming as a viable
industry in the US, and at the same time strengthening environmental stewardship.
Although not primarily concerned with wild areas, the AFT centers its efforts around
conservation of fann and ranch land through purchasing and legal protection. What
distinguishes the AFT from other farming and ranching organizations is that it
rhetorically connects environmentalism and agriculture through an appeal of
safeguarding natural resources.
The identity of the AFT is quite unique in that it borrows from two usually
distinct rhetorical traditions: agriculture and environmentalism. Since the rise of large
54 In that to maximize the reliability of the instrument, a certain degree of construct validity must be
sacrificed, and that a more qualitative analysis would be more appropriate for describing the meanings that
people associate with their organizations' forms of political advocacy.
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agri-business and endangered species protection, these two camps are often in conflict.
For example, environmentalists' efforts to restrict grazing on public lands have incensed
the ranching community, who tend to feel that their profits are threatened by such
measures. Water rights have been another particularly divisive issue, in that the farming
community, who again, feel that such restrictions unfairly and unreasonably constrain
their economic viability by reducing access to irrigation, has resisted environmental
protections against riparian exploitation. The AFT turns this conflict on its head. To
agriculture, they attempt to prove that viable farming is dependent on effective
environmental stewardship, and that agricultural workers, having such close connections
to the land, should rightly consider themselves environmentalists. To environmentalists,
they highlight the decline of the family farm as not only lamentable, but also
environmentally unsustainable. The AFT does this by positing a common enemy of both
camps: corporate consolidation of agricultural land coupled with an application of
techniques that are neither industrially nor environmentally sustainable. Furthermore, by
placing food at the center of the presentation, the AFT seeks to include both perspectives
into a common interest. Their slogan "no farms, no food" (AFT, 2009) emphasizes the
interconnectedness of agriculture to not only environmentalists, but to everyone, and
builds on the recent tum to organic and sustainable agriculture and food production.
This bridge-building bent, combined with their focus on long-term, big-picture
planning, shows a certain degree of inclusivity to their identity, in that they link these two
disparate perspectives as a central approach. However despite this inclusive aspect to
their identity, overall the AFT should be considered exclusive to (although not
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incompatible with) most other environmental identities, in that its focus is "exclusively
[... ] on the preservation of long-term agriculture and agricultural lands" (Don Stuart,
personal communication). Although there is an inclusive side to their identity which is
notable, the specificity of their purview excludes them from overlap with many EO's
mIssIOns.
As the AFT is primarily an agricultural organization, they define natural resources
as those that can be consumed. The exploitation of nature is a given for this industry, and
thus this EO as well, so the question becomes how to most sustainably exploit the natural
world. This approach of husbandry defines the EO, and thus their discourse tends to
reflect a consumptive, utilitarian bias. The ability of science to successfully regulate
human consumption of natural areas is also a given assumption, as this is the method that
they propose: to more sustainably manage the natural world. By stressing the importance
of economic development, they are able to reach farmers feeling the strain of a sagging
economy and a loss of the small farm, however in so doing, they probably lose some
support from those EOs who would stress protecting the environment for its intrinsic
value.
The strategic approach of the AFT is to secure viable farmland under the
protection of the trust (by attaching easements that prohibit development) to prevent
factory-farm and other construction encroachment, as well as to shape federal farm
policy. For example, they worked collaboratively on the Food Conservation and Energy
Act of 2008 (the so-called Farm Bill), so that it would provide subsidies and incentives
for environmentally friendly agricultural practices. Their general goal is to increase the
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voice of the small farmer in federal agriculture policy discussions, while simultaneously
encouraging that voice to reflect environmentally sustainable practices. Their input on
the Presidential Climate Control Plan helped explain agriculture's role in mitigating
climate change. Additionally, they educate farmers and ranchers on agricultural practices
(such as on the use of organic fertilizers and pest control techniques) which free the
farmers from dependency on expensive chemicals, as well as have a softer environmental
impacts on places such as the Chesapeake Bay.
The AFT encourages local food-purchasing campaigns as well, which they argue
reduce the greenhouse gasses generated during transportation, stimulate local farms and
provide an economic incentive for them to implement organic farming techniques. They
are continuously lobbying for municipal, state, and federal contracts to create
conservation easements. Their education efforts are designed both to train farmers to be
environmentalists, as well as to connect the concerns of the farmer to those of the rest of
society. The only alliance-building they expend energy upon is with "the land trust
community to help strengthen their farmland protection programs" (Don Stuart, personal
communication). The exclusivity of their mission probably does not afford them the
opportunity to form substantial alliances outside that rubric (see Table 3 above:
inclusivity and alliance participation are positively correlated). The AFT's strategic
choices are centered around their mission, and reflect a disposition of working within the
system to achieve farmland protection.
The resources that the AFT garners are fairly substantial, as one would expect
with any successful trust. Primarily they receive financial resources from environmental
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foundation grants, which run the gamut of contentiousness. For example, one of their key
funders, the Northwest Fund for the Environment, is quite adversarial, and would like to
see the AFT engage in litigation and direct action. Another key funder, Boeing, is leery of
getting involved in controversy, and would prefer to see the AFT participate in
collaboration and education. They also receive money from individual donations and
contracts (their membership subscriptions are not profitable), although Mr. Stuart
explained that the vast majority of their largesse comes from the foundations. As
moderate stances do not seem to dissuade the more contentious foundations from funding
their projects nearly as much as contentious stances would dissuade the more moderate
foundations from funding their projects, they tend to lean toward moderation. Mr. Stuart
explains that their "moderate environmental position probably also has advantages"
because it maintains the flow of money. "I am pretty sure there are some funders like
Boeing and others that would be more likely to fund us because we're a bit closer to the
middle" (Don Stuart, personal communication). Here we see the conservatizing influence
of the types and sources of financial support, and the conscious process in which EO
leadership engages to secure various resources.
The AFT did not support protests against NAFTA or the WTO, because they,
particularly Mr. Stuart, instead articulate the importance of including trade in any
successful environmental legislation. They did support the Kyoto Protocols, and continue
to extol the benefits that it brings despite the US not signing the agreement. Mr. Stuart
also explained that from his perspective, it appeared that the only reason it did pass
among those who signed is because it included a trade component. He was referring
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specifically to tradable permits for pollutants, however I maintain that this idea is
inextricably linked to market principles because it depends on the notion that through free
exchange, profit can be maximized within acceptable limits that maintain environmental
viability. So although the oppositionality of supporting the Kyoto Protocols is
noteworthy, it is clear that the general disposition of the political advocacy of the AFT is
not oppositional, and indeed seeks redress within the confines of the system, and depends
on alliances with corporate and government elites for successful implementation of
farmland security.
The political advocacy of the AFT is not particularly oppositional, which given
the typology, is quite predictable. Their identity is relatively exclusive, which non-
oppositional EGs tend to be, and the degree to which it is inclusive only suggests further
ties to establishment elites that would discourage oppositional political advocacy. They
engage in a discourse of technical management and exploitation. They do focus on
lobbying, but it appears that their close work with government agencies in such projects
as the Farm Bill and the Presidential Climate Control Plan suggests that the type of
lobbying they employ is more collaborative than contentious. They do engage in
education, which is more attributable to confrontational EGs, however that which the
educate about is not particularly contentious; agricultural techniques do not draw the
same kind of fire as tree-sitting or road destruction. The alliances they form further
demonstrate their lack of oppositionality, as they mostly restrict alliances to other
members ofthe land trust community. They are a relatively large organization with
substantial resources, and although they are without many volunteers, nonetheless tend to
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behave in a manner more congruent with the larger organizations. The sources of their
funding further establish this relationship, as their predominant sources are corporate, and
they so far have not perceived a decline in funding from more contentious foundations as
a result of their moderate stances. Their position on climate is their only oppositional
form of political advocacy, and their reason for supporting the Kyoto Protocols (trade) is
linked to the reasons they did not advocate oppositionally on the WTO or NAFTA. This
case generally supports the EO typology, and the reasons behind its few departures
actually help explain the typology further.
5.2.2 - Institute for Applied Ecology - Tom Kaye
The Institute for Applied Ecology (IAE) has a generalized mission statement that
could be applied to many EOs, in that they purport to "conserve native ecosystems
through research, restoration, and education" (IAE, 2010) This generic appeal however
does not demonstrate a completely inclusive identity, as my interview with the Executive
Director, Tom Kaye, revealed. Although their mission is generalized, they see themselves
as distinct from other organizations, because their unique institutional position allows
them to work on all three above mentioned areas simultaneously in ways that other EOs
cannot. Indeed, in the quantitative analysis, the correspondence score of their responses
to survey items concerning their identity placed them in the bottom quartile of EOs in my
sample for inclusiveness of identity (see Table 8). This is probably due to the fact that
they work "primarily with public agencies" (Tom Kaye, personal communication) and as
such, do not need to include the identities of other EOs under their rubric. This suggests
that although their mission statement does not explicitly exclude other EOs' identities,
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they nonetheless see themselves as being uniquely capable of acting in concert with
established public agencies. This does not represent the type of exclusive identity that we
see in some other organizations, yet it is clear that to a certain degree, the lAE envisions
its mission as distinct from other EOs.
Table 8
Internal Case Diagram
Identities Strategies Resources
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American Farmland Trust 10 hI 10 10 hi
h
Institute fOJ Applied Ecology 10 10 hi 10 hi hi
Cascade Raptor Center 10 hi 10 10 hi hi hi
Native Forest Council, Inc. hi hi hi hi hi hi [10]
h
FSEEE hi [0 hi hi hi
*Ecofeminism International hi hi hi Lo hi
h
*Nat. Env. Protection Society 10 hi 10 10 10 hi hI
'pseudonyms
hi =top quartile
10 = bottom quar1ile
The lAE's identity should also be characterized by technicality, as they depend on
scientific management of natural resources in order to monitor "native species and
ecosystems in order to determine population trends and effective methods for
management and restoration" (lAE, 2010). This requires faith in the scientific process
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and on technologies that assist in the management of natural areas. The IAE' s goal is not
to indoctrinate, but rather to be as scientifically objective as possible. This is the type of
technical environmental discourse that is consistent with EOs of this type.
However, Mr. Kaye also noted that nature has intrinsic value that should be
protected for its own sake, which is a less exploitative identity that is usually not
associated with an identity of technical rationality. It is unclear which of their
representatives responded to the 2006 survey, however 'intrinsic value' was not a
statement that they reported closely identifying with at that time. While it is possible that
their identity has changed over time, I believe instead that this is an indication of
miscommunication during my interview with Mr. Kaye. Agreeing with a statement that
nature has intrinsic value is very different from placing that intrinsic value near the top of
the identity priority list. Indeed, nature may have intrinsic value to them, however its
utilitarian value may be emphasized more often in their political rhetoric. This seems to
be more of an indication of savvy political positioning than it is for genuinely non-
exploitative positioning.
Strategically, the IAE is quite diversified. Their three areas of focus (research,
education, and restoration) take on a multitude of forms. Their research is all applied, as
their namesake suggests, and involves monitoring of population trends of both native
species as well as invasive species, and from that research they develop strategies of
cultivating the former and reducing the latter. They routinely engage in cooperative
research and restoration projects with federal and state agencies such as the Bureau of
Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. They are currently working with the
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Nature Conservancy on a multi-site prairie restoration research project, and also with
Benton County (Oregon) on a conservation plan. Their Education within the IAE is
science-based, wherein students (K-12, as well as adults) are taught about endangered
species and threatened habitats, and taught how to grow those species in captivity
followed by release into the wild. Recently they published and distributed a weed guide,
so that community members might identify and reduce the proliferation of non-native
invasive species. Although the IAE tries to maintain an air of neutrality, they nonetheless
include a restoration component to nearly all of their educational activities. Their habitat
restoration also includes the cultivation and distribution of native seeds. They do not
participate in any form of litigation or lobbying, as it is outside their purview. They also
may develop partnerships from time to time, but do not explicitly focus on alliance
formation, as it is not a necessary strategy to fulfill their mission. Herein lies the lack of
inclusivity of their identity: they do not actively exclude any particular effort, but they
have such a refined set of prescribed practices that they do not need to widen the scope of
their identity in the way that a more contentious organization might. They act in a very
moderate, reasonable manner, so they are not compelled to expend energy convincing the
public that their efforts are practical.
The resources they garner also tend to have an effect on their political advocacy.
Mr. Kaye pointed out that the money they receive is earmarked for specific projects, so
they do not have the leeway to utilize it for alternate projects. Although IAE
representatives may not describe it this way, their sources of income probably have a
conservatizing effect on their political advocacy, as these resources are channeled into
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specifically prescribed functions. They do not accept commissions however, so the
sources of funding they receive do not necessarily set the agenda. Indeed, the IAE only
seeks funding for projects they wish to pursue, so although the money may be channeled,
this is consistent with the IAE's mission. Most of their money comes directly from
government grants, and they collect no membership dues. They have between 18 and 30
staff members seasonally (greater numbers in the summer months) and only sporadic
volunteers. Their staff is paid quite well (in the highest quartile of my sample from the
quantitative analysis), and Mr. Kaye seems to think that they have about the right amount
of financial and human resources to continue to effectively meet their organizational
goals. Although not a large EO per se, they nonetheless have several attributes that are
similar to larger EOs, because they are well funded, those funds are highly accounted for,
and they hire a very professionalized and well-compensated staff.
The IAE does not consider itself as engaged in political advocacy, because they
do not try to influence the passage or repeal of any given policy. They rather see their
role as to provide political agents with accurate facts so that they "can make informed
policy decisions" (Tom Kaye, personal communication). This however actually does fit
my definition of political advocacy, because the implication behind the "facts" they
present is that public policy should include sensitivity to environmental concerns. Also,
the facts they choose to focus on and share have political implications. There is no way to
completely divorce the two concepts. One can be certain that some politicians would
resist the conclusions drawn by the research for purely political reasons. The presentation
of any information has political implications, and environmental data even more so,
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because if true, it implies action that would threaten the profit margins of the
industrialists. The IAE might not view their advocacy as political, but those who resist
the conclusions they present most assuredly do. However, this political advocacy is not
very oppositional at all, and is designed as such. The way they present their information
as neutral is clearly an effort to portray their advocacy as cooperative rather than
adversarial.
Most of the characteristics of the IAE conform to the expectations of the typology
for a large, non-oppositional EO. They have a relatively exclusive identity and routinely
employ technical discourse. They do not litigate nor lobby. They do focus on education,
which is somewhat deviant from the expectations of this type of EO, however the
education they employ attempts to be more neutral than persuasive, which is a much less
oppositional form. They do not focus on alliance formation, and they have substantial
financial resources. All of these characteristics point to an EO that prefers to engage in
less oppositional political advocacy. It is not surprising then that they also did not oppose
any of the three landmark political events.
5.2.3 - Cascades Raptor Center - Louise Shimmel
The Cascades Raptor Center (CRC) is a wildlife animal hospital and nature center
located in the wooded foothills surrounding Eugene, Oregon, and was founded in 1987
with the dual purpose of rehabilitating wild birds of prey, and educating the public in an
effort to spread "awareness, respect, appreciation, and care of the earth and all its
inhabitants" (CRC, 2009). They began by taking live, permanently disabled, and/or non-
releasable birds that they had rehabilitated, in addition to other forms of media, to schools
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and public sites "to help the human part of the natural community learn to value,
understand, and honor the role of wildlife" (Ibid). Since 1994, when they moved to their
current location, they have combined these efforts with on-site visits to their nature
center.
I interviewed Louise Shimmel, Founder and Executive Director, on a picnic
bench outside the center. The trees were tall, the shade was crisp, and the calls of raptors
surrounded us. One tethered Kestrel was feeding on a nearby perch, and two giant
German Shepherds were calmly patrolling the estate. She began by explaining that she
did not consider the CRC to be a political advocacy organization, because they do not
take stands on political issues, by which she clarified she meant specific policy proposals
or political candidate races. The CRC needs credibility with the public, or else people
who encounter injured animals will not bring them to the center. The biggest danger they
see to engaging in any form of political advocacy on legislation is that it could be
perceived as contentious, and thus hinder their overall mission of helping the birds.
In this way, the identity of the CRC is relatively exclusive, and has become more
so over time. In the early years, their mission was more broadly defined, stating that they
focused on the "preservation of raptors and all wildlife and their habitats through
rehabilitation and education" (Louise Shimmel, personal communication). Some
apparently interpreted this as advocacy for more restrictive environmental policies, which
is precisely the type of advocacy the CRC seeks to avoid. They later on changed their
mission statement to include a human component, in an attempt to soften its edge, and
increase its universal appeal. Attempting to tap into the Oregonian heritage of trapping,
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logging, and farming, they designed their mission statement to appeal to the types of
people that might have resisted an organization with a more overtly politically
environmental bent. She also explained that she considered the CRC to be in a different
subcategory of 501C-3 non-profit organizations than other environmental organizations.
Although she did not elaborate and I was unable to verify the accuracy of that comment,
it nonetheless illustrates that their identity is actually quite distinct from that of other
EOs.
The CRC embraces a discourse that emphasizes the intrinsic value of species.
Their mission statement clearly affirms this with an insistence on having the birds come
first, and they enforce this by minimizing raptor exposure to humans as much as possible.
The logic of wildlife rescue has significant tensions with exploitation discourse,
specifically because of this bio-centric prioritization. Furthermore, on the mission
statement webpage, they include the famous quotation from Chief Seattle of the
Duwamish people: "the earth does not belong to us; we belong to the earth" (CRC, 2009).
This sets up a relationship between humans and nature that does not subordinate the
needs of the environment to the needs of humans. Although this non-exploitative
discourse is consistent with the mission of the organization, this bio-centric leaning has
further political implications, because it could be perceived as a stance that is
confrontational towards industry, particularly farming and ranching. It is clear why it is
that the CRC changed their mission statement to reach out to this part of Oregon's
heritage; they needed to temper the potentially contentious idea ofputting the birds first,
so as to mitigate any negative political implications that might hinder their mission.
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The strategies employed by the CRC lie within a very narrow range. As described
above, they rehabilitate birds of prey, release them when possible, and then utilize those
that cannot be released to compliment their education efforts. In order for the CRC to
operate as an effective rehabilitation center, they must remain credible with the general
public. And through this credibility, they are able to inspire people to care about the
birds. They do not lobby, litigate, participate in alliances, or engage in any other tactics
outside education and rehabilitation.
The three largest expenses that the CRC must cover include the mortgage, the
salaries for the staff and the food for the animals. She explained that the food for the
animals at times was greater than $1,000 per week. They have a chick house and a mouse
house where they attempt to raise as much food on their own as possible, however they
are rarely ever able to keep up with the demand, and must purchase prey from outside
sources. Some of this money comes from membership dues and sponsorships of
individual birds. Each of the cages that she showed me had tags on them with names of
the people and organizations that sponsored each bird. Members receive a newsletter and
are entitled to free center visits and tours. They receive funds from the government, and
in particular from the Forest Service, however this money is given without solicitation.
They do not spend much time or energy seeking new governmental funding sources, yet
frequently are offered what are called "challenge cost share grants" to assist with their
educational efforts. They have less than three full time employees, but enlist the help of
over 100 volunteers, and with a wide spectrum of duties. Some are educators who
predominantly work in the schools making presentations to students. They also utilize
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breeders to manage the prey. They have an animal care team, which travels to the sites
where the animals are found, and transports them to the facility. They have a clinic staff
charged with the task of caring for the birds and cleaning the cages, and another site staff
person who handles presentations and tours. The CRC hires an accountant and a
bookkeeper, and Ms. Shimmel receives a salary, but the rest ofthe staff are volunteers.
This is a relatively unique resource configuration, because although they do not bring in
an exceptional amount of financial resources (the CRC is in the least wealthy half of my
sample), they nonetheless employ such a large number of volunteers that they tend to
take on the characteristics of a significantly larger organization.
The attempt by the CRC to frame what they do as outside the realm of advocacy
is a conscious process of perception management, but it is not wholly consistent with
other comments by Ms. Shimmel. In her explanation that they do not engage in advocacy
she included various examples of political advocacy that they actually do perform. For
example, she mentioned that she might personally respond to a posting on the Federal
Registry that might affect their permits, or write a letter in support of "No Child Left
Inside", or allow the organization to be listed as a supporter on their website, or suggest
that members support the Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife non-game check-off
on their tax return. Each of these represents a form of advocacy with political
implications. Although she was very careful to explain how they do not participate in
political advocacy, it is clear that by my definition, they do. This disconnect in our
definitions though highlights their position: they are aware that they have a stance that
could be perceived as contentious within the political realm, but they try to minimize its
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prominence as much as possible so that they can maintain an air of political neutrality,
and thus scientific credibility. It is this non-contentious, non-oppositional character that
defines their political advocacy.
The CRC is a unique EO that does not quite fit the typology. They do engage in a
form of political advocacy, but they avoid voicing concerns about specific ballot
measures or candidates in an effort to appear as reasonable (as non-oppositional) as
possible. Similar to other EOs that prefer less oppositional political advocacy, the CRC
has a relatively exclusive identity, does not utilize litigation or lobbying, does not seek to
form new alliances, and has substantial volunteers. However, unlike many other EOs of
this type, they do focus on education, and do not gamer substantial financial resources.
The focus on education is not surprising however, because unlike other non-oppositional
groups, the underlying assumptions of the CRC's political advocacy could be perceived
as oppositional, because it places the concerns of animals above those of humans.
Furthermore, the CRC does not have extensive ties to Washington policy elite. They
receive government grants, but those are given, not sought. These two factors coupled
together suggest that they are aware that their advocacy could be perceived as
oppositional, and that they do not have the political ties to mitigate this perception among
policy elite, so instead they attempt to avoid politics altogether, and then bolster their
mainstream legitimacy through education.
It is also crucial to examine the historical development of this organization. The
CRC began as an educational EO during the 1980s, and despite the Spotted Owl
controversy that was so salient at the time, the CRC did not take an official position. This
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desire to create an educational, yet non-oppositional EO was an integral part of the
inception and development of the organization. Similar to the way that oppositional
groups use education as a mechanism to present their position as reasonable, the
educational arm of the CRC helped frame the EO in a manner that is more palatable to a
wider swath of political perspectives. Therefore, although the CRC does not perfectly fit
the typology in that they are more educational than the average non-oppositional EO, the
way in which they depart bolsters further the idea that identities matter in terms of their
effects on political advocacy. Their unique historical position and strategic choices that
have coincided with the evolution ofthat identity has shaped their political advocacy in
this manner, and led them towards more narrowly defined, non-confrontational political
advocacy.
5.2.4 - Native Forest Council- Tim Hermach
The Native Forest Council (NFC) has one ofthe most totalistic and far-reaching
mission statements of any EO I examined, in that they seek to "fully protect and preserve
every acre of publicly owned land" (1\iFC, 2010). In my interview with their President,
Tim Hermach, he explained the uncompromising nature of their identity. By "fully" and
"every" they argue that there should be no compromise in environmental defense.
Anything short of complete protection for all public land is viewed as unacceptable. He
likens the compromises that other EOs make (in settling for some logging on public
lands) to "Sophie's choice" 55 and argues that they are unforgivably selling out their
55 In reference to the idiom derived from the novel and film by the same name, wherein an actor is forced
into making a decision in which any and all options have equally negative outcomes. In the story, Sophie
was forced to choose which one of her children lived, and which one the Nazi's took from her to be
executed.
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children. Throughout the mission statement, totalistic language is invoked to support this
position, and in the interview he further qualified his stance, in a very passionate manner.
They aim to protect "all" publicly owned natural resources, and are more concerned with
maintaining that hard line than they are in converging with other softer line EOs
collaboratively.
The inclusivity of the NFC's identity is particularly perplexing. On the one hand,
the identity ofthe NFC is similar to that of other EOs with inclusive identities; they use a
wide lens with which to frame the range of ecological issues that they find salient and
connected. For example, in their mission statement they implicate timber sales, grazing,
mining, oil and gas extraction as all having negative environmental implications. Thus,
their rhetoric draws upon the concerns of several different EO camps in order for them to
define the extent of the problem. This delimited issue-focus includes more disparate
strains of identity than might be utilized by a single-concern or regional EO. They also
tend to frame their purpose as encompassing an extensive range of ecological causes.
Their survey responses concerning their issues of concern further support this
interpretation, with a correspondence score in the top quartile of my sample in terms of
inc1usivity. The organization frames its identity in somewhat inclusive terms in order to
address the diverse array of issues that they deem important.
However, the exclusivity of their identity is even more apparent. I spoke to him at
his home in Eugene, Oregon, which is also the office for the NFC. He spoke of many of
his former colleagues somewhat negatively as they had, in his eyes, sold out the
movement by making too many concessions. He frequently argued that those who sell out
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the "lungs of the Earth" should be punished, even to death (Tim Hermach, personal
communication).
Mr. Hermach emphasized how different he was from other environmentalists,
explaining that he came from a military and corporate background, which he viewed as
diametrically opposite from that of many environmentalists that he discounted. He
decried the usefulness of direct action of nearly any kind, and refused to support any such
activity. He explained that not only is a clear, compelling message important (and nearly
always absent from a protest event), but also that an approachable physical appearance
and attire are crucial to the success of the EO as well, and environmentalists that do not
take this into consideration actually help the timber industry by discrediting the entire
environmental movement. To these other environmentalists he said "I like your passion,
your spirit, you've got a good heart, but you're stupider than a mud fence and a danger to
the rest of us" (Tim Hermach, personal communication). Despite the inclusive nature of
the NFC's wide issue focus, the uncompromising position of their leadership represents
somewhat of an exclusive ecological identity.
The NFC avoids the use of techno-rational discourse whenever possible, and
implicates the hubris of the scientific managers as being the core of the environmental
crisis. He argues that forests are systems that are far too complex for humans to manage
sustainably. For example, he points to the millions of microscopic organisms that live in
the topsoil of a forest, and which are crucial to its health. Logging in these areas warms
the soil, killing the organisms, and thus severely hindering forest re-growth. The only
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way to a healthy forest from this perspective is, to leave it alone, which is why he
advocates ending all extraction of natural resources on public lands.
Furthermore, the identity of the NFC leans away from exploitative discourse. One
aspect to exploitation is the quantification of the exchange value of the forest, and its
measurement of value with precision. However, forest management bureaucracies are
incapable of doing this, because they are incapable of quantifying the value of the forest.
According to Mr. Hernlach, when a government bureaucracy cannot measure a
something with precision in monetary terms, they must treat its value at zero, the one
thing we all know it is not. The message of the NFC is that nothing truly valuable, such
as "a tree, the soil, the air, the water, climate, weather, security, happiness, love, joy,
wife, kids," can be precisely measured in monetary terms (Tim Hermach, personal
communication). The faith that the NFC has in the capabilities of scientific management
to successfully and sustainably regulate forest health while continuing resource extraction
therefore, is very low.
The NFC has a very limited repertoire of action. Although their ideology is of the
more uncompromising of any EO I interviewed, they nonetheless do not identify with
other similarly contentious EOs. They rule out direct action completely, which is the
tactic most often preferred by EOs that are more concerned with principle than
pragmatism. The NFC is self-admittedly more principled than pragmatic, yet is highly
critical of others with a similar orientation. Then again, without access to channels in
Washington or a large financial base, they are constrained against utilizing more
mainstream tactics as well: litigation and lobbying are too expensive, and most forms of
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diplomacy are foreclosed upon by their uncompromising stance. They also do not pursue
alliances very often, and indeed emphasize the betrayal they have experienced in
previous alliances. The primary tactic that they report continuing to employ currently is
education. They research issues of a wide variety, and using mail, email, blogs and their
website, distribute as much information as they are able. Mr. Hermach explained that this
was the only strategy that he could envision that was consistent with the mission of the
NFC, and within his reach financially. The choices they have made strategically and
ideologically reach synergy with this type of political advocacy: contentious to the point
of becoming adversarial and even hostile toward much of the rest of the environmental
movement.
The resources that the NFC garners (particularly the financial support) are
minimal and dwindling. They are completely supported by voluntary donations, and they
perform virtually no public fundraising activities of any kind. They do apply for grants,
however two oftheir usual grants have been declined this year. Mr. Hermach explained
that he has had to put $40,000 on his credit cards just to keep the doors open, and that he
is unsure for how much longer he will be able to continue in this manner. He admitted to
being "financially irresponsible," (Tim Hermach, personal communication) and sadly
lamented that he was bankrupt. He was quite aware of the connection between his
oppositional political advocacy and his dwindling funding sources. He claimed it as a
badge, in that it was the only path he felt could keep his honor. He proudly explained that
at dozens ofjunctures throughout the years, they "have stood on principle against
money ... and suffered for it" (Tim Hermach, personal communication). At several points
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he invoked a religious justification, explaining that as long as he was meant to continue
this work, he would be provided for. His sincerity and commitment to his path were
inspiring, and his awareness of the consequences of his choices evident.
Mr. Hermach spoke of the typical development path of the EO with great lucidity.
He explained how EOs begin with an irresponsible visionary willing to take risks to
confront an injustice. This person is motivated by the severity of the crisis at hand, and
their inspirational leadership compels others to join the organization. Then, the EO
grows, matures, and then hires employees. This begins as directorships for particular
projects, but then as the EO gains greater momentum and begins to gamer more financial
resources, they find it necessary to hire a financial operations officer - a "bean counter,"
(Tim Hermach, personal communication) whose task becomes to rein in the risky
behaviors of the visionary, and force accountability for every expenditure. This gives the
EO legitimacy to a certain degree, but then the financial officer will tend to shrink the
visionary's discretionary spending, thinking more towards the long-term survival of the
EO than strict adherence to the mission. At some point, argues Mr. Hermach, the spirit of
the organization dies, because its purpose becomes self-preservation instead of producing
a vision. As he told me this story, there was visible sadness on his face, yet also pride. He
was completely aware of the path that he avoided, and the inevitable consequences that
would ensue. He has resigned to his fate, and is unapologetic for the direction that he has
guided this EO. He enjoys a clear conscience for acting in alignment with his morals,
even in the face of an EO on the decline, perhaps at its twilight.
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The political advocacy of the NFC helps illustrate the crossroads that all EOs
must face: Does the leadership of a fledgling EO take their growth and success and build
on that to make sure that they can effect change over time, becoming evermore enmeshed
with the political process, or do they instead adhere to a staunch, uncompromising stance
that keeps them more closely connected to their original purpose, but which incurs
greater risks of instability? The NFC has consciously selected the latter path, and as such,
emphasizes their moral high ground over their historical successes. Their political
advocacy is so oppositional that they disregard much of the environmental movement as
"more bad than good, maybe by a factor of trillions to one" (Tim Hermach, personal
communication). He even went so far as to compare parts of the modern American
environmental movement to the "creeping, leaping fascism" of 1930s Germany (Tim
Hermach, personal communication). The political advocacy of the NFC is so oppositional
that its leadership is comfortable labeling the rest of the environmental movement akin to
Nazism. They are aware that this inflammatory rhetoric is divisive, yet they embrace it
wholly in order to make the moral juxtaposition upon which their organization is built:
absolute defense of the environment is essential, and any efforts shy of that are
deplorably unforgivable.
5.2.5 - Ecofeminism International: "Denise Smith"
Ecofeminism International (EI) 56 is a health, gender and environmental
organization that seeks to reduce toxins in consumer products, with a focus on those that
56 A pseudonym; Not every EO was willing to allow me to disclose the name of their organization. One of
these is Ecofeminism International (EI). As citing text from their website would reveal their true
organization name, I will refrain from that area of analysis, and instead focus on the information provided
me in the interview.
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negatively impact women's health. I interviewed their Director of Programs and Policy,
whom I will refer to as "Denise Smith," who explained that the identity of EI has evolved
over time. At their inception they were more broadly concerned with conservation issues,
and since then have narrowed their focus to the problem of exposure to chemicals that
inordinately affect women. In many ways, this is a very inclusive identity, as it sits on the
bridge between the environmental movement and the women's rights movement(s). The
purpose ofthe EO is to fuse the concerns of reproductive health and justice with those of
environmental health. This inclusion of human health into the EO mission is not
necessarily consistent with the identities of the decidedly bio-centric or animal-centric
EOs (such as the Animal Liberation Front, ALF or People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, PETA), however even these EOs would have a hard time opposing EI because
at the very least, their concerns do not compete. The wide net that their identity casts
could also dovetail with the concerns of some of these bio-centric EOs, as they would
both be targeting cosmetic companies. There is nothing particularly divisive about their
identity, which allows it to function relatively inclusively. Furthermore, EI attempts to
bridge multiple areas of concern, which is an effort towards inclusivity.
However, their unique position as an identity bridge also departs them from other
missions because the specificity of their mission statement prevents overlap with other
EOs. They no longer focus on conservation issues (exclusive), yet they still consider
themselves aligned with the environmental justice movement (inclusive). "Ms. Smith"
also claimed that she believes that EI is the only EO that frames the environmental crisis
as a women's issue, which although they are far from the only such EO (e.g., Ecofeminist
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Visions Emerging, Ecofem.org, etc.); their perception of isolation further demonstrates
the degree to which she sees EI's identity as not overlapping ideologically with other
EOs.
This intricate social movement identity demonstrates further complexities when
examining the degree to which they employ techno-rational and exploitation discourse.
Most EOs that employ technical discourse also employ exploitation discourse, as the two
tend to have some commonalities, particularly utilizing scientific management to
preserve nature for human consumption. EI however confounds this by positing that
technological monitoring of toxin levels is essential for human health, but that human
health ought not supersede environmental health. "Ms. Smith" explained emphatically
that they held the idea that humans are a part of, and not separate from nature. While this
is not necessarily a position opposing the exploitative consumption of nature by humans,
it nonetheless leans away from that utilitarian perspective by suggesting that we are
intimately connected to nature, rather than merely its stewards. Thus this usage of
technological discourse and simultaneous avoidance of exploitation discourse is a unique
combination, however it makes sense given the mission of the EI.
EI tends to focus its efforts on federal policy to make consumer products safer.
For example, they recently have been working on a campaign to prohibit the use of
certain chemicals that are found in one of the most popular brands of salon nail polish.
The chemicals have been proven to have deleterious effects on unborn children and on
women's reproductive capabilities. They worked with some groups that participated in
street theatre in Washington DC, which directly implicated the company in question. As a
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result (as well as from the massive mail and email campaign waged by EI that urged
people to contact their representatives in DC) the company decided to remove the
chemicals from their product line. This is the sort of pressure that they can apply: by
attracting attention to the severity of the problem, they are able to influence public policy.
They do not hire their own lawyers to accomplish these efforts, but they do get involved
with lawsuits on particular issues. They do not officially lobby congress, but they are
very involved with policy formation at earlier stages. They hold quarterly webinars that
teach women about some of the harmful chemicals that they should avoid. They use this
platform as well as their other advocacy channels to spread awareness, so that citizens
will apply pressure on their governments to prohibit the sale and distribution of harmful
chemicals. One way that EI makes its advocacy stronger in DC is by working to develop
strong alliances with other EOs, such as the Sierra Club. "Ms. Smith" stated that they
frequently work to "create a broad coalition with other environmental groups, workers
rights groups, labor groups, and reproductive justice groups, which could include the pro-
choice community" (personal communication). This strategy of building wide coalitions
and utilizing scientific data to persuade the public to put pressure on Congress is
consistent with that of other EOs and feminist organizations, which is how the inclusive
capacity oftheir identity operates on the strategic level: when these factors converge
synergistically, victories, such as the most recent nail polish campaign, become realized.
The resources that EI garners are not as telling as in some other organizations.
They receive a moderate amount of financial support (roughly 60th percentile ofEOs in
my sample), and utilize that money mostly for the media campaigns. They receive most
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of their money from member donations, which they prefer to refer to as supporters. They
have a limited staff (6 members), a board of directors (6 members), and an advisory
board (5 members). They utilize sporadic volunteer labor for mailings, office work, and
tabling at various locations. They do not quite fit the profile of a large, developed,
professionalized EO, but they seem to be moving in that direction.
The political advocacy of EI, despite its somewhat contentious nature (such as is
evidenced by their participation and endorsement of the demonstrations in Washington
DC) is actually quite cooperative with Beltway politics. They do expend considerable
effort opposing particular stances (or lacks of stance) by politicians, but their overall
advocacy on those issues is relatively conciliatory. The changes that they suggest are
quite minimal, and as such, their political advocacy not very oppositional. It is difficult to
frame an argument for why the companies should be allowed to distribute products with
harmful chemicals in them. The goal the of the EO is not to get people to change their
minds about the moral value of toxic chemicals (as few if any would maintain that toxins
in consumer products have moral value at all), but rather to recognize the extent and
implications of their use. Thus for a politician to cooperatively convince the company to
concede is a win/win, because they lose no support from acting too contentiously, and
they receive the added benefit of being able to claim that they acted to help their
constituency. This is not a risky stance for a career politician to take, provided that the
groundwork is laid first, which is what EI does. Their inclusive yet unique identity
coupled with their awareness-raising and diplomatic strategic orientation cements their
place as an EO with cooperative, non-oppositional ties to Washington. Although most
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EOs that share this inclusive identity, and that also cultivate alliances tend to act more
oppositionally, the specific ways in which the EI conducts its activism shows how their
non-oppositional political advocacy is constructed.
5.2.6 - Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics: Andy Stahl
The Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) is an EO that
focuses on reforming the environmental ethos of the U.S. Forest Service from within, and
holding it "accountable for responsible land stewardship" (FSEEE, 2010). In a personal
interview, their Executive Director, Andy Stahl referred to their task as to "provide adult
supervision for the Forest Service" (personal communication). The ultimate goal of the
organization is to reform the Forest Service's basic land management philosophy toward
more environmentally sustainable practices. Modeling their path after the father of
wildlife management, Aldo Leopold, the FSEEEjoins the efforts and concerns of Forest
Service workers, concerned citizens, resource managers, and environmental activists into
a national organization that promotes environmental ethics, educates the public, and
defends whistleblowers who expose the unsustainable practices of the Forest Service.
Although the identity of the FSEEE overlaps with that of other EOs, they
nonetheless view themselves as quite distinct. Mr. Stahl explained that they "aren't
interested in having the grand identity issues where you're allied in so many different
ways with these other organizations." Instead, he explained that the unique component of
their mission is the defense of whistleblowers, which is something that no other EO
practices. Also, they work within the boundaries of the Forest Service, hoping to reform
it from inside, which is quite different from the adversarial relationship between the
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USFS and many other EOs. Indeed, many EOs see the USFS as the source of the
problem, and that its institutional structures prevent effective reform. This tension is not
insurmountable, and indeed, Mr. Stahl mentioned that some groups they will work with
on specific projects, however they will not simply provide rhetorical support for any EO
or cause (such as through a hyperlink on the website or any other form of public
endorsement) unless they are committed to devoting considerable resources towards its
achievement. These factors combined have had the effect of heightening tensions
between the FSEEE and the rest of the environmental movement, to the extent that they
feel that they are regarded as "uncooperative lane wolves, a reputation [they] carry
proudly" (Andy Stahl, personal communication). This division is partly by consequence
(because their ties to the USFS create tensions) and partly by design (as they actively
engage only those projects that they are committed to seeing to fruition, and do not
provide endorsements), and clearly establishes the exclusivity of the FSEEE's identity.
The FSEEE relies on the concepts of scientific management, despite their critique
of the way it is currently conducted in the USFS. They build on the tradition of Leopold's
wildlife management, which involves careful scientific assessments and environmental
impact statements. They depend on this scientific data because their audience, the USFS
itself, is unflappable with regards to moral appeals. The USFS operates as a bureaucracy
with institutional momentum, so the arguments made by EOs (such as the FSEEE) have
to be rational and provable, so that they can actually have an effect on policy. Thus their
discourse will tend to adopt the same character as the bureaucracy within which it
operates. The USFS employs a very technological ecological discourse that does not
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require translation: the intended audience operates from the same bias, so the arguments
of the FSEEE are more palatable to the USFS. Likewise, the USFS utilizes an
exploitation discourse, because that is the political persuasion out of which they evolved:
to sustainably manage the forests for the consumption by humans. Connecting the human
use-value to forest health has been a key argument advanced by the USFS since its
inception, mostly as a way to gain credibility with the business community. Now, the
FSEEE utilizes this same discourse because again, it operates within the larger
bureaucracy, and must speak the same language to be effective.
The strategic plan of the FSEEE is threefold: to advocate for environmental
ethics, to educate the public and to defend whistleblowers. Rather than being overtly
principled activists devoted to a grand cause, the FSEEE rather tends to only take on an
issue if they think they can win. For example, they were asked to endorse two measures
that were very much aligned with their mission. However they decided to avoid doing so
because they were not also willing to devote enough resources to them to get them to
pass. Both the Red Rocks Wilderness Bill and the Northern Rockies Ecosystem
Protection Act are within the rhetorical rubric of the FSEEE, but since they were not
willing to devote considerable time and energy to either project, the FSEEE refused to
endorse the passage of the bills. However, they do support the designation of the Devil's
Staircase area in the southern Suislaw National Forest as a wilderness area, and they both
symbolically and substantively support the passage of that bill. These are the only
litigation or lobbying activities that they partake in: attempting to pass bills that protect
the areas that they focus on, but nothing outside their immediate purview. Forming
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alliances with other EOs is just not something the FSEEE is interested in pursuing, unless
it is a specific project upon which they are willing to see to completion.
Their educational strategies take several forms including public speaking tours, a
quarterly journal (Forest Magazine), detailed monitoring reports that they distribute to
various organizational leaders as well as to the general public, and also supplements for
middle-school environmental curricula. They attempt to shift the direction of USFS
planning by widely publicizing the disastrous effects of unsustainable timber harvest
practices, and also by touting the benefits of successful restoration programs.
Their third major strategy is to defend whistleblowers that bring crucial
information forward, or who are embroiled in conflicts that have environmental
implications. For instance, one of their struggles involved some female workers who
were claiming that they were suffering sickness due to exposure to a paint that they were
required to use marking trees. These concerns were ultimately taken into consideration by
an arm of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, who conducted a
biological impact study that revealed that exposure to the paint might be implicated in an
increased risk of miscarriages among women. These concerns were not garnering support
internally, so the women approached the FSEEE, who ultimately prevailed in compelling
the USFS to discontinue the use of the paint. Perhaps if more EOs prioritized greater
inter-organizational communication and alliance building, a coalition between EI and the
FSEEE would have emerged on this issue. Although they are strategically quite different,
both EOs in this case would have had the same goals, and could have assisted each
other's efforts.
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Another campaign that the FSEEE became involved in was to expose fraudulent
land exchanges between an environmental advocacy group negotiating on behalf of the
USFS in Nevada and some developers who wanted greater access. A whistleblower came
to the FSEEE and leaked a document from the Office of the Inspector General
establishing the fraudulent land exchanges. The FSEEE then sent their investigative
reporter to delve into county records, and were ultimately able to prove the impropriety
and publish the results. This is a good example of how their three strategic options
overlapped: their whistleblower protection arm was able to acquire the information, and
the educational and advocacy arms were able to distribute the information.
The FSEEE receives most (80-90%) of its financial backing from its individual
members (both dues and donations), most of whom are actually not current USFS
employees. This means that the individual $35 contributions allows the leadership a great
deal of advocacy leeway (no specific interests to which to be beholden), which Mr. Stahl
argued meant that their funding did not constrain their actions. However, he also pointed
out that if they did not have frequent victories on issues that attract attention, that this
funding would diminish. If they don't accomplish enough that the membership finds
interesting, the subscriptions will not get renewed. Therefore the FSEEE is not
constrained by their funding against certain forms of political advocacy per se, however
they are compelled to engage in winnable struggles with reasonable, pragmatic,
achievable goals. They once had a major EO threaten to withdraw a $50,000 grant if the
FSEEE published a particular article, and after the article was published, did indeed
withdraw the contribution. Mr. Stahl explained that this was an expensive story, but one
..------------~~---~- ------------ -
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that was picked up by ajournalist at the Seattle Times who then used it to win the
National Environmental Journalist of the Year Award. The FSEEE knew that the pressure
was being applied to them, and yet they refused to acknowledge its authority. So although
the resources they garner do have an effect on their political advocacy, it is not as simple
as interest constraint. Certainly that mechanism is in place, as is evidenced by the attempt
of the grant holders to influence the FSEEE's political advocacy, however this control is
apparently not tremendously effective. Instead, the nature of the small donation liberates
the EO to pick its battles, widening the repertoire ofpolitical advocacy, while
simultaneously compelling the EO to produce rallying incremental victories, thereby re-
narrowing the repertoire. Therefore EOs of this type are not so much constrained against
certain political advocacy as they are compelled to engage in a narrow range of advocacy
forms.
The political advocacy of the FSEEE should not be considered oppositional,
despite their refusal to cede authority to whichever donating organization withdrew their
contribution (Mr. Stahl did not want to mention the organization by name). Obviously
there is a certain amount of contention that emerges when a group's sole purpose is to
take on an agency of the federal government. However, the manner in which they
conduct this contention is not particularly confrontational. Not only did they decline to
oppose any of the historic political events, but also they categorically refuse to take
stances against any national political positions on which they are not willing to follow
through completely. Also, despite their lack of concern for how they are perceived by
other EOs, they are very much concerned with how they appear to government agents
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and entities. They do not seek the support of other EOs, but are very much concerned
with how they are "perceived by political and administrative decision makers." The
degree of oppositionality of EO political advocacy exists on a continuum, running along a
spectrum of limited oppositional actions to a broader commitment to nationally engaged
issues. Thus the political advocacy employed by the FSEEE is not relatively oppositional,
which is consistent with their identity, their strategies, and their resources.
5.2.7 - Center for Biological Diversity: Jay Lininger
The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is a wilderness preservation and
wildlife conservation organization that seeks to create legally binding protections for a
wide range ofthreatened and endangered species and habitats. I spoke with their Forest
Fire Ecologist, Jay Lininger, who works out oftheir head office in Tucson, Arizona. He
explained how they use "biological data, legal expertise and the citizen petition provision
of the powerful Endangered Species Act" (ESA) to achieve enduring legal protections
(CBD, 2010).
The inclusivity of this mission cannot be overstated. They do not primarily focus
on any single species or area, and indeed have expanded their territory over the years to
include all 11 western states, both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and even some areas as
remote as the North and South poles. Mr. Lininger explained that they began as single
species surveyors, and have over the years moved into litigation and enforcing the ESA.
He explains that one of the elements of their mission is to engage in "solidarity politics,"
with other EOs, First Nations, and the public (Jay Lininger, personal communication). In
this way they seek to include as many causes as possible into a multifaceted approach.
------------------------- --
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This is further evidenced by the number of scientists that they employ (12) to spearhead
various campaigns. The rubric of their mission is so widely drawn that they could nearly
include almost any other environmental organization. The CBD depends on scientific
data to effectively report and track environmental damage and recovery, and as such
employs a discourse that is not averse to technology. However, they maintain that
"diversity has intrinsic value," (Jay Lininger, personal communication) which suggests
that unlike other EOs that tend to employ technological environmental discourses, the
CBD does not prioritize human consumption of natural resources. Instead, the CBD's
identity includes the value of nature for its own sake, which departs from the utilitarian
perspective of most of the EOs that prefer technical discourse.
The strategic platform of the CBD has multiple overlapping components:
research, legal struggles to enforce the ESA, grassroots organizing, list building, event
planning and petitions to the Federal Government to list additional species and habitats as
threatened or endangered under the ESA, and education. Their research involves the
scientific assessment of biological data as indicators for environmental damage and
recovery. They use this data to bolster their legal activities, which involve lawsuits,
injunctions, and other legal pressures to enforce the ESA. They organize petitions to
intensify these pressures, and participate in policy advocacy circles as well. Their
educational outreach is extensive, including media campaigns, event tabling, and
presentations in the schools. Recently they completed one of their most widely
distributed media campaigns, which was a pair of public service announcements
explaining the effects of climate change on polar bears. Mr. Lininger explained that they
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do not get involved in direct action at all, as they need the perception of legality in order
to maintain legitimacy on policy discussions. They frequently get involved in alliance
formation, particularly when there is a local group already addressing one of their key
areas of concern. Through this multipronged approach, the CBD is able to address a
multitude of concerns: expanding their protected territory, widening the scope and
enforcement of the ESA, and engaging in an approachable environmental public
dialogue.
The CBD is able to gamer fairly substantial financial resources, which is
evidenced by their ability to pay 56 staff members, of which Mr. Lininger explains nearly
half are lawyers. The other staff members are mostly ecologists of various types, each
with advanced degrees and areas of specialization that overlap with the CBD's mission.
They also hire office workers to help with the day-to-day operations, and enlist the
assistance of many volunteers as well. They have the fiscal discretion to invest in
expensive media campaigns, and to attract competitive and reputedly qualified staff
members. The resource portfolio ofthe CBD is similar to that of other large, well-
established, relatively mainstream EGs, and has a similar leadership structure. As they
aged, they grew their coffers, increased their accountability, and with that
professionalized and bureaucratized their internal structure.
Despite this professionalized structure and their general conciliatory approach, the
CBD nonetheless engages in political advocacy that could be considered somewhat
oppositional, which is illustrated by the tale of their inception that they recount in their
mission statement. Apparently three men performing owl surveys in New Mexico in 1989
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for the USFS turned up a Mexican Spotted Owl living in an old-growth tree. When they
found that the tree was scheduled to be removed as part of a massive timber sale that
violated the USFS's own rules, the three took the story to a local paper. The tree was
ultimately saved, and the struggle drew in several more activists who helped form the
group that would eventually become he CBD. In those early years they worked to shut
down major timber operations in the Southwest, as well as addressing the deleterious
effects of cattle grazing. These efforts were done in opposition to the advocacy of various
government agencies (e.g., the USFS), and although not extremely confrontational,
nonetheless represented advocacy in contention with that of many ranchers, logging
companies and policy elites. Furthermore, the CBD supported signing the Kyoto
Protocols and had many members that attended the WTO protest in Seattle (although they
officially could not support the latter demonstration), suggesting that their historical
development out of this oppositional political tradition has colored their current political
advocacy. Finally, Mr. Lininger confirmed that he believed their organization to be fairly
unique in that it is large, but unlike other large EOs, actually does engage in political
advocacy that is somewhat oppositional, although its "oppositional tactics are largely
confined to litigation" (Jay Lininger, personal communication). Their oppositional roots
have not been completely discarded, although particularly in recent years, have been
steered primarily into litigious channels.
Their innovational shift was to try to achieve wider, more sweeping legislative
changes, particularly by expanding and enforcing the ESA. This historically coincided
with their rapid growth into an established organization. As would be expected, they
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began hiring lawyers and professionalized staff, which had the effect of cementing their
political advocacy as minimally oppositional. As a tax-exempt organization, the CBD
cannot officially participate in any form of direct action, which Mr. Lininger argues is an
inevitable consequence of an EO getting larger and older. Their most effective means of
raising funds is through the tax exempt status of the donations, so they cannot participate
in anything that might be perceived as illegal or otherwise jeopardize that status, or else
these donations will begin to diminish. Mr. Lininger argues that this is the path of
development of the EO: it begins with a strong adherence to a cause, and then as the EO
grows and gains financial momentum, its political advocacy tends to become less
oppositional. He cites the World Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy as prime
examples of large, old, rich, Washington DC based EOs that are "extremely non-
confrontational" (Jay Lininger, personal communication). Thus although the CBD is a
relatively large and well-established, well-funded EO that operates through intra-systemic
channels, and engages in political advocacy that is not exceptionally oppositional, they
nonetheless see themselves as an EO that developed out of an adversarial relationship
with the USFS, and as such continue to engage in somewhat oppositional political
advocacy through litigation. Thus here we can see the general tendency of EOs with
nonprofit status, and particularly those with tax-exempt status, to institutionalize and
normalize their political advocacy behavior. Not only are they restricted from engaging in
very much electoral and legislative lobbying because of federal regulations tied to their
tax status, but they also add institutional scrutiny to their organization by entering the
federal funding bureaucracy.
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This level of oppositionality of political advocacy is to be expected among those
EOs that commonly employ litigation as a strategy. EOs that have inclusive, non-
exploitative identities and that depend on litigation tend to take oppositional stances, such
as the CBD's stance on the Kyoto Protocols. This is consistent with the typology in the
sense that it clearly shows how this degree of oppositionality of political advocacy is
connected to an inclusive identity and a litigious strategy. Additionally, confounding data
suggests that their level of resources actually reduce their oppositionality, which is why
they did not officially take a stance on the WTO. Many of their staff members attended
the protest with the tacit approval of the EO, suggesting that endorsing the protest was
not too far outside their acceptable political advocacy. However, due to the resource
concerns, they were constrained from that form of political advocacy. This helps to
clarify the typology: their identity and strategies encourage the EO toward somewhat
adversarial relationships with government agencies, yet their resources and internal
structure help explain how and why they refrain from or scale back the oppositionality of
their political advocacy.
5.2.8 - Julia 'Butterfly' Hill
Although she does not represent an EO by the strictest definition 57 Julia
'Butterfly' Hill is perhaps the most well-known young environmentalist of our time, and
has made such unique and widely publicized contributions to the environmental
movement that necessitate her inclusion in this analysis. Perhaps her most well-known
action was living in a 1500+ year old, 180 foot tall Redwood tree, known as 'Luna,' for
57 because an individual is usually considered to be a member of an organization, but not the actual
organization itself
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over two years, ultimately saving the tree. Her 738 days of civil disobedience ended in
December of 1999, and resulted in a settlement with the Pacific Lumber Company, who
eventually accepted $50,000 from Earthfirst! on her behalf to preserve the tree and all
trees within a three-acre buffer zone. The tree was attacked in 2000 by someone with a
chainsaw, but survived, and has since been buttressed with guy wires and steel brackets.
Ms. Hill assured me that the tree is still alive and healing well.
Ms. Hill's political action caught the attention of the world. The romance of her
story inspired numerous contributions to her cause, and the alliances that emerged as a
result were essential to her logistical support and ultimate success. These alliances
developed beyond the action as well, as she and other activists formed the Circle of Life
Foundation, a non-profit EO designed to inspire people to recognize the
interconnectedness of all things. At this point, the organization's website celebrates that
their mission is complete, and that they have successfully transitioned into a new
organization, the Engage Network, which seeks to build on these principles of
interconnectedness by facilitating organizational development at the cusp of
environmental and human rights organizations.
The idea that someone could be so devoted to their cause as to sacrifice nearly
every material comfort that most of us take for granted and then endure extreme risk to
their personal survival (she explained that they on multiple occasions attempted to blow
her out of the tree with a helicopter, among other intimidation tactics and psychological
warfare) for over two years inspired me from the instant that I became aware of her
struggle. Due to the intense commitment that would be necessary to withstand such
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intense pressure without regard to her own personal safety, before our interview I
imagined an obdurate, reactionary ideologue with radical, uncompromising ideals. I
found precisely the opposite. Of all of the people I interviewed, she came across as the
most inspirational and yet simultaneously level-headed. Far from a reactionary, she
comported herself with calm compassion, and without any judgmental insinuation
whatsoever, even for those she opposed politically, and even for those who tried to
murder her while she was living in the tree. She appears to follow her life code
religiously (although she admits to being fallibly human, and thus not able to adhere to
her designed path 100% of the time), however she argued that she has absolutely no
contempt for those on alternate paths, even when those paths directly collide with her
own. She is aware of this common perception of her and mentioned that often people are
surprised to find out that she is not angry or judgmental at all. She does take fierce
stances on issues of importance, however she does this with "compassion, love and
respect," (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication) in an effort to foster
conversation, negotiation and dialogue.
At multiple points during the interview, her responses forced me to rethink my
questions. For example, when I spoke of her identity, she immediately problematized the
notion. She explained that although she admits to having an identity, and was more than
willing to discuss it, that the idea of identity was something she had been struggling with
lately. Her work has always been spiritually motivated. While not an adherent to any
particular denomination, she nonetheless leads a life that she feels to have great spiritual
significance. It was this spirituality that motivated her to put her own safety injeopardy
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for the tree, Luna. The core of this spiritual path lies in recognizing the
interconnectedness of all things. For Ms. Hill, separation between people is at the heart of
all of the world's problems, a condition she refers to as the "disease of disconnect." Our
identities then, if we allow them to become reified, are what define us as apart from
others, thereby continuing the cycle of struggle. Her ideas build on the principles of non-
violence as advocated by Gandhi, King, and many others, in that she recognizes that there
is a cycle reinforced by reaction, and which must at some point be interrupted. If an
activist group identifies an adversary and then constructs an identity in opposition to that
of the adversary, then they have re-initiated a disconnect that prevents resolution.
Arguments made by those one defines as having an opposing identity can be easily
written-off as being closer to the party line of the identity than to a genuine assessment of
the world. For example, if a Republican makes comments about health care, many
Democrats are unlikely to listen. However if one is unaware of the political party of the
health care advocate, one must listen to the argument before determining if it is worth
opposing. Partisanship is a rather obvious example of conflict emerging over identity,
however Ms. Hill might argue that this happens with more loosely-defined identities as
well. I was amazed at her lack of resentment towards those who tried to murder her, but
in retrospect, it is perfectly in line with her identity: one that is so inclusive that it
challenges the notion of identity itself.
The inclusivity of Ms. Hill's perspective is the core of her philosophy. For her,
the "disease of disconnect," or what she also calls "separation syndrome" is the
fundamental problem with the world; failing to see the interconnectedness of all things is
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the root of environmental exploitation, movement fragmentation and human rights
abuses. "If you're connected to something then there's life there and when you're
disconnected in some instances there's destruction, there's violence, there's fear" (Julia
'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication). Rather than operating in one single EO, Ms.
Hill instead connects with literally hundreds ofthem as a consultant and participant. The
EOs with more inclusive perspectives, that seek solutions that benefit and include as
many people as possible, tend to attract her attention the most. She prefers EOs that are
more solution-oriented than problem-oriented.
Ms Hill does not herself engage in techno-rationalist or exploitation discourses,
and tends to align with organizations that also avoid such discourses, however she
refused to speak disparagingly about EOs that do embrace such discourses. Her respect
and support for the struggles of these more utilitarian EOs, even when in conflict with her
own, was evident. She receives many invitations to participate in various EOs, however
she is more likely to be inspired by more holistic organizations that exist in the overlap
between the environmental and human rights movements. Connectivity is her most
sought-after resource, and "inclusivity is definitely a part of connectivity" (Julia
'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication). For Ms. Hill, social healing is the way to
improve the world, and as with any other form of healing, involves patience, compassion,
and selflessness. The crux of this effort is a desire to connect across the deepest social
chasms in order to create better overall understanding, and from that will ideally evolve
better social policy. Even when people perceive her as an adversary, she refuses to match
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their anger. Her process is grounded in the assumption that potential adversaries have
more in common than not, if they are patient and open enough to take the time to find it.
The strategies available to Ms. Hill are quite varied, ranging from civil
disobedience to cooperative negotiation. Since the Circle of Life transitioned into the
Engage Network, she mostly focuses on training activists and then sending them out into
the world to make a difference. She refuses to be put into a box in terms of what
strategies work best, because her strategic perspective involves adaptability, spontaneity,
forethought and most of all, compassion. The strength in the movement is in its diversity,
even in diversity of practices. Strategies that work in one context may be completely
useless in another. For example, she points out that if she had been sitting in a tree in
certain parts of South America, they would have just cut the tree out from under her and
murdered her long before she had been in the tree long enough to become a martyr.
Reflexively, just because a given strategy failed in a particular context does not mean that
it cannot succeed elsewhere. Creative resilience is essential to finding the best possible
strategy to fit the context, and grounding oneself in compassion is her recommended
method of finding the best strategy.
There are some activists with whom she agrees strategically, but because they are
coming from a place that is not grounded in compassion, they tactically act in ways that
re-inscribe the cycle of violence. External strategy is less important to her than internal
strategy, which brings it back to connectivity: if activists cultivate compassion and try to
connect to even those that might be considered adversaries, then hope remains for healing
society. However, this will be much more difficult if activists act externally without
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becoming first grounded internally. She wants to maintain connected to these activists as
well, however her task at the Engage Network is to establish that a more interconnected
approach would be superior, and hopefully to inspire others to become more introspective
with their political advocacy and behavior.
Financial resources have not been a principle concern of Ms. Hill's. From the
earliest days of the tree sit, her needs were provided for by others. She spent considerable
time and effort, even when she was in the tree, connecting to other activists via telephone,
and from that developed a network that was capable of sustaining her struggle
logistically. Her more important resources were internal however: that which could
sustain her psychologically and spiritually while she was in the tree. It was obviously
quite difficult to live in a tree for over two years. She had to climb around the tree in
order to keep her muscles from atrophying. She had to pass the time without losing her
sanity. She had to withstand the psychological torture inflicted upon her, including loud
noises, shaking the tree by knocking other trees into it and flying a helicopter close by,
and verbal insults and attempts at manipulation of all varieties. She had to watch them cut
the trees nearby, and could do nothing to stop them, she explained that were it not for the
spiritual path that she had found before climbing the tree, and then refined while in it, she
never would have made it. The entire path, she explained, was and is grounded in
compassion and interconnectedness. By emphasizing the connectivity between humans
and nature and between humans and each other, she is able to cultivate the compassion
that she feels is necessary to negotiating environmental and social health.
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Ms. Hill also feels that her spiritual path is what makes sure not only that the
financial resources will keep flowing, but also that she will be able to perceive and
appreciate the non-financial resources that become available. "If we choose a spiritual
path we know that resources come in all manner of ways" (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal
communication). One could look at this in supernatural terms, in that she believes that if
she cultivates the forces of compassion that they will then provide for her financially.
However, the explanation need not be limited to just this interpretation. She also
explained how her spiritual path kept her alive while sitting in the tree, and how since
coming down, it has allowed her to build alliances across what might have otherwise
been fissures between activist perspectives. In this way, other tangible resources, such as
alliances, as well as intangible resources, such as sanity and motivation to persevere,
become available to her as a direct result of her spiritual path.
Furthermore, while she recognized the importance of garnering money, because it
has become "such a powerful energy mover in our society," (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill,
personal communication) she also pointed out that the forces she is looking to transform
have and will likely always have, much more money, so if she were to focus on that
resource alone, then she would fail. Ms. Hill also argued that larger EOs that are more
financially dependent, will tend to sell out one sacred place in exchange for the protection
of another. Whether it is to secure that the $35 contributions do not dry up, or if it is
because the EO is beholden to a larger donor, financial dependency has the effect of
encouraging EOs to abandon or sacrifice their commitments and values. Also, she has
seen people with nothing making incredible shifts in their lives, so money is not the
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answer. Instead, she chooses to find resources in the subtler experiences that give her
personal strength, such as the air, a quiet moment, a new alliance, creating a message that
"speaks to people's hearts and grabs their attention" (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal
communication). She explains that to think merely of money is to fester the disease of
disconnect, and to open oneself to the idea of connection allows one to perceive these
other boundless resources.
The political advocacy of Ms. Hill is compassionately confrontational. In some
ways, she is quite oppositional. She sat in a tree for an extended period of time, which
could be perceived as trespassing, an illegal action. She takes fierce stances on
environmental issues, and is unafraid to speak truth to power. She has no moneyed
interests to which she would be beholden, so she is not constrained from participating in
any political advocacy that she feels is appropriate and consistent with her spiritual path.
She took oppositional stances on all three of the landmark political events (WTO,
NAFTA, and Kyoto). She cares less for her own survival and comfort than she does
about her principles and her path. Government agencies avoid working with her because
of her public profile and reputation for standing up against unjust laws. This all paints the
picture of someone engaged in oppositional political advocacy. However, the compassion
behind her motivation, the sensitive, patient and nuanced way in which she interacts with
the world and her spiritual path of connectivity suggests a political advocacy that is not
adversarial. It is confrontational, but compassionately so, such that it seeks to dissolve,
rather than foment conflict over the environment. In this way the political advocacy of
Julia Butterfly Hill is oppositional, yet unlike most other similarly fierce EOs, she seeks
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connectivity over division, compassion over adversarial communication, and cooperation
over conflict.
5.2.9 - Environmental Consultants: "Mike Jones"
The Environmental Consultants (EC) is a pseudonym for a for-profit, limited
liability conservation corporation that consults with other companies and EOs on various
conservation and restoration projects, focusing mainly on forest, desert, grassland, and
river ecosystems, predominantly in the Pacific Northwest. The founder, owner, and sole
proprietor of the company was not comfortable disclosing his name or organization
name, so I will refer to him as "Mike Jones." Most of the consulting that he performs is
with other EOs who seek to address issues of overgrazing, ecosystem-based carbon
sequestration (to address climate change), and the production of industrial hemp as an
alternative to forest fiber extraction.
The mission of the EC overlaps with many other conservation organizations, as it
loosely defines conservation as any effort to protect natural areas or resources. By this
measure it is difficult to consider how an EO would identify itself ideologically opposed
to the EC. However, the EC is not a 501C-3 non-profit organization, and has no
membership, employees, or volunteers. Therefore the identity of the EC is the identity of
"Mr. Jones." Ifhe sees a struggle outside what he is interested on addressing, he can
avoid doing so without internal repercussions. His organizational identity is merely a
function of the current state of his personal identity. In this way, the EC is not particularly
inclusive. It takes no input from members, as it has none. It may choose to participate in
alliances, however it does not need to, because it is hired to perform its duties. The
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client/professional relationship that emerges is quite different from that of other EOs
because through contract, expectations are clearly defined, making ideological and
rhetorical alignment unnecessary. "Mr. Jones" can choose to dovetail the concerns of the
EC with those of other EOs or not, and the contract he keeps with his client is unaffected.
The identity of the EC is consistent with technological solutions, and indeed depends on
scientific data to establish environmental harms. However, "Mr. Jones" pointed out that
ecosystems are much more complex than we can imagine, and that scientific management
to date has been mostly a failure. That notwithstanding, he believes that it is possible for
us to manage natural areas consumptively, and that effective environmental stewardship
should be our ultimate goal, but that instead of the arrogance and greed that characterized
previous attempts at scientific management, we need to recognize the complexity of
ecosystems and seek long-term solutions.
"Mr. Jones" explained his notion of strategies as existing in three categories: there
are radical strategies, idealist strategies and realist strategies. Radical strategies are
uncompromising, and rest on the assumption that the ends justifY the means; the
immediate individual battle is not nearly as important as the long-term strategy. The
idealists never let the ends justify the means, and would rather lose than win for the
wrong reasons. The realist strategies acknowledge the conditions that beset them, and
seek to play the hand they've been dealt as best as they can (which also allows the ends to
justify the means). So for issue-oriented EOs, it is appropriate to engage in any of the
three strategic platforms depending on the situation and the development of the issue.
They begin with radical strategies to get the issue or location some attention. Then they
----_._ .._--------------_ .._.__.-
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shift to idealist strategies to frame the public debate and to package the issue as
approachable to the general public. Finally, the EO should shift to realist strategies in
order to cash in on the political gains achieved in the previous stages and actually get the
area or species legally protected. However, some EOs, rather than organizing around a
particular place or species, instead orient themselves around a particular type of strategy
and then shop for issues that they feel they could effectively assist while adhering to their
strategy, and when the issues are at a stage when that would be appropriate. They do not
follow an issue all the way through, but instead contribute when their modus operandi is
most congruent with the stage of the struggle.
The EC is a realist EO, one that seeks to gain from the exposure garnered from
the radicals (such as by bring to the public's attention whatever environmental harm is of
concern), builds on the principles and methods ofthe idealists (such as non-violence) and
then executes a realist strategy of actual protection. The EC then focuses mostly on
lobbying for legislation to protect threatened areas and species. They do not engage in
litigation (as "Mr. Jones" is the only member of the organization and is not a lawyer),
alliance building, or education (although he is currently working on a book extolling the
harms of logging). He explained that EOs attempting to advance uncompromising
stances (such as zero-cut) are actually reflecting a strategic methodology. The EC views
certain forms of logging as acceptable (for fire management, to return second and third
growth forests to pre-logging conditions, for thinning plantations to increase biological
diversity, etc.), and that this is a necessary concession to getting logging in old-growth
forests prohibited. However, the zero-cut EOs continued to oppose legislation that "Mr.
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Jones" believes was essential to ending commercial logging in national forests, which he
views as a great victory. The EC had seen that the issue had progressed beyond the
agitation stage, and was ready to move on to pragmatic policy formation. What "Mr.
Jones" thought the radical groups needed to do at that point was to move on to the next
issue that needed attention drawn to it, such as ending logging on private lands. EOs that
were not poised to participate in dialogue with the realists should have re-embraced their
radical roots instead of retreating to divisive and counterproductive idealism that could
have derailed the legislation. Polarization on an issue is useful, but only when you have
the majority on your side. At a certain point, the issue evolves to the resolution stage, at
which point one has to be able to shift gears enough to get the legislation passed, or else
the momentum and political opportunity will be lost, and the efforts leading up to that
point wasted. However, according to "Mr. Jones" the realists won, legislation prohibiting
logging in our National Forests is in place, and despite the small remaining pockets of
albeit fervent and strong resistance, the health of these areas is almost completely
secured.
Due to the small size of the EC, there is almost no overhead. He receives no
money from the public, and has no membership. He solicits foundations that give money
to the non-profit EOs that he consults for, or sometimes he will work for the foundations
directly. Sometimes he is paid by the EOs themselves, out of funds that they have already
obtained. His funding is thus more project-based than tied to a particular grant. This is a
unique situation, because as a consultant, the only money he needs to collect is his salary.
There are not large sums of money earmarked for projects for which he has to be
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accountable. Thus unlike other organizations that have war chests associated with
particular interests that partially determine their repertoires of action, the EC is
unconstrained in that manner. He can choose to not to consult for any organization with
which he disagrees, and if hired, he can be fairly certain that he will have the leeway he
needs to negotiate appropriate legislation.
Despite the legislative lobbying nature of the EC, their political advocacy seems
to be more conciliatory than oppositional, although it maintains a certain level of
confrontation with policy elites. "Mr. Jones" explained that he spends most of his time in
Washington DC, where democracy is a contact sport - "you're always pushing against
someone, and they are always pushing against you" ("Mike Jones", personal
communication.) Also, he has routinely confronted the popular Beltway free-market
ideology by arguing that markets cannot handle certain social issues effectively. For
example, he pointed out that it is illegal to sell your kidneys, and few free-market
scholars would advocate to the contrary. He also consulted with several EOs concerning
the harmful effects of unrestricted trade on the environment, in both the NAFTA and
WTO historical contexts. Additionally, he worked with groups on climate legislation,
leading up to and beyond the Kyoto protocols. The nature oflobbying for environmental
concerns in Washington DC pits the EO against the policy elites, however the EC has
chosen to minimize this tension as much as possible in order to get comprehensive
legislation passed.
"Mr. Jones" is intimately aware of his precarious position in Washington DC. He
accepts that this involves a game of politics in which the effective advocate must be
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careful not to alienate potential allies. "Either you do politics, or politics does you"
("Mike Jones", personal communication.) As is evidenced by his conflict with Mr.
Hermach, conciliation to accomplish a pragmatic goal is more important to the EC than
staunch defense of absolutist stances. There is a continuous and delicate political game
that is played in Washington where no struggle is isolated, and access is everything. This
means that once one campaign is complete, there will be another one to follow, so it
behooves one to not bum bridges. However, it is possible to act oppositionally from
within the tent. "Well, okay, you don't want to be out of the ballpark, but what's wrong
with being way out in left field? Left field, that's where all the power hitters are" ("Mike
Jones", personal communication.) This unique stance of cooperative oppositionality is a
form of political advocacy that is perfectly suited to the strengths of the EC. They are
small enough to not have constraining monetary influences, yet they are constantly
engaged in a political dialogue that encourages them to maintain some semblance of
inclusion in the Washington policy circles.
5.2.10 - National Environmental Protection Society: "Jackie Peterson"
The National Environmental Protection Society (NEPS) is a pseudonym for
another EO that was willing to speak with me only under conditions of confidentiality,
and is a large, very well-known, national-level conservation EO with offices in most
states, and a head office in Washington DC. A stafflobbyist at one of the state chapters
of the organization, to whom I will refer as "Jackie Peterson" spoke to me about the EO,
and explained that they are narrowly focused on the conservation of wildlife and wildlife
habitat, unlike other EOs that address "broad environmental issues" (personal
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communication). When asked about which issues she felt were outside her mission, she
included waste/contamination issues, human health issues, or anything to do with game
species. She explained that they have broadened their mission as of late to include energy
conservation, renewable energy, and climate research. This suggests that although mostly
exclusive to alternate environmental ideologies, their identity is not particularly rigid, and
indeed is currently undergoing evolution over the climate debate. They have no problem
relying on scientific management of nature for human consumption, suggesting that
science itself is a great resource. Despite this exploitative and techno-rationalist
discourse, they nonetheless also advanced the idea that nature has intrinsic value that
ought to be protected for its own sake. This came out of our discussion, so it may have
been more a rhetorical concession than a core belief, however she was at the very least
comfortable associating this non-exploitative discourse with the organization for which
she spoke. This complex and nuanced relationship shows that although the NEPS has a
relatively exclusive identity that associates with exploitation and technological
discourses, it nonetheless aims to position itself as in line with, if not directly
overlapping, other similar EOs.
Although "Ms Peterson" appeared somewhat guarded about disclosing any details
about any particular campaigns that the NEPS was working on, she explained that they
employ several strategies, all with the goal of conserving various species. These efforts
include to negotiate on the ground between "landowners and other interested parties," to
"interact at the policy level with agencies and other stakeholders" and also to engage in
advocacy at the legislative level ("Jackie Peterson", personal communication). She would
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not elaborate on who these parties, landowners, and stakeholders might be, and seemed
genuinely concerned that I would keep her identity confidential. This emphasizes an
important relationship between the identity of the NEPS and the strategies they employ:
as it is an EO with an exclusive identity, and which practices legislative negotiation with
policy elites, it cannot risk being perceived as unreasonable to its valued "parties,"
"landowners" and "stakeholders." Thus, her dialogue with me was quite cautious, almost
as if I represented the media, or that her statements would instantly become public record.
This is probably more telling about political advocacy than if she had been more candid.
This large EO is so concerned with maintaining a positive perception in Washington that
they cannot risk potentially damaging interviews, and as such are closed to much
communication within the environmental movement. This isolated identity and intra-
systemic strategic choice seem to suggest a form of political advocacy that would not be
oppositional to Beltway interests. Additionally, when the NEPS negotiates
development/land use compromises that are within acceptable profit limits for the
developers, their political advocacy is not oppositional to business interests, either.
The NEPS engages in scientific research, and utilizes this research in its
educational campaigns. One strategic area they seek to improve in is linking their rural
educational efforts to specific conservation projects. They also utilize this data for their
lobbying efforts, in which they engage on a regular basis. They have a full-time presence
in the State House. They engage in litigation over permit reviews, and will oppose certain
permit approvals. Over the last ten years however, litigation has become decreasingly
useful for them, as their efforts have been principally channeled into lobbying. She
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explained that they have been reasonably successful working proactively with partners
and "both traditional and non-traditional allies" at the permitting phase of operations, so
they have not needed to reactively respond with litigation. They do not get involved with
protesting as a general rule, and instead prefer to portray themselves as more integrated
and pragmatic than a protest-style EO would be. They do not get involved with building
alliances with other EOs. 58 The close relationships that they have been able to develop as
a result of focusing on this pre-permitting lobbying strategy have allowed them to work
from within the Beltway system to promote environmentally sound legislation and to act
as a watchdog for environmental permitting without the need for cultivating alliances, or
being associated with other, more oppositional EOs.
With more than forty paid employees and over 100 volunteers at their state office
alone, the NEPS represents one of the largest EOs in my sample. They gamer a
substantial amount of financial resources from memberships, donations, and both public
and private grants. As a membership organization, they depend on small, individual
contributions from members who feel that the EO is accomplishing the goals of the
mission. They also frequently obtain large grants, which are usually unrestricted sums of
money from the public sector, with which they can do pretty much whatever they want.
They seek out most of their more restricted-purpose grants directly in order to fund
particular campaigns and projects, so although technically restrictive, "Ms Peterson"
expressed that the sources of the grants do not have a constraining effect on their political
advocacy. Also, because much of what they do is lobbying, they are legally prohibited
58 The actual organization has a factor score on questions of"strategies preferred" in the 3rd percentile for
alliance participation in the quantitative analysis, indicating a very low priority of use.
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from accepting substantial public grants, so that influence, it is exists, is minimal at best.
Although the EO is not constrained by its funding source per se, their resources are
nonetheless structurally connected to their particular form of political advocacy.
Despite having greater financial resources than nearly all (9ill percentile) of the
EOs in my sample, "Ms Peterson" lamented that the NEPS currently did not have enough
to fully accomplish their mission, and that more funds were essential for them to do so. If
they had more, she explained that they would use it to purchase more rigorous polling
results and projections, more economic studies to share with decision-makers, fund
trusted facilitators to improve negotiations and common understandings between the
NEPS and their opponents, hire more staff and improve the effectiveness of their media
outreach and issue penetration into the State House. She regretted having to be selective
in her prioritizing of resource expenditures, but asserted that they are generally quite
efficient with what they receive.
This disconnect between her perception of their financial size and its actual size
relative to other EOs demonstrates the momentum of the large, resource intense EO, and
the connections that these resources share with their political advocacy. The model of
these EOs is to constantly acquire ever more financial contributions, without regard to the
relative size of the EO compared to other EOs. Despite the NEPS's already considerable
size, the key factor that "Ms Peterson" emphasized, and returned to frequently during the
interview, was how the only limiting factor about their financial resources was the limited
amount that they gamer: more resources would mean less limited political advocacy,
from her perspective. The ever-increasing size of the EO and its ability to provide
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effective public outreach expands the possible goal set to include those ideas on the wish
list that prompted the drive to expand the funding. This in turn creates a demand for more
resources, as the wish list materializes into specific campaigns and projects. Successes on
these projects stimulate donations, which expand the wish list, and thus the demand for
more resources. This 'treadmill of donation' encourages the EO to continually expand,
and seek out sources of funding that are already in line with the form of political
advocacy in which they already engage, and which originally inspired the donations. It is
not necessarily that the large EOs have sold out to corporate concerns, it is that they have
leaned towards their donors' interests in order to meet not just the needs of the donors,
but also of the perceptible goals of their membership. This speaks less to the agency of
the EO choosing a path of less-oppositional political advocacy and instead more towards
a structural reinforcement of mutual interest, or to coin a phrase, a 'treadmill of
donation.'
This narrow form of non-oppositional political advocacy quite predictably did not
materialize into the NEPS opposing any of the three landmark political events. They did
support federal climate legislation this year, but in a very cooperative manner. They did
not support any protests of any kind, nor would they publicly endorse such events.
Instead, much of their political advocacy involved courting relationships with policy
makers in Washington DC. She explained that this cordial negotiation process involved,
in her words "meeting with them, sharing our views, listening to theirs, getting feedback,
trying to work together as much as possible, being up front when we disagree, being very
public with our 'thank yous' when we think they have done a good job" ("Jackie
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Peterson", personal communication). This level of involvement with the political realm
centers on cooperative dialogue over confrontational stances, and as such, the NEPS
represents an exemplary case in my typology for a large, resource rich EO with an
exclusive identity, that engages in a non-oppositional form of political advocacy.
5.2.11 - Greenpeace: Matt Leonard
My final interview was with Matt Leonard, the Actions Campaigner for
Greenpeace US (GP), the largest and most financially sound EOs in the country of its
kind, perhaps even in the world. Its historical beginnings have defined its evolution, and
its disposition as a confrontational EO capable of direct action is partially attributable to
the events of its inception. In 1971, in an attempt to protest US nuclear testing on
Amchitka Island, a small ship called the Phyllis Cormack left the port of Vancouver, with
the goal of placing themselves in the way of the detonations. Although ultimately
intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, the incident marked the EO's birth, and since that
time it has grown to an international organization with chapters in over 30 countries.
The identity of GP is exceptionally inclusive, indicated primarily by the wide
range of issues and tactics that they pursue. From preventing illegal whaling, to nuclear
issues, climate issues, toxins issues (including environmental racism), deforestation, the
health of Antarctica, and a plethora of policies and campaigns for specific causes. Mr.
Leonard explained that their mission overlaps with many other organizations, and in their
website mission statement they have claim to have "no permanent allies or adversaries"
(Greenpeace, 2010). This positions them as ideologically aligned with nearly any other
EO, and capable of addressing nearly any environmental issue. Nothing in our interview
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or their website was particularly revealing with regards to their employment of a
technological environmental discourse, however I got the sense that they would have a
fairly balanced approach, such that they utilize scientific environmental data to their
advantage, yet they nonetheless do not shy away from questioning and challenging the
logic and consequences of industrial, technological rationality. Their stances against
industrial whaling posit that the needs of nature can outweigh the needs of humans in
certain arenas, which is a move away from exploitation discourse. This is another
example of an EO whose inclusive identity also corresponds to a preference for non-
technical and non-exploitative discourses.
More interesting is their close identification with the principles of non-violence.
Similar to Ms. Hill above but distinct from the central mission ofthe other organizations
with whom I spoke, GP's entire ideological frame is centered around these principles.
This is evidenced by their continual celebration of the tale of their inception, when their
founders were willing to place their bodies in harm's way to protest nuclear testing.
Building on the works of Mahatma Gandhi and Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., they extend
this compassionate yet actively engaged approach to address the intersections between
violence, environmental destruction, and the deleterious effects of the military industrial
complex.
The repertoire of strategic and tactical options open to GP is wider than most
EOs, for several reasons. Initially, because they were born out of a direct action event,
confrontation has remained not only open to them, but also has been reinforced as an
important part of their heritage. Over the years they grew substantially, and now due to
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their largesse, they have a whole host of more expensive techniques available to them as
well (the impact of the sources of their financial support will be discussed below). Some
of these techniques Mr. Leonard explained were what most consider to be traditional, 59
such as media campaigns, educational campaigns (usually high school and above),
research (environmental and political), lobbying, litigation and coalition building.
Additionally, he explained that the OP is in a unique position, in comparison to
other EOs of its size and stature, in that it is much more capable of engaging in
confrontational strategies such as protests, marches and other more disruptive techniques.
Some of these, such as direct actions to impede potentially legally-protected resource
extraction, are perceived by the general public as illegal. Particularly immediately
following the events of September 11, 200 1, these tactics often draw the popular Beltway
label of "eco-terrorism." However, although on occasion these actions indeed do push
legal limits, the entire repertoire ofOP is grounded in the principles of nonviolent civil
disobedience. The violent label that is attached to their actions is thus used by
establishment elites and pundits defending corporate interests as a way to marginalize the
resisting perspective and polarize the movement as a whole.
While this fragmentation has occurred in many sectors, OP itself seems relatively
strategically resilient, and committed to a cohesive environmental movement. They
continue to form alliances with other EOs, such as with Earth Justice and the Center for
Biological Diversity (interviewed above) on impact litigation. They partner with the
59 Although he later affinned that we should more correctly view the non-violent civil disobedience
techniques ofMLK and Gandhi as traditional, as those are the time-honored traditions upon which GP has
been built.
--------------
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Rainforest Action Network and Friends of the Earth frequently, which are two of the only
other larger organizations that actively promote non-violent civil disobedience. They also
cooperate with larger organizations such as the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources
Defense Council, the World Wildlife Fund, and Environmental Defense for lobbying
efforts. As they maintain simultaneous 501 C-3 and 501 C-4 IRS tax status, they are not
restricted from lobbying, although it is not one of their primary strategies. Instead, they
focus more on their media campaigns, education, and direct action. Their education
includes organizing college campuses, as well as instruction in high schools. They have a
program called Greenpeace Organizing Term, which provides social movement
organizing training for young adults for which they can receive college credit. Their
primary strength, according to Mr. Leonard, is their ability to take "action on the ground
to directly stop and intervene with environmental destruction, to bear witness to those
atrocities, [as] a way to dramatically call attention to them" (Matt Leonard, personal
communication.) It is through this heroic appeal to justice that they are able to participate
in enough dramatic direct action to inspire a constant supply of small donations, thereby
reinforcing their strategic resilience.
With an annual budget of roughly $30 million, GP is the most well-funded EO of
its kind, most of which comes from their membership, predominantly at the $10-20
donation level. With offices in over 30 countries, they are an internationally significant
player in the global environmental movement. They also have countless volunteers who
help with the day-to-day office work, as well as with the labor-intensive efforts of
building grassroots coalitions: canvassing, tabling, organizing and showing up to the
227
demonstrations, phone banking, talking to people on the streets, and internet social
networking. The volunteer labor power at their disposal compared to other EOs is
considerable, and is what allows them to participate in such labor-intensive activities.
The financial resources they gamer are substantial as well. With most of their
funding coming from small membership subscriptions, GP is free to engage in most any
form of political advocacy they wish. Most EOs tend to grow, and in so doing fall into
the 'treadmill of donation,' where they are beholden to foundation interests that expand
their need for securing more resources, which further funnels the efforts of the EO into
less contentious, more conservative struggles, demanding greater resources, ad infinitum.
Mr. Leonard described this in his own terms, by lamenting the decline of the
membership-based EO, particularly in the last few decades, and the rise of the
foundation-based, less-contentious EO. He spoke no ill-will towards these EOs, however
he recognized how foundation ties shape issue selection toward more conservative or at
least moderate stances.
One such EO with whom they continue to maintain ties, yet about whom they
nonetheless lament the folly oftechnique, is the Nature Conservancy. As a foundation-
driven EO, they are capable of purchasing huge tracts of land, and negotiating the shift of
natural area ownership into more environmentally-friendly hands, which can be an
beneficial enterprise. However, according to Mr. Leonard, much of what they do by
purchasing land from potential exploiters is to pay those that would threaten exploitation,
which is an unfortunate message to send to industry. "Quite often they collaborate really
closely with some of the worst companies and actors in government that are causing that
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destruction." (Matt Leonard, personal communication.) At the very best, they shift
industrial damage from one area to another without questioning any of the root causes of
the destruction. Thus for larger organizations, it is the source of the funding that appears
to have the greatest effect on the political advocacy ofthe EO: membership-driven EOs
are much more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than are EOs that are
more foundation-driven.
Mr. Leonard also explained that political opportunity cycles make a substantial
difference in the type of strategies that they employ. For instance, during the George W.
Bush Administration, there was no recognition from Washington that climate change was
a real problem, so any sort of environmental legislation was going to be tough. Instead,
they took to larger media campaigns by exposing specific severe violators such as Exxon,
instead of going directly to the legislature. However, during the immediately post 9/11
years, direct action on environmental issues ran the risk of being labeled eco-terrorism,
and invoking the legal and public perception penalties that would arise. This curtailed
certain more confrontational direct action opportunities, and steered GP more towards
public perception media campaigns, targeting specific corporations and education. GP
has always attempted to maintain a somewhat insider's stance (despite their predilection
for oppositional political advocacy), so during those years, they ratcheted back some of
their advocacy and intensified others to respond to the appropriate political cycle. Now
that there is a Democratic legislature and Executive who are at least capable of
acknowledging the climate crisis confronting our planet, GP is recently more capable of
shifting their efforts towards legislation, lobbying, and direct action, although Mr.
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Leonard also explained that the timing of their tactical shifts can be as specific as month
to month. With the flexibility and freedom of a membership-driven funding source, GP
has the unfettered ability to choose the path of their organization "tactically, politically,
[and] organizationally" in ways that other donor-driven EOs cannot. Sometimes the
attached strings are in black and white, but sometimes, Mr. Leonard explains, there are
subtle, more indirect implications that operate in very real ways. With the risk of losing
funding from a small number of donors, the pressure to secure a yearly grant renewal
creates an incentive to align with the interests of the donors. Contrarily, GP and other
member-driven EOs distribute that risk across hundreds or thousands of people, thereby
aligning the leadership with the aggregate instead of the will of a few influential
individuals.
In general, the political advocacy of GP is oppositional, or as Mr. Leonard put it,
"a bit more of the left flank, more of a no-compromise oriented approach" (Matt Leonard,
personal communication.) He was quite clear that they prioritize moral over pragmatic
stances, and are less constrained to speak out more strongly than most other groups. They
worked extensively on attempting to thwart and then respond to the NAFTA, and did
some work on (although were not the most prominent group present at) the WTO. They
have been instrumental in the drafting of climate legislation from the beginning, which is
an issue that particularly since Kyoto, has increasingly become the EO's central mission.
More recently they have been involved with international climate treaties such as the
Copenhagen Accords that were just agreed upon December of2009. The oppositional
character of GP' s political advocacy is apparent at every level of analysis.
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This is not to argue that GP is only capable of purely adversarial political
advocacy. Indeed, quite to the contrary, GP attempts to be, in as much as they can given
their confrontational demeanor, an inside player when it seems most appropriate. To their
targeted adversaries and in the public eye they "bear witness to the truth" (Greenpeace,
2010) in a manner that is more the role of the agitator. However in policy circles to which
they are invited they behave in a conciliatory and constructive manner as much as
possible. Greenpeace US is a confrontational EO that practices a wide range of
techniques, some of which are disruptive, yet it also, due to its age, size, historical
momentum, and level of networking with policy elite, is in a position to be taken more
seriously by the Beltway than many other EOs of equally oppositional political advocacy.
5.3 - Conceptual Intersections
5.3.1 - Identities
The diverse array of ideological predispositions that this group of eleven EOs
displayed was much more complex than I was originally able to comprehend, and yet it
also served to highlight some of the important and predictable relationships revealed by
the contributions of previous social movement and environmental organization theorists,
as well as those that were confirmed (and in some cases problematized) by the typology I
developed in the previous chapter. In exploring the notion of EO identity, my research
continually revealed the importance of the connections between what the leadership
consciously or unconsciously portrayed the EO's general stance to be, and the way in
which they tend to conduct political advocacy. These ideas evolved out of the ideas of the
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'bridge' theorists presented in Chapter II (Brulle, 2000; Dreiling, 2001; Schulz, 1998;
Sewell, 1992; Tarrow, 1998), who all explain how ideas and material conditions interact
in a complex and historically specific manner, and that both have close connections to
how the organization behaves, and thus how the environmental movement itself behaves.
The results I found corroborate these findings and provide greater detail as to how these
forces interact. Sometimes the results are inconsistent and contradictory, and even in
these moments, exploring the tensions reveals the patterns of the multiple strands of
social forces that are constantly pulling EOs in multiple directions. It is by taking into
consideration this complexly-detailed terrain that we can more accurately map the
environmental movement as a whole.
Some EOs approach environmental problems as if they are an interconnected set
of crises that necessitate cooperation among a diverse array of EOs with a multitude of
concerns. 60 They view this variation in identity as a source of strength, and build on it
with the purpose of creating a cohesive social movement capable of not only perceiving
the interconnected and intersectional nature of each of the multiple strands of
environmental exploitation, but also coordinating multifaceted strategies to improve
environmental health for all. EO's such as *Ecofeminism International 61 and Julia
'Butterfly' Hill's Engage Network explicitly reach into the lexicon of the economic
justice and human rights movements in order to maintain a common perspective of
communication that would facilitate devising cooperative strategies that include as many
60 Note the strong positive correlation between inclusivity and alliance formation (See Table 3) showing the
mutually reinforcing dynamic between identities and strategies.
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voices as possible. For Ms. Hill, this is a deeply spiritual practice that helps her combat
the "disease of disconnect." Despite his uncompromising passion, Tim Hermach of the
Native Forest Council inclusively implicates multiple connected power systems for what
he perceives to be the slide in environmental health over the last decades. The
multifaceted Center for Biological Diversity puts this philosophy into practice by hiring a
large staff of expert ecologists to individually spearhead a whole host of projects. Each of
these EOs constructs their identities in an inclusive manner, with the intention of
buttressing the rhetorical thrust of other organizations, environmental and otherwise, and
formulating and participating in a cohesive, transformative, comprehensive and multi-
pronged socialleconomic/environmentalljustice movement. It is no surprise that
consistent with the expectation of the typology, each of these EOs also participated in
some form of oppositional political advocacy (although the CBD to a somewhat lesser
extent), which should be expected from any social movement-style EO. Here we can see
how the drive to include a multitude of voices and concerns is connected with wider-cast,
more movement-oriented and contentious political advocacy.
Contrarily, other EOs have the tendency to narrowly define their purpose as very
distinct from that ofother organizations. These EOs approach environmental problems
much differently. Instead of casting the net wide, they hone in on specific, particularized
goals with finite definitions for success. In this way they are able to prove to their
constituencies that progress is being made, thereby maintaining those sources of support.
Membership-driven EOs such as the *NEPS and FSEEE depend on monthly $35
contributions to maintain their day-to-day operations, and thus, must define their goals
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narrowly to establish these revenue-generating successes. The FSEEE furthermore exists
within the Forest Service, which also has a purview-narrowing effect. These EOs have
found a niche that they see as distinct enough from the rest of the environmental
movement to necessitate a more specific focus. Also, some EO's narrowly define their
mission so as to avoid association with other EOs that they feel are detrimental to
successful environmental legislation. Organizations such as the *Environmental
Consultants consider their efforts better spent on single, narrowly-defined efforts.
Without a membership or 501 C-3 tax status, the *EC is different from the other EOs I
examined, and is more concerned with maintaining partnerships with established entities
than cultivating solidarity with a diverse array of movement-style organizations. The
AFT emerged to address the concerns of ranchers and farmers, whose interests are often
in conflict with those of the environmental movement. The CRC defines their mission
narrowly in order to maintain sufficient credibility with the public. EOs such as these are
leery about being perceived as aligned with movement-style organizations such as the
NFC, whose staunch stances and uncompromising politics could be viewed as mistimed
polarizing efforts that result in obstacles to effective environmental legislation. As would
be expected from the typology, none of these organizations opposed any of the landmark
political events, and each constructs their political advocacy in relatively cooperative and
conciliatory manners. Here we can see how the impetus to delineate a narrowly defined
set of goals is connected to political advocacy that is oriented more towards cooperation
with political currents in Washington DC than toward systematic disruption or that which
might be perceived as divisive.
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It is curious that this pursuit of avoiding divisiveness is connected to an exclusive
identity that often results in fragmentation between EOs. A desire to include as many
voices as possible is seen by these EOs as potentially controversial (or simply outside
their purview), and thus avoided. The reason this is not ironic is that it illustrates a
perceptible disconnect in perspective: from whom are we divided? To the EOs in the
inclusive identity camp, separation from Washington political elites is acceptable, as long
as the fissures between similarly-minded EOs can be minimized. To the EOs in the
exclusive identity camp, separation from Washington political elites must be minimized,
while fissures between EOs can be largely disregarded. From either perspective,
divisiveness is seen as the problem, it is just that they disagree upon whom they should
and should not encourage, or minimize divisions.
This dynamic traces the rift between these two types of EOs that is evidenced by
the typology. EOs with an identity that tends to be inclusive of that of other EOs will tend
to engage in oppositional political advocacy, such as that of Greenpeace, Julia 'Butterfly'
Hill's Engage Network and Tim Hermach's Native Forest Council. However, EOs with
an identity that tends to be exclusive of that of other EOs will tend to engage in non-
oppositional political advocacy, such as that of "Mike Jones'" *Environmental
Consultants and the American Farmland Trust. However, the very inclusive *National
Environmental Protection Society does not engage in political advocacy that would be
considered oppositional, which disconfirms the typology. This will be explained better
below when I account for the member vs. donor-dependent resources, however initially it
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would appear that inclusivity of identity is a better predictor of oppositionality of political
advocacy for smaller, less resource intense EOs than it is for the larger EOs.
Some remarkable examples illustrate further the nuances of this complex set of
relationships. Interestingly, Ms. Shimmel of the Cascade Raptor Center did not view her
organization as a political advocacy organization, yet she did consider her efforts part of
the environmental movement. This suggests that the environmental movement itself is
much larger and multi-varied than I had imagined. If the most exclusive, least political,
least oppositional EO I could find still considers itself part of the movement, then the
terrain is vast indeed. Prior to this analysis, I would have discussed the environmental
movement as existing within the bounds of advocacy. EOs that do not consider what they
do to be political advocacy, such as some nature centers, hunting groups and
domesticated animal groups, would lie outside the movement's rubric, even if their
general intentions might overlap from time to time. This was the separation between
movement-style EOs and non-movement style EOs that seemed so clear prior to having
that conversation with Ms. Shimmel. However, if an organization envisions itself as part
of the environmental movement, then its collective intent becomes aligned, at least
relatively, to the movement, thereby warranting its classification as such. In the context
of our discussion Ms. Shimmel admitted that there are obvious political implications to
her EO's work, however they minimize the direct connections between politics and their
rehabilitation and education work. Thus the environmental movement is even more
ideologically diverse than I had originally understood, in that it includes even those
organizations that do not consider what they do to be political advocacy.
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Similarly, Mr. Kaye at the IAE mentioned that as they do not engage in any form
of litigation or lobbying, their form of applied ecology does not represent political
advocacy per se. Their restoration projects are contracted rather than pursued, and their
research is aimed at providing policy makers with "neutral facts" from which to make
more informed policy decisions. Again however, as their efforts are to increase
environmental health and viability, a proposition that certain political entities would
certainly oppose, by my definition, they indeed do engage in (an albeit somewhat indirect
and certainly non-oppositional form of) political advocacy. However, unlike most other
EOs that do not engage in oppositional political advocacy, the IAE has a relatively
inclusive identity, in that they explain that their mission has "broad overlap" with that of
many other EOs. This tension brings this complex relationship into clarity: if the EO
perceives what it does as advocacy, directly persuading political elites of a particular
agenda, then an inclusive identity draws them into oppositional political advocacy.
However, if the EO does not consider what it does advocacy, and instead attempts to
minimize the political implications of its work in order to maintain legitimacy and
perceived neutrality, then it does not matter how inclusive their identity is; the de/acto
political advocacy that they engage in will be decidedly non-oppositional.
Most EOs employ some form of technological environmental discourse, at least in
terms of the ability of scientific measurement to establish environmental damage. The
two EOs I spoke to with the least faith in the capacity of science to adequately measure
the extent of the crisis were predictably (considering the typology) also quite capable of
oppositional political advocacy: the NFC and Julia 'Butterfly' Hill. The NFC emerges
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repeatedly as the quintessential small, oppositional EO, 62 and although Mr. Hermach
himself utilizes scientific data frequently, he nonetheless vehemently decries the ability
ofthe GAO to assess the value of wild lands. He adds passionate punctuation to this by
advocating use ofthe death penalty for the "bean-counters" who make "Sophie's choice"
and thus sell out their children. Therefore, although Mr. Hermach relies on certain
scientific data to do his job, his resentment for the GAO and the typical implementation
of scientific-rationalist management of wild areas was palpable, and is intimately
connected to his unique form of oppositional political advocacy. However, the political
advocacy of Ms. Hill is beyond merely oppositional. While it is true that she takes what
she describes as "fierce" stances, she does so from such a compassionate and grounded
way that she is able to practice her techniques of "connectivity" throughout her political
advocacy. Although this is a form of oppositional political advocacy, it nonetheless
represents such a cohesive and interconnected form that it deserves mention. Indeed, one
thing that becomes abundantly clear through this research is that division weakens the
environmental movement as a whole. If other organizations could internalize this factor,
they might be able to find ways to advocate fiercely while maintaining compassionate
interconnection. What this would look like is still not completely clear to me, but it seems
that her model offers the environmental movement its best hope in reconciling these
bifurcating influences.
EOs that seek to remain amiable towards the concerns of the farming, logging,
fishing and ranching industries, as well as toward wild game and outdoor recreation
62 With the inclusivity of their identity being the only possible exception: inclusive of many causes,
exclusive ofthe many other EOs who have, in their eyes, 'sold out'
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groups, pretty much universally employ a discourse that emphasizes the human right to
sustainably consume natural areas. EOs that employ this discourse of exploitation are
frequently associated with less oppositional political advocacy, as they attempt not to
disturb industrial and membership ties that might be threatened by policy proposals that
appear biocentric. Conversely, EOs that break from this interpretation and instead value
the natural world intrinsically, for its own sake, tend to engage in more oppositional
political advocacy. This is because appreciating wild areas for their intrinsic value is
anathema to the principles of the free market, which emphasize the calculation of
exchange and use value, and which reduce all items to commodities. As free market
principles are afforded overwhelming bipartisan Beltway support, any departure from
that form of political advocacy becomes oppositional. The NFC's hard line, zero-cut
stance is exemplary of the EO that does not engage in exploitation discourse much at all,
but does engage in oppositional political advocacy. However the AFT's advocacy on
behalf of farmers is quite the opposite in both regards. The punishments that Mr.
Hermach wishes upon his adversaries shows, in a rather extreme example, how departure
from exploitation discourse is linked with oppositional political advocacy. Ms. Hill also
demonstrated this connection, although her vehement stances against industry and
technology are much more forgiving and tempered, which seems to be fueled by her
philosophical path of connectivity. Inversely, the guarded caution of Mr. Stuart's
responses illustrates the way that exploitation discourse is connected to non-oppositional
political advocacy. His apprehension to even be referred to as an EO was indicative of his
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awareness that his bread is buttered elsewhere. Attempting to avoid political advocacy is,
albeit inadvertently, engaging in the least oppositional form of political advocacy.
The details above enrich our understanding about the relationship between the
three discourses: inc1usivity, technological and exploitation, and the types of political
advocacy in which EOs in the US engage. This confirms what we already know about the
environmental movement as well, in that the degrees and types of rhetorical connections
to industry (such as excluding non industry-friendly groups, having a propensity to
employ technological andlor exploitation discourse) have substantial effects on the
behavior of groups within the environmental movement. In other words, institutionalized
and industry-friendly strands of the environmental movements are less likely to confront
the mutual interests of industry and Washington DC, 63 and those strands of the
movement without those ties (inclusive of non industry-friendly groups, low propensity
to employ technological andlor exploitation discourse) are comfortably poised to oppose
the Beltway.
5.3.2 - Strategies
The methods that each EO uses to engage the world are very specific to their
particular form of political advocacy, and are interestingly connected to their various
identities and resources. Those EOs with close ties to Washington elites are not willing to
jeopardize those connections, and instead will seek intra-systemic methods to achieve
63 This is not to suggest that hunting/fishing groups necessarily follow the model of the institutionalized
EO, however it is noteworthy that none of the hunting/fishing organizations in my sample opposed any of
the landmark political events. One could speculate that this is due to some ideological connections between
most people who engage in those recreational activities and a somewhat conservative, pro-corporate bent,
although that is beyond the scope of this research. Further studies should examine these connections in
greater detail, potentially including a class/race component, as well as analysis of the influence of talk radio
and television/internet punditry.
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their solutions. For example, the pre-policy negotiations of the large, established NEPS,
and the efforts by the AFT to cooperate with industry to improve the environmental
stability of farming are both types of strategies that reflect a view of the world that needs
change, but not drastic upheaval. Their lack of inclusion of other EO voices represents
trepidation towards other EOs that try to alter the fundamental structure of the world too
severely, or too quickly. However, another group ofEOs are motivated by the belief that
change is not happening quickly enough, and thus needs to happen much more
drastically. These EOs employ a very different set of strategies, which are connected to a
different set of identities. For example, Ms. Hill's "fierce" stances are connected to her
ability to sit in a tree for over two years. The NFC's zero-cut policy marginalizes it from
other potential allies somewhat, however that very marginalization has insulated it
against the institutionalizing and professionalizing forces to which older EOs tend to
succumb. They might be on the verge of bankruptcy, but they have maintained integrity
with their mission, and with minimal assistance, will continue to be able to do so. The
interplay between the identity of the EO and the strategies they employ shows that they
are formulated in mutually reinforcing ways such that out of this nexus between identity
and strategy evolves a grand template for the normative prescriptions that EOs have for
the world, or their political advocacy.
The degree of oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy is equally
proportional to the degree of change they seek, and indeed is another way of expressing
the same concept. EO's that push for more drastic or immediate change, or efforts toward
sweeping, fundamental alterations to the very fabric of society, are engaged in more
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oppositional political advocacy. Beltway politics are thus more rigid, unified, and less
subject to fluctuations than the myriad strands of the environmental movement as a
whole. Washington responds to the movement, but the movement exerts multiple,
sometimes contradictory influences. Similar to the effects of the tide on the sand, a great
amount of counteracting energy is expended by the waves of environmentalism before
the sand of politics is forced to move.
Interestingly, the strategy of litigation was confounding. Initially I expected that
because hiring lawyers can be a relatively inflated expense, it was probably only
frequently employed by larger, more well-funded, less oppositional 64 EOs such as the
Nature Conservancy or the National Audubon Society. In the survey we asked about
litigation and lobbying as a pair. As lobbying is an even more financial resource-intensive
activity than litigation, I assumed that these would be employed more frequently by EOs
in our sample with fewer gross receipts. I also expected that those that employed
litigation and lobbying would do so in such a way as to maintain effective connections to
established elites so that future litigation and lobbying efforts would be successful.
However, in the quantitative analysis, I found the opposite: that the well-funded EOs in
the sample were not more likely to engage in litigation and lobbying, and that those that
did engage in those techniques also tended to prefer more oppositional political
advocacy. I struggled with this and determined that I must have overlooked two things.
First, litigation and lobbying are two very different techniques, and most that engage in
one do not in the other. In fact, as 501C-3 non-profit organizations, all but two ofthe EOs
64 Although Greenpeace and several other larger organizations of this type do actually engage in
oppositional political advocacy.
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I interviewed are prohibited from spending more than a very small amount of their time
and money on political campaigns. In future studies, I would like to separate these factors
and measure them independently.
Secondly, I came to the conclusion that much of the litigation that occurs is pro
bono over a particular area or species, and many small EOs, such as the Cascadia
Wildlands Project for example, have at least one lawyer in their employ. Therefore,
although many ofthe high-profile lawsuits are conducted by the large, non-oppositional
EOs, many other lawsuits ofthe smaller more oppositional EOs, represent a larger
proportion of total environmental litigation. This was bolstered by the testimony from
"Ms. Peterson," who explained that the type of litigation that the *NEPS does is
principally pre-policy, so it is not very controversial. So litigation is, as I expected,
employed by larger organizations, but it is not typically their main thrust, and it rarely if
ever is conducted in a confrontational manner. Confrontational litigation however, such
as suing a corporation for environmental damage, or filing injunctions against logging
sales, is much more oppositional, and something that smaller EOs have much more
access to than I had originally assumed.
However, in deeper exploration of the qualitative data, I found that those I
interviewed who did frequently utilize litigation tended to not employ oppositional
political advocacy, which provides support for my original hypothesis. EI for instance
works to pass legal restrictions against products that are harmful to women. This has its
adversarial character, and they have even gone so far as to support some street theater
against the products. However, their general demeanor is cooperative and the degree of
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change they ask for relatively minimal and widely respected as reasonable. They conduct
webinars and ask their constituents to write their representatives to support their
positions, but they do not get involved with political struggles outside their very
immediate mission.
Lobbying, too, I originally hypothesized, would be a technique reserved for the
large, non-oppositional EOs that could afford it. However, in both the correlation matrix
and the logistic regression, we see that this is not the case: that EOs that tend to lobby
also tend to employ some form of oppositional political advocacy, as do the EOs with
lesser coffers. The explanation that emerged was that lobbying by definition is a
somewhat confrontational technique, and that oppositional political advocates must need
to resort to it to reach crucial political channels otherwise closed to them. Also, as
mentioned above, there could be a construct validity problem due to pairing litigation and
lobbying in the original survey instrument. However, the testimony from the two EOs I
interviewed that do lobby (the *EC and the *NEPS), actually supported my original
hypothesis. The *EC spends a great deal of time lobbying in Washington, and yet "Mr.
Jones" considers himself "inside the park." He knows that there is no zero-sum game per
issue. The next issue he takes up will demand amiable relationships with the same
entities, so it does not behoove him to tread heavily. This confirms my expectations prior
to the quantitative study: lobbyists are not oppositional. This result also helps to explain
the unexpected relationship in the quantitative section: that smaller, lower-budget
organizations, such as the EC, can effectively lobby. In fact, a lobbyist on their own is the
smallest possible EO unit, and even with sizeable compensation would not compare in
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gross receipts to any of the larger organizations. The testimony from the *NEPS helped
confirm my original hypothesis as well, in that it represented a large, resource intensive
EO that can afford a large staff including multiple lobbyists, and which does not get
involved with oppositional political advocacy.
Examining the way in which these EOs discussed their educational strategies was
not particularly fruitful. It seems almost every organization has some educational
function, and each seemed to define that function differently. The AFT and CBD do
community education. The IAE, *NEPS and the CRC go into schools and teach children
environmental practices. The *NEPS, AFT and the IAE conduct environmental research.
The CBD, NFC, and FSEEE all distribute different types of information in an attempt to
educate the general public. The *EI distributes information about harmful products to
women who might avoid using them. Julia 'Butterfly' Hill trains other activists on how to
effectively engage the world. The only exception is the consultant/lobbyist, "Mr. Jones"
who largely supports the media campaigns on his issues, yet does not actively participate
in any of them. Future studies should explore these different types of education and their
implications on political advocacy more specifically, as they seem to have a substantial
effect, however the quantitative analysis does not capture this because the concepts are
not measured accurately enough in the original instrument to perform such analyses now.
Additionally, the qualitative data above suggest that there is a rich tapestry of educational
styles that warrant a more detailed exploration, and that the overlap between pedagogical
and environmental literature could herein be consulted, and ideally ultimately bolstered.
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Although I had originally hypothesized in the quantitative chapter that EOs
preferring alliance formation as a strategy would be less likely to engage in oppositional
political advocacy, I found the opposite to be the case, and it was the strongest odds ratio
effect of any in my model. I sought to explain this by suggesting that oppositional EOs
would need to reach out to other organizations actively in order to minimize the negative
implications of their less compromising stances, and as such would spend a greater
portion of their energy cultivating those alliances. This is thus not a measure oftheir
connectedness via alliances, but instead a measure of upon what they focus. Put another
way, it is more an index for what an EO wants, than what they have.
The interviews were particularly revealing as well, with regards to why EOs who
might not have many alliances due to the oppositionality of their political advocacy,
would devote energy toward acquiring them. Although nearly every EO explained that
they pursued alliances in one form or another, there were two interesting exceptions (the
NFC and the FSEEE), the first of which helps clarify this disconnect between my
expectations and quantitative results. The NFC's answers to questions concerning their
preferred strategies achieved a factor score in the top quintile of my sample on alliance
formation, suggesting that relative to others, the NFC tries to cultivate alliances. In the
interviews Mr. Hermach seemed to focus more on his list of adversaries, suggesting that
allies are something that the CBD indeed does need to cultivate, and should and probably
does devote substantial time and energy to acquiring. This is probably partly because they
have burned quite a few bridges among potential allies, they thus seem to have very few
remaining, particularly locally. This is a direct consequence of the oppositionality of their
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political advocacy, as their uncompromising stances and critical assessments of other
EOs place strains on potential alliances.
Unlike the NFC however, the FSEEE spends next to no effort cultivating
alliances, and even celebrates its "lone wolf' status. They explicitly form no symbolic
alliances of any kind. They will not even rhetorically endorse a campaign unless they are
willing to devote considerable time, energy, personnel, and financial resources to it, and
then see it through to its completion. As an organization inside the federal Government,
the FSEEE has a unique location and vantage. It is understandable then when Mr. Stahl
explains that they care very much about how they are perceived by the government and
the public, but do not care about how they are perceived by other EOs. This confines their
political advocacy to intra-systemic channels, which are (almost by definition) not
oppositional, which helps support the typology 65 as it shows that a lack of interest in
alliances is associated with non-oppositional political advocacy. Mr. Stahl appeared quite
conscious that their lack of interest in alliances is precisely because they need to cultivate
relationships within the system that they want to persuade, but not necessarily oppose.
Mr. Stahl also explained however, that they defend whistleblowers, which has
always struck me as a brave stance to take. It is indeed directly confrontational to use the
legal apparatus of the state to expose its own transgressions. To whatever extent the
actions of the FSEEE are perceived by relevant government entities as a threat (a
seemingly necessary threshold for any credible authority), their political advocacy is
oppositional. In this regard, the typology is again problematized, however my original
65 in both the correlation matrix as well as in the logistic regression
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hypothesis is supported. It is essentially the counterpart to the hypothesis that alliance-
makers do not tend to engage in oppositional political advocacy: In this case, an alliance-
rejecter is engaging in somewhat oppositional political advocacy.
These data provide greater clarity to the typology. They are not entirely
corroborative, however where the typology breaks down (such as over some ofthe
reasons why the quantitative study did not reveal my expectations concerning litigation,
lobbying and political advocacy), we see the expected social forces at work. Namely, that
the strategic choices that EOs make are intimately connected to their identities, and more
importantly, to their particular forms of political advocacy. Furthermore, the data
highlight the complex patterns that underlie the environmental movement as a whole. The
ways that the various EOs have emerged at their respective historical periods has great
bearing on the strategic choices they make, and as well on the ways that they then
behave. The one thing that I did not find was much conflict between the groups over
strategy. I did not officially interview any environmental activists who would defend
illegal actions of any kind, so my sample does not encompass the debate on property
destruction, which left a whole host of potential strategies open to whomever wished to
or could afford to employ them. Apparently there is very little resentment between
conflicting EOs on the basic cannon of organizational activity. The one obvious
exception is alliance formation, which speaks to the somewhat dismal state of the
environmental movement today. Many EOs talk solidarity politics, but when it comes
down to it, are unwilling to recognize common ground. Those that openly admit to being
averse to cooperation I admire in terms of honesty, but if there is one thing that this
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research suggests, it is that until cooperative, comprehensive strategies are coordinated
collectively, it seems that the environmental movement will remain incapable of
sufficiently ameliorating environmental degradation.
5.3.3 - Resources
Perhaps the greatest contribution that the Resource Mobilization Theorists have
made to our understandings of the modem environmental movement is that the structures,
behaviors, messages, successes and failures of the environmental movement are at least
partially determined by the types, amounts, and sources of their resources, financial and
otherwise. We can see these relationships playing out in the interviews, revealing the way
that resources affect the identities, strategies, and political advocacy of these EOs. The
pattern of these relationships between the EOs and their resources then helps us map the
undercurrents of the environmental movement itself.
Initially noteworthy is the confirmation of the parsimony of the resource variables
from the previous chapter (see 4.6.8 above): Larger EOs such as the *NEPS tend to
gamer substantial public and/or government support, pay competitive salaries to a
sizeable staff, bring in substantial financial resources and attract numerous volunteers.
Interestingly, despite their wealth relative to other EOs, they nonetheless feel
constrained, as "Ms Peterson" explained, in their spending as well as in their staff human-
hour resources (resource inefficiency). This constraint creates a drive to secure ever more
resources, accelerating the 'treadmill of donation:' further professionalization, a tailoring
of objectives to reflect a narrow set of pragmatic interests and a conservatization of
political advocacy. Thus in order to secure future contributions from donors, EOs such as
249
the American Farmland Trust, and the Institute for Applied Ecology will tend to engage
in less oppositional political advocacy. Contrarily, smaller, less financially viable EOs
such as the Native Forest Council are unconstrained in their political advocacy, and thus
free to vehemently oppose not only those with whom they are in direct conflict, but also
other EOs with similar yet distinct sets of goals (who could possibly otherwise serve as
allies). This confirms the typological conclusion that resource rich EOs tend to pursue
less oppositional political advocacy than those with more modest budgets.
However, the typology is disconfirmed by Greenpeace, whose growth into an EO
with substantial budgets has not resulted in a conservatizing influence over their political
advocacy. This is because EOs such as Greenpeace receive their money from a large
number of small, individual membership contributions, and EOs such as the *NEPS
receive their funds primarily from a small number of large donations. The large donations
have the effect of channeling the EOs efforts into more pragmatic avenues, and likewise,
those EOs with close ties to their memberships will pursue more dramatic, theatrical and
provocative activities that are more likely to secure the individual contributions. Thus the
typology shows that resources matter, and these data show that the sources of those
resources matter as well: donor-driven EOs are less oppositional than membership-driven
EOs.
5.3.4 - Typology Refinement
As explained above, these data include numerous confirmations of the typology.
The two variables that emerge as the most salient and explanatory are the inclusivity of
their identities and the financial scale of the EO. The concept of inclusivity initially
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perplexed me, because I predicted that an inclusive EO would be focused more on
coalition building on all fronts, rather than maintaining staunch stances on particular
issues, and thus would be predisposed toward a non-oppositional form of political
advocacy. However, I found in the quantitative section that inclusive EOs are actually
more inclined toward oppositional political advocacy. It became clear at that point that I
was missing something. At that point I decided that the problem was perspective: what is
it that is being included? If inclusivity of identity means including issues that are
perceived as more provocative by the general public then it should indeed be associated
with oppositional political advocacy, and inversely, excluding those views would be a
move away from oppositional political advocacy. This was a useful but not wholly
satisfactory explanation for me however, because it did not take into account the intuitive
connection between inclusivity and cooperative, non-oppositional dialogue. It essentially
explained the relationship from one direction while not addressing the counter
explanation from another.
In examining further the qualitative data, it became clear that indeed, there is a
positive connection between inclusivity and non-oppositional political advocacy as I had
originally hypothesized, such that EOs like the *NEPS utilize their inclusive approach to
cultivate and maintain alliances or at least non-adversarial relationships with and within
the political system. In order to explain the complex interaction between these
contradictory influences, it became necessary to take both resources and identities into
consideration, but with a primacy on the fomler. The point here is not that the model
should give any greater importance to resources over identities (or to structure over
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ideology) 66 but that the logic of the typology requires assessing resources first (see
Figure 1). The qualitative data suggests that a refinement in the typology is necessary,
because while all of the EOs that I spoke to that engage in oppositional political advocacy
are member-driven, not all of the non-oppositional EOs are donor-driven (e.g., FSEEE,
CRC). There is variation in identity among both oppositional and non-oppositional EOs,
which suggests that the form of resources needs to be assessed first.
~mall, Minimal
. Financial Resources
Large, Substantial
Financial Resources
Inclusive
Identity
Oppositional
Political
Advocacy
Exclusive
Identity
Member-
Driven
Non-Oppositional
Political
Advocacy
- -~Donor
Driven
Figure 1. Typology refinement.
66 Although this may indeed be the case that this is an indication of structure's conceptual primacy over
ideology, it is a subject for future analysis. It is my supposition that resources and identities are equal1y
important in the determination of political advocacy and that their logical order in the above typology
refinement is due merely to the logic of the determination itself: by definition, there are no small EOs that
received large sums from a few donors, but there are large EOs that have inclusive identities, so the size of
the organization must be resolved first. This lends credence to the logical but not conceptual primacy of
determining source of resource (structure) prior to inclusivity of identity (ideology).
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Among those EOs that do gamer substantial financial resources, those that receive
a preponderance from their membership are more likely to participate in oppositional
political advocacy (e.g., Greenpeace) than those that receive a preponderance from a
handful ofdonors (e.g., *NEPS), identity notwithstanding, this supports existing research
(Dreiling, 2001) on the importance of resource sources on EO advocacy behavior.
Additionally, among those that gamer minimal financial resources, those that have an
identity inclusive of that of other organizations (e.g., Julia'Butterfly' Hill) are more
likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than those that have a less
inclusive identity (e.g., *Environmental Consultants), resource source notwithstanding
(donor- vs. membership-driven). 67 Thus among small organizations, the inclusivity
versus exclusivity of identity is what is most important in determining the EO's
oppositionality of political advocacy. However, among large organizations,
oppositionality of political advocacy is more influenced by whether the largesse is from a
multitude of members or a small number of donors (see Figure 1). The typology can be
refined in this manner to produce more accurate results, but only if the size of the
organization is taken into consideration first.
5.3.5 - Oppositionality of Political Advocacy
Although the original typology is generally correct in that resources matter in
their ability to exert influence over the oppositionality of an EO's political advocacy, it is
not until the above refinement is applied that some of the intricacies of the relationships
become apparent. Therefore, if we examine first the size/financiallargesse of the EO, and
67 Because there are no small EOs that received large sums from a few donors
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then assess from where the resources come, and then the inclusivity/exclusivity of their
identity, we can more illustratively explore this dynamic. Consider a spectrum of political
advocacy from oppositional to non-oppositional (see Figure 2), and each EO sitting
somewhere within that spectrum.
The development of the concept of oppositionality of political advocacy has been
consistent throughout this analysis, and is perhaps the only variable that was not
significantly problematized in the process. 68 It operates as a valid measure because it
seems to capture the overall degree of change that the EO proposes to the world, both
conceptually and materially. Non-oppositional groups such as the AFT do not ask for
revolutionary change, but instead strive for incremental and pragmatic reforms to protect
specific farmlands. The NFC on the extreme other end of the spectrum seeks nothing
short of a complete revolution in our entire political/economic/military system, with the
alternative being suicide. Somewhere on the political advocacy scale less oppositional
than the NFC would be Julia 'Butterfly' Hill and Greenpeace, who both take fierce
stances, yet do so in as cooperative and compassionate ways as they can, and ground their
methods in the example led by Dr. King and Gandhi. Just a bit less oppositional still
would be the Center for Biological Diversity and *Ecofeminism International, who
pursue their issues passionately, but are incapable of direct action or even substantial
lobbying. Somewhere in the middle, depending on the issue, would be the *EC, who
remain close to industrial and political elites, but probably represent the most
68 Other than in tenns of problematizing the dichotomous nature of the variable and asserting a mitigating
degree, which is the point of this very analysis, however unlike the other variables, nothing contradictory to
expectation was found.
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revolutionary voice within those circles. Leaning now towards the non-oppositional end
of the spectrum would be the CRC, who consider themselves part of the movement, but
refuse to support any form of advocacy on ballot measures or candidates. The FSEEE is
less oppositional still, as it operates within the government bureaucracy itself, and is only
confrontational in its strategic platform of whistleblower defense. The *NEPS is not
particularly confrontational at all, yet its allies might gain it a scornful eye from some of
the more reactionary elements in Washington. The IAE has some critique of industrial
practices, yet is very integrated with the corporate elite. And as mentioned above, the
AFT is the least oppositional of the eleven EO with whom I spoke.
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Figure 2. Oppositionality of political advocacy scale.
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This conceptual spectrum of political advocacy aligns with the refined typology,
as well. Ifwe think of the spectrum as a scale (see Figure 2) then we can think of each
refined variable as a weight to be added, in the appropriate order, to one or the other side
of the scale, from which the reading would represent the degree of oppositionality of the
EO's political advocacy. The concepts that represent the weights on the oppositional side
would be an EO that is small and resource deficient EO (small); if not small, then has a
member-driven resource base (member-driven); and if small, then has an inclusive
identity (inclusive). The concepts that represent the weights on the non-oppositional side
would be an EO that is large and resource rich EO (large); with a donor-driven resource
base (donor-driven); and if small, then has an exclusive identity (exclusive). Thus most
EOs would have some form of conflicting or balancing influences in some regard,
thereby determining their degree of oppositionality of political advocacy. This weighted
spectrum takes the refinements of the typology into consideration and allows more
accurate predictions of political advocacy.
5.4 - Conclusion
This template helps describe the landscape of the environmental movement as
well, because it illustrates the rift between those EOs with political advocacy that
confrontationally demands fundamental change, and those that see more pragmatic
solutions as holding greater promise for securing environmental health. The relationships
between the EOs I studied led me to four major observations about the environmental
movement. First is that the movement itself is not very oppositional. Second, that it is
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even more diverse than I had imagined. Third, that the intersection of structure and
ideology best explains movement behavior. Fourth, that the movement is not only
diverse, but also fragmented and factionalized, and unless some intra-movement politics
of inclusion can be constructed in a more systematic and lasting way, the environmental
movement may become even more fragmented and ineffectual.
First, the environmental movement is currently in a cycle of low oppositional
character. There are some organizations that still practice confrontational political
advocacy such as civil disobedience, indicating the potential for disruptive politics to
emerge amid the more conciliatory practices. However, the vast majority of organizations
that were in my sample, as well as those that I spoke to, expressed either a lack of interest
or lack of ability to engage in political advocacy that is exceptionally confrontational.
The path of the EO is to start oppositional, but to grow into a donor-driven bureaucracy
without that capacity. If less oppositional EOs could appreciate the value of the
reasonable yet oppositional voice of their sister EOs, perhaps more successful coalitions
between the various loci of the environmental movement could be more effectively
coordinated in more concerted yet diversified efforts.
Second, the environmental movement is incredibly ideologically diverse, and
even more so than I had originally understood. The above analysis reflects just a small
cross-section of the movement, but even so, it includes at least one voice from most ends
of the conceivable spectra. It even apparently includes even those organizations that do
not consider what they do to be political advocacy, such as the CRC. The NSM scholars
in the 80's taught us that diversity can be a strength, as it can provide the movement an
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apparatus for reaching the multitude of concerns that would be necessary to solve the
complex social issue at hand, in this case true environmental sustainability. As we as a
society begin to collectively address the very real threat of anthropogenic climate change,
we will need to build on those diverse strengths forged out of the unique experience of
each struggle.
Third, the intersection of structure and ideology best explains movement
behavior. There is one bifurcation of the movement more motivated by structure (the less
oppositional wing) and another by ideology (the more oppositional wing) however the
bulk of the movement lies in the intersection between them. The sectors of the movement
that are financially intense are more subject to the structural concerns of the paths of
financial transfer, while those that are financially minimalist are more subject to the
ideological concerns of their inclusivity of identity. The patterns revealed by the EOs I
studied show these intricately interconnected influences and thus reveal the undercurrents
to the environmental movement itself.
Finally, the "disease of disconnect" that Ms. Hill warns us about is truly the
greatest threat to the environment and social justice. The fragmented and factionalized
state of the current environmental movement is the symptom. Forging cross-
organizational dialogues will help facilitate conceptualizations ofthe level of cooperative
and coordinated efforts that will be necessary to confront the deepening social and
environmental crises ahead. Thus hopefully the environmental movement will continue to
expand its inclusive identities, so that it can address the myriad issues that the coming
years have in store.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Make no mistake; human beings are on the precipice. We are a species that is
incredibly versatile, clever, and adaptable however, so we do have the capacity to design
a just and sustainable society. It will first require that we collectively and cooperatively
address the severity of the challenges ahead. The mounting evidence for the deepening of
various environmental crises, not the least of which is anthropogenic climate change, is
becoming increasingly incontrovertible. The interconnected issues of environmental
racism, poverty, sexism, human rights violations, militarism, toxics exposure,
unsustainable industrial practices, rampant consumerism, population pressures and
regressive economics are fused together by mutually supporting forces (domination,
profit maximization, exploitation, etc.) that foster institutions and coalitions of groups of
powerful elites that act in many ways more cohesively than the social movements poised
to address them. A collective will capable of ameliorating this interconnected web of
crises will require an equally interconnected public dialogue that includes as many voices
as there are concerns.
In some ways, there does not seem to be sufficient solidarity between these social
movements to effectively counter this deepening multifaceted
social/environmental/economic problem, and many of the movements suffer from a lack
of internal cohesion as well. The fragmentary nature of the EOs in my sample
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underscored those tensions in the environmental movement proper, and helps illustrate
the fissures that need to be recognized. Once we do, we can begin to map a more
cooperative environmental movement that can function more internally cohesively, as
well as with other social movements.
These fissures are far from absolute, and recognizing them does not necessarily
give them more power. It is not my aim to reify these barriers, but rather to expose and
challenge them, notice where they break down and how, and seek ways to bridge beyond
them. For instance, on the FSEEE's campaign against the toxic tree paint that had
deleterious impacts on women, a dialogue between the FSEEE and *EI might have been
mutually beneficial to both organizations. Granted the FSEEE was successful in their
struggle anyway, and there could be a risk of redundancy (as *EI had several concurrent
successes as well), however some degree of cooperative communication seemed possible,
had those channels existed. Had they reached out to each other over this issue, even
minimally, they would have contributed to the development of collective communication
channels. Both EOs however consistently displayed an exclusive identity, thereby
limiting the chances of that dialogue. This is only one example of how tracing the fissures
within the organizations that comprise the movement illustrates the potential avenues of
internal cohesion for the environmental movement as a whole, and that can be buttressed
through collective dialogue.
Furthermore, what I uncovered above about the importance of identities in
detern1ining EO's advocacy behavior, also informs us about its importance in the
environmental movement proper. The most salient identity component that emerged in
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both the quantitative and qualitative analyses was the concept of inclusivity. All others
things being equal, the more inclusive the mission of the EO, the more contrarian its
advocacy tended to be, and most EOs in my sample were not particularly inclusive. To a
certain extent, this explains the crossroads to which the movement itself has come.
Should the movement retain its compartmentalized nature in order to not lose ground, or
should it bridge internally and externally in order to collectively address these crises? The
trend seems to be towards the former, but the latter camp is alive and thriving at multiple
strata of the movement - from large EOs like Greenpeace to single activists such as Julia
'Butterfly' Hill. These points push the movement towards inclusion, however it is unclear
if the organizational limitations (professionalization, donor-driven interests, and political
conciliation) are surmountable. Some transitional EOs, such as the CBD have bridged
these concerns to a certain extent (by maintaining alliances and a contentious political
stance without becoming completely ostracized by the Beltway), however others at both
ends of the spectrum have retrenched. The large, donor-driven organizations and the
smaller, club/nature center/recreation organizations orient themselves increasingly
exclusively. This is not to belittle or blame what they do. Indeed, if anything, this
analysis proves that we must look beyond such divisions to actualize the full strength of
the environmental movement.
Some EOs are not EMOs, in that they do not act consciously as part of the
movement. However, many of these groups, such as Ducks Unlimited (a sport hunting
habitat conservation group) have overlapping concerns with all who wish to have healthy
environments. They often seek, among other things, habitat protection, wetlands
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restoration, and toxics removal. We must therefore consider them as a part of the
environmental movement, even if they claim not to be. Furthermore, as surprised as I was
to find the local raptor recovery and nature center consider themselves part of the
environmental movement, it nonetheless affirms the importance of widening our scope.
They did not consider their work advocacy, yet they did consider the center's work a part
of the environmental movement. The ideological diversity of the environmental
movement was then shown to be even greater than the literature had suggested, in that it
was impossible to fairly exclude multiple environmental identities from the umbrella.
Thus as my analysis of EO identities reveals, environmental movement theorists need to
expand what we consider to be the outer boundaries of the environmental movement as a
first step toward building a common discursive terrain that might have the capacity to
contribute to the above-stated crucially important collective environmental discourse.
The relationship between the strategies that EOs employ and their political
advocacy also tells us about the state of the environmental movement as a whole. Initially
it is important to note that the strategic rigidity that so characterized wings of the
environmental movement ofthe 70's and 80's no longer seems to be as polarized. Rather
than being locked into narrow defenses of particular strategic platforms, the modern EO
seems to be more capable of viewing strategies as tools in a toolbox, with a "range of
strategic possibilities which they tend to make use of depending on the given political
problem" (Hje1mar, 1996). Additionally, although the EOs themselves have gained a
greater ability to select from the range of appropriate strategies, that range itself is
somewhat more limited than it was thirty years ago, because some of the most disruptive
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techniques have all but been abandoned. 69 This, combined with the time elapsed since
9/11, helps explain the recent centering effect of strategies: as moderately adversarial
techniques (such as litigation and lobbying) are perceived less negatively under a
Democratic Congress and Executive, and since terrorist attacks are not quite so fresh in
the American consciousness, and since the most disruptive tactics have all but been
removed from the movement's repertoire, the EOs within the movement are at greater
liberty to select the strategy that is most appropriate given their particular situation and
context, than they were in previous eras. This was supported by the testimony from those
I spoke with as well as by the lack of significant indicators in the quantitative model. The
environmental movement as a whole is less polarized strategically and more capable of
flexible application of a wide range of relatively reasonable yet often confrontational
strategic platforms than it was 20-30 years ago. Should this connection between my
findings and the movement as a whole be correct, this bodes well for the movement's
growing capacity to abandon rigid interpretations that hinder progress and instead
embrace the diversity of the movement and address all social/environmental crises as
interconnected challenges.
The relations,hip between an EO, its resources, and its political advocacy is
predictably strong, but what is revealed by my analysis is that greater attention to the
sources of financial supports needs to be incorporated in future analyses of EOs. This
analysis shows however that larger, more financially stable organizations will tend to
have greater professionalized leadership, and will receive their money from sources
69 Tree spiking was endorsed by Earthfirst! during that era, however virtually no influential groups do
anymore.
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whose interests the EO must take into account. Although the combined influence of these
factors should discourage oppositional advocacy behavior, EOs such as Greenpeace are
capable of engaging in contentious politics, yet have a well-funded, professionalized
leadership. Thus the 'treadmill of donation' which locks some EOs into a constant drive
to secure ever greater funds from influential donors in order to keep from losing ground,
and which conservatizes their political advocacy toward that of the donor, does not
actually apply to membership-driven organizations. The grassroots approach avoids the
trap of the treadmill. Thus if the environmental movement is capable of developing a
more inclusive dialogue that promotes wider, more grassroots support among society, the
movement will more likely represent the ideas of its constituencies, and thus promote
participation by the membership.
The lack of conservatizing effect from public and government supports on
political advocacy as supported by some of the literature (Chaves, 2004) as well as by my
findings suggests that expanding federal funding for ecological protection might benefit
the environmental movement by decreasing its dependence on special interests and by
further institutionalizing the environmental ethic into the American governmental
bureaucracy.
The single greatest goal of this research project was to make some (albeit
modest) contribution to the development of a collective dialogue capable of addressing
the crises confronting the environmental movement. I do this by tracing the contours of
the rifts between and within EOs and thus the environmental movement as a whole, and
by trying to account for the complex interaction of forces that sharpen and/or soften the
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fractures. By exposing the contradictions in the expected results of the model that I
develop, the complexities in the relationships between identities, strategies, resources and
the oppositionality of political advocacy emerge, bolstering a nuanced and interconnected
way of looking at social change that recognizes the web that bind these disparate
concerns together. To the extent that EO participants, supporters and leadership come to
recognize that environnlental problems, exist in a "multidimensional web rooted in a
larger structural crisis, then," as Rodman (1980) points out, "a transformative ecology
movement can be invented." In many ways, Rodman's aspirations thirty years ago have
come to fruition. The growth and strength of the environmental justice movement, by
those who "experience multiple and intertwined forms of social, political and economic
marginalization" (Faber & McCarthy, 2002, pA08) represents a new wave of
environmentalism that recognizes multiple layers of interconnection. "The subaltern
dimensions of the experiences of these activists has led them to focus their agenda on the
interconnections of environmental and other societal issue" (Ibid.). To the extent that this
collective understanding is still gaining momentum in the environmental movement
(Pulido, 1996), a renewed hope for a collective dialogue continues to grow. Although
internal conflicts within the movement remain an important concern, the diversity of the
movement is its greatest strength (Mertig, 1992). If these mutual understandings become
the backbone of the modem manifestation of the environmental movement and if this
strength can be channeled through a truly cooperative public dialogue that recognizes not
only the interconnections between crises but also between people, institutions and groups,
then the multi-faceted alliance of social movements should be able to expand their
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possibilities for collective action and advocacy, and may very well have the capacity to
address the monumental social and environmental challenges confronting the human
species.
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